Salisbury Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Carpenter

Citations: 131 Ill. App. 3d 829; 476 N.E.2d 15; 86 Ill. Dec. 839; 1985 Ill. App. LEXIS 1740Docket: No. 5—83—0557

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; February 26, 1985; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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A construction contract dispute involves Kenneth C. and Barbara Carpenter, Salisbury Plumbing and Heating Company, and Fred McGilvray, Inc. On May 5, 1977, Carpenter contracted Salisbury to install a fire sprinkler system in a commercial property. Salisbury subsequently contracted McGilvray to provide the necessary fire protection system. By June 1977, the system was completed, but Carpenter found it unacceptable and halted further payments after an initial installment. 

Salisbury sued Carpenter on August 7, 1978, in Marion County, while McGilvray filed suit against Salisbury on July 20, 1981, in Dade County, Florida. In response to Carpenter's counterclaim against Salisbury, Salisbury filed a third-party complaint against McGilvray in Marion County on September 27, 1982. Salisbury engaged a Florida law firm for the Dade County litigation, where it was served, answered, and participated in pretrial activities. The Florida trial concluded in favor of McGilvray on February 4, 1983.

Subsequently, McGilvray sought to file a supplemental answer in Marion County to plead the Florida judgment as an affirmative defense and counterclaim against Salisbury. The trial court allowed the counterclaim but refused to accept the Florida judgment as an affirmative defense. After the trial court’s rulings, a bench trial resulted in the following judgments: Salisbury's claim against Carpenter was denied; Carpenter's counterclaim against Salisbury was granted; Salisbury's third-party complaint against McGilvray was granted; and McGilvray's counterclaim based on the Florida judgment was denied. 

The trial court found that Salisbury did not receive adequate notice of the Florida proceedings to mount a defense, indicating that an injunction issued by the court on January 14, 1983, restricted further proceedings and that motions filed by McGilvray to dissolve the injunction were denied.

McGilvray notified the attorneys for Salisbury and Carpenter about the filing but failed to inform them that his attorney would request the Clerk of the Appellate Court to present the Motion on the scheduled date. On January 18, 1983, at 5:00 p.m., McGilvray’s attorney learned that the Appellate Court had granted a stay but did not communicate this to Carpenter or Salisbury's attorneys. Salisbury’s attorney only became aware of the Appellate Court's decision on January 19, 1983, at approximately 8:30 a.m. They learned that a jury trial was set for 11:00 a.m. that same day in Florida. Despite filing a motion to reconsider the stay, it was denied on the same day. Salisbury attempted to travel to Florida to assist in the defense but arrived on January 20, 1983, the second and last day of the trial. Carpenter, at Salisbury's request, also tried to attend but arrived too late to testify. Salisbury was thus denied the opportunity to fully participate in the defense and to present Carpenter as a key witness, without any fault on his part. 

On appeal, McGilvray argues that the trial court erred by not recognizing the Florida judgment and requests a reversal of the circuit court's decision regarding Salisbury's third-party complaint, seeking judgment in his favor on the counterclaim. McGilvray does not contest the judgment establishing Salisbury’s liability to Carpenter. Salisbury contends that the trial court correctly determined, under section 12. 621(b)(1) of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, that the Florida judgment should not be recognized due to inadequate notice of the proceedings, which prevented adequate defense. The trial court ruled that Salisbury did not receive timely notice of the stay until just before the trial, which it found insufficient. However, upon review, it is concluded that the notice referred to in the statute pertains to the notice required by the Florida court, not the Illinois appellate ruling. Salisbury was aware of the Florida litigation and had retained counsel there, thus the timing of the notice regarding the stay does not constitute inadequate notice under section 12. 621(b)(1).

Salisbury contends that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in its case against McGilvray, citing Case Prestressing Corp. v. Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine. Salisbury argues that McGilvray's lawsuit in Florida involved a different cause of action since Carpenter was not a party to that litigation. However, the court disagrees, noting that the contractual liability between Salisbury and McGilvray was established in the Florida case, which Salisbury attempted to relitigate in Illinois through a third-party complaint. Under the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution, Illinois must give res judicata effect to the Florida judgment. The court rejects Salisbury's argument that the absence of Carpenter from the Florida litigation negates the res judicata effect. Salisbury's reliance on Case Prestressing Corp. is deemed misplaced, as that case involved parties withdrawing a claim from litigation, which is not applicable here. Consequently, the court reverses the judgment in favor of Salisbury against McGilvray on the third-party complaint but does not grant McGilvray's request for judgment on his counterclaim based on the Florida judgment. Instead, it instructs McGilvray to register the Florida judgment in Illinois under the appropriate statutes. The court affirms the judgment against Salisbury in favor of Carpenter. The circuit court's judgment is thus partially reversed and partially affirmed, with concurrence from the justices.