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Bank of Elk Grove v. City of Joliet

Citations: 171 Ill. App. 3d 321; 525 N.E.2d 569; 121 Ill. Dec. 511; 1988 Ill. App. LEXIS 934Docket: No. 3-87-0786

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; June 24, 1988; Illinois; State Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, the Bank of Elk Grove challenged the City of Joliet's denial of its applications for rezoning, a special use permit, and planned unit development for a 65-acre tract. The city council had denied these applications following a negative recommendation from the plan commission, requiring a two-thirds majority vote as per the city's zoning ordinance. The Bank contended that this supermajority requirement was invalid under the Illinois Municipal Code, which only allows such a requirement in response to a written protest. The trial court initially ruled in favor of the City, asserting the ordinance was procedural and did not require reenactment upon Joliet becoming a home rule municipality. However, upon appeal, the court found that the supermajority provision was void at its inception in 1968 and remained unenforceable despite the city's later home rule status. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, emphasizing that the lack of statutory authority rendered the supermajority requirement invalid, thus necessitating further proceedings to assess the zoning applications under a simple majority rule.

Legal Issues Addressed

Home Rule Authority and Procedural Rules

Application: The case addressed the city's argument that its home rule status allowed it to maintain a supermajority requirement, which was ultimately rejected as the ordinance was not reenacted post-home rule acquisition.

Reasoning: The trial court ruled in favor of the City, concluding it did not need to reenact the supermajority requirement after attaining home rule status, viewing the ordinance as procedural.

Precedent and Supermajority Provisions in Zoning Laws

Application: The court drew parallels to prior cases invalidating similar supermajority provisions, reinforcing the lack of statutory support for such rules.

Reasoning: This requirement, deemed void upon adoption, parallels findings in Traders Development Corp. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, which invalidated a similar supermajority provision due to a lack of statutory authority.

Statutory Authority and Zoning Amendments

Application: The decision rests on the lack of statutory authorization for a supermajority requirement in the absence of a written protest, rendering the ordinance provision unenforceable.

Reasoning: The plaintiff contended that the supermajority requirement was void upon its adoption in 1968, as the Illinois Municipal Code only permitted such a requirement in response to a written protest against proposed amendments.

Validity of Supermajority Requirement in Zoning Ordinances

Application: The court examined whether a supermajority vote requirement in Joliet's zoning ordinance was valid, concluding it was void at the time of adoption and not cured by subsequent home rule status.

Reasoning: The court noted that the legislature has not authorized requiring more than a majority vote based on an adverse recommendation from the plan commission.