Mazanek v. Rockford Drop Forge Co.

Citations: 131 Ill. App. 3d 495; 475 N.E.2d 1127; 86 Ill. Dec. 748; 1985 Ill. App. LEXIS 1686Docket: No. 83—1087

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; March 14, 1985; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Mitchell J. Mazanek, an employee of General Electric Company (GE), was injured in an electrical fire while cleaning switchgear manufactured by GE and sold to Rockford Drop Forge Company (RDF). Mazanek filed a negligence claim against RDF, which subsequently sought indemnity from GE and its division, General Electric Supply Company (GESCO). During the trial, Mazanek settled with GE for $65,000 and agreed to indemnify GE against any judgment in the third-party action. The jury awarded Mazanek $540,000 against RDF, while ruling RDF was entitled to limited indemnity from GE amounting to $2,721.22 based on a service contract. This verdict prompted RDF to appeal.

In a prior case, Mazanek v. Rockford Drop Forge Co., the court reduced the $540,000 judgment by the $65,000 settlement amount and affirmed the decision except for the service contract’s liability limitation, which was deemed inapplicable and led to a remand for a new trial on the third-party action. Although both Mazanek and GE argued that RDF should be barred from indemnity due to active negligence, the court did not address this as there was no cross-appeal from them.

On remand, Mazanek’s counsel represented GE to safeguard Mazanek’s interests. The jury again found in favor of RDF's indemnity claim, resulting in a judgment of $646,950.28, which included the original judgment amount adjusted for the previous court's ruling, plus interest and costs. GE appealed, reiterating that RDF was barred from indemnity due to active negligence and raised additional claims regarding trial errors and statutory basis for part of the interest awarded. The court determined it only needed to address the active negligence issue. The switchgear, an AKD-5 Powermaster, was purchased by RDF from GE in 1962, and its operation involved circuit breakers designed to prevent overcurrent by tripping open, with key components housed in separate compartments.

The switchgear was located in the compressor room of RDF’s plant, which had a moderate level of dust. Conflicting testimonies arose regarding the suitability of the AKD-5 Powermaster, not designed to be dust-secure, for this environment. In 1963, dust-secure options were available from GE. Walter Fulton, RDF’s plant engineer, indicated that the AKD-5 was selected based on GE's Edmund Brown's recommendation. GE provided a manual detailing maintenance requirements, which emphasized the necessity of a periodic maintenance schedule, annual inspections, and keeping maintenance records. RDF failed to perform any maintenance on the switchgear for ten years, despite the manual's directives.

Expert testimony from Andrew Frank highlighted that safe annual cleaning and inspection required de-energizing the switchgear for two to three days, which would disrupt the entire plant's operations. In April 1973, due to observed dust in a breaker compartment, RDF sought GESCO’s services for cleaning and inspection. Fulton acknowledged the risks of dust on insulating supports, which could lead to electrical arcing and potential explosions.

RDF arranged for GESCO to conduct the work over a weekend to allow de-energization, but GESCO, following GE's guidance, stated they could work on energized equipment. On July 12, 1973, a GE crew began cleaning and inspecting the switchgear and continued the following day. An explosion occurred during this process, severely injuring crew member Mazanek while he was cleaning a breaker compartment.

Mazanek suffered burns covering 50% of his body and is permanently disabled, having not worn protective clothing during an explosion caused by an electrical arc from an insulating support in a bus compartment. This arc was the result of accumulated dust, which created a 'tracking' phenomenon allowing current to flow between bus bars. Expert testimony indicated that the tracking may have existed for months before the incident, likely exacerbated by GE workers' actions. GE argues that RDF's active negligence bars them from recovering indemnity under common law, which was in effect before the Skinner decision recognized joint tortfeasor contribution rights. Under common law, no contribution was allowed among joint tortfeasors, though the theory of implied indemnity was developed, permitting indemnity where one party's negligence was deemed active and the other’s passive. A qualitative distinction between the negligence of the tortfeasors is required for indemnity to be successful. The court, referencing Carver v. Grossman, stated that if a third-party plaintiff is found to be actively negligent, they cannot recover indemnity regardless of the third-party defendant's negligence status. GE supports its claim of active negligence by referencing precedent cases, asserting that both GE and RDF were actively negligent in this incident.

Price Brothers had a maintenance contract with Otis Elevator Company, which was canceled six months before an elevator accident. Prior to the cancellation, Otis advised Price Brothers to conduct annual safety tests, noting that none had been performed in the past year. Price Brothers neglected to arrange such a test. After the contract ended, they engaged Westinghouse Electric Corporation for repairs, but three months later, while securing the elevator with a sling, it fell due to a malfunctioning safety device and broke the sling. Evidence indicated Westinghouse was negligent for not taking adequate precautions. The injured employees sued Price Brothers, which subsequently sought indemnity from Westinghouse. The jury awarded damages to the employees and required Westinghouse to indemnify Price Brothers. However, the appellate court upheld the employees' claim against Price Brothers, ruling that Price Brothers' negligence was active since they provided an unsafe work environment and failed to warn Westinghouse of dangers. The court also highlighted Price Brothers’ awareness of the need for safety testing. This case parallels RDF's situation, where RDF neglected annual maintenance on its equipment, creating an unsafe work environment for GE employees. Evidence suggested that GE also exhibited active negligence by not implementing additional safety measures. Under Illinois law (Carver v. Grossman), a party guilty of active negligence cannot recover indemnity, regardless of the other party's negligence type. RDF contested that GE's manual did not require annual cleaning, but this interpretation was dismissed as it overlooked the explicit maintenance requirements outlined in the manual.

Under the 'BUS COMPARTMENT' section, the manual instructs to "wipe and vacuum clean the busses and supports." In the case discussed, GE had a duty to inspect and clean the switchgear, which, if done properly, would have identified a danger. RDF argues that its negligence was passive, as distinguished from the case Topel, where the third-party defendant's duty did not include checking safety devices. However, the court disagrees, asserting that the distinction pertains only to the level of culpability, not the nature of the negligence. The court finds RDF's negligence to be active, supported by the General Telephone Co. v. New Berlin Transit, Inc. case, where negligence was deemed active due to a failure to maintain telephone wires at a safe height. The court emphasizes that RDF’s failure to clean the switchgear over ten years contributed to the hazardous condition, distinguishing this case from others cited by RDF that involved passive negligence related to construction defects. Additionally, the cited case Simmons v. Union Electric Co. is noted, but it too does not alter the conclusion regarding RDF's active negligence. Overall, both Topel and General Telephone establish that RDF’s actions constituted active negligence, as they directly contributed to the hazardous condition.

A contract mandated Sachs to implement all necessary safety precautions to prevent accidents. The supreme court determined that Sachs' negligence was active, contrasting with Union Electric's passive role. While there are parallels to the Simmons case, the key distinction lies in the nature of liability; in Simmons, liability arose from knowledge of an unsafe condition rather than from negligence creating that condition. The current case establishes that RDF's negligence directly caused the hazardous situation, aligning with precedents set by Topel and General Telephone that classify such negligence as active. The overwhelming evidence indicated that RDF was actively negligent, warranting a reversal of the circuit court's judgment in favor of GE. The case is remanded with instructions to enter judgment n.o.v. in favor of GE, as supported by Pedrick v. Peoria, Eastern R.R. Co. HOPF and STROUSE, JJ., concur.