Cha v. City of Chicago

Citations: 194 Ill. App. 3d 213; 550 N.E.2d 1198; 141 Ill. Dec. 152; 1990 Ill. App. LEXIS 112Docket: No. 1—88—1147

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; January 29, 1990; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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The License Commission of the City of Chicago suspended Hyo K. Cha's hotel/motel license for the Lakeside Motel due to findings that Cha knowingly allowed the premises to be used for prostitution, violating the Criminal Code of 1961. Cha filed a petition for writ of certiorari in Cook County, claiming the Commission's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence, but the circuit court upheld the Commission's ruling, leading to the current appeal, which was affirmed.

During the Commission's hearing, despite Cha's hearsay objections, testimony was presented by Chicago police officer Arthur Smith. Smith recounted being solicited by Rachelle Plummer for a sexual act and being led to Lakeside by her. At the motel, Smith informed Cha about the arrangement and asked if Plummer was safe, to which Cha replied affirmatively. Smith then paid Cha an additional amount for Plummer's next day's rent. 

While in the motel room, Plummer attempted to order marijuana, using the motel's switchboard, which Cha facilitated. Smith overheard Plummer's conversations, where she confirmed instructions about avoiding police, indicating Cha’s involvement in the illegal activities. As the situation unfolded, Cha attempted to prevent Plummer from leaving the room when Smith identified himself as a police officer and arrested both individuals.

Plummer, a prostitute, testified about her arrangement with the petitioner, allowing her and approximately 20 other prostitutes to work at Lakeside motel. Petitioner provides motel rooms to those without payment, charging the clients upfront for the rental fee. Since January 1987, Plummer has brought 25-30 clients to the motel. On April 16, 1987, she offered sexual services to a man named Smith for $35, who instead gave her $100, but he did not arrest her. She signed a registration card for her room, falsely certifying it was not for illegal purposes. Petitioner claimed he was unaware of her prostitution when he rented the room to her from April 13 to April 16, later stating she had been there for three weeks due to illness. On April 16, after Plummer and Smith arrived, Smith paid for the room. Petitioner informed Plummer via phone that the room registration was solely in her name, allowing only one occupant, and he called her twice more about this policy before her arrest. The document emphasizes the legal standard for reviewing administrative agency findings, stating that such findings are presumed correct unless clearly contradicted by evidence. It concludes that conflicting testimony typically favors the agency's determinations.

Petitioner contests the Commission's suspension of his license, arguing that it lacked a specific basis. However, the Commission cited section 11.17(a) of the Code, indicating that on April 16, 1987, petitioner knowingly allowed his premises to be used for prostitution, which is sufficient for the suspension. Petitioner also claims there was no evidence he knowingly arranged prostitution, referencing section 11.15(a)(2), but this section was not included in the suspension order, so this argument does not need consideration. Furthermore, petitioner argues that the Commission relied on inadmissible hearsay from Officer Smith's testimony. Despite acknowledging that hearsay is generally inadmissible, the court finds sufficient competent evidence exists outside of this testimony to support the Commission's decision. Evidence demonstrated that Plummer, identified as a prostitute, had an arrangement with petitioner allowing her to operate from his motel. Petitioner accepted payment for the motel room from Smith, who was engaging with Plummer. Petitioner’s defense based on a registration card is deemed unpersuasive, as it merely reflects a formality rather than the true intent of the parties. The Commission is entitled to evaluate witness credibility and evidence, and the circuit court upheld the Commission's decision, affirming the suspension.