Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; July 6, 1984; Illinois; State Appellate Court
Jessie Donald Sumner, an inmate at Menard Correctional Center, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to intervene in a lawsuit initiated by PJS Enterprises against Paul Klincar, chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board. The lawsuit stemmed from a temporary restraining order granted to PJS on March 9, 1983, which prohibited Klincar from excluding the media from Sumner's parole hearing. PJS claimed such exclusion violated the Illinois Open Meetings Act, asserting the hearing was a public meeting. Following a hearing, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction on March 21, 1983, preventing Klincar and the Board from excluding PJS or other media from any parole hearing, citing violations of the Open Meetings Act.
On June 10, 1983, Sumner filed a motion to intervene, arguing that the temporary restraining order had coerced him into refusing to testify at his hearing, that his interests were inadequately represented by the parties involved, and that he had a right to intervene to safeguard his own interests. During a hearing on July 13, 1983, Sumner's attorney contended that Sumner’s rights to a fair parole hearing were compromised, asserting that the Attorney General could not adequately represent Sumner's interests, which diverged from public interests represented by the Prisoner Review Board. Sumner sought to ensure his interests were presented in court to determine the merits of allowing media presence at his hearing, and he argued that opposing his intervention would force him to relitigate similar issues in a separate suit.
Exceptions to the Open Meetings Act are being argued as applicable in this case. The intervenor's counsel asserts that there are important factors and facts that need to be presented to the Court, particularly concerning the rights of a prisoner to decide on press presence during hearings. The counsel emphasizes that the intervenor's interests are not adequately represented by the defendant and cites affidavits indicating the intervenor's opposition to press involvement. The trial court expresses confusion about what specific issues need to be litigated beyond the current case, noting that while the intervenor will be affected by the decision, it is unclear what unique aspects warrant intervention.
The counsel for the intervenor proposes that certain matters impacting Mr. Sumner be addressed in a closed proceeding due to safety concerns. The trial court questions the timing and basis for the motion to intervene, expressing skepticism about its necessity and the relevance of the issues raised. The court notes that if the intervenor has a distinct situation requiring confidentiality, it may be necessary to pursue a separate action for protection rather than intervening in the current case. The trial court recognizes the plaintiff's action as a means to clarify the agency's compliance with the Open Meetings Act.
The trial court denied the motion to intervene, determining that the proceedings should not be burdened by protective orders regarding the intervener. An order was issued on August 3, 1983, stating there was no reason to delay the enforcement or appeal of the denial. On August 16, 1983, the defendant consented to a judgment related to public evidentiary hearings but not to the Prisoner Review Board’s deliberations. Subsequently, on August 29, 1983, a permanent injunction was ordered. The appeal challenges the trial court's discretion in denying the intervention.
According to the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, individuals may intervene as of right if their interests are inadequately represented and they may be bound by the outcome. The statute requires a petition detailing the grounds for intervention, along with initial pleadings. Intervention is at the trial court's discretion and can only be overturned for clear abuse. The purpose of intervention is to streamline litigation by resolving related controversies in a single action.
In this case, the intervener failed to identify specific issues he would raise and his petition consisted mainly of conclusory statements lacking substantive legal grounds. Although he claimed an exception under the Open Meetings Act and requested a protective order, he did not provide adequate legal justification. The trial court's refusal to allow intervention was deemed appropriate, as the intervener's concerns appeared more suitable for a separate action. The case dealt with general applicability under the Open Meetings Act, making it impractical to incorporate individual issues into broader proceedings. The trial court's decision was affirmed, allowing the intervener to pursue his claims independently if desired.
