Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; June 24, 1982; Illinois; State Appellate Court
Ellen R. Rubenson filed a lawsuit against MSI Real Estate to recover fees for securing a tenant for the defendant's building. The trial court dismissed her amended complaint with prejudice, citing that she was unlicensed as a real estate salesperson when she rendered her services, which contravened section 7 of the Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen License Act. Rubenson contended on appeal that she was exempt from this requirement and, alternatively, that she could recover for services rendered after obtaining her license.
The plaintiff's complaint noted that on May 23, 1977, she was offered a salaried position by the defendant to perform leasing services for Three Illinois Center, with a salary of $12,000 and additional compensation based on tenant acquisition. This agreement was oral and not documented in writing at that time, and she was not licensed when it was made. Following her efforts to engage Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Company (Peat-Marwick) for leasing space, Rubenson obtained her real estate license on November 2, 1977, on which date she entered into a written employment agreement that acknowledged her licensed status and extended her role beyond just leasing for Three Illinois Center.
The subsequent agreement provided a $12,000 annual draw against commissions for leases secured. Despite being instructed to take a passive role in ongoing negotiations with Peat-Marwick, she was promised a commission if a lease was signed. After her employment was terminated in December 1978, Peat-Marwick signed a lease in May 1979, leading to her demand for compensation.
Section 7 of the License Act prohibits compensation claims for services restricted to licensed real estate brokers and salesmen unless the individual was licensed prior to offering those services or securing a promise of compensation. The plaintiff, Rubenson, was unlicensed when she proposed leasing services in May 1977 and during negotiations in July 1977. Rubenson contends that Section 6 exempts her from Section 7, as it allows actions for compensation by a building owner's regular salaried employees even if unlicensed, provided their activities are part of property management and not related to the vocation of leasing real estate.
However, Rubenson's role was solely to lease the property, suggesting she was engaged in the vocation of leasing, which would disqualify her from this exemption. The interpretation of Section 6 must align with the License Act's purpose of assessing the competence of real estate professionals. Rubenson cites Brandenberry Park East Apartments v. Zale, where the court ruled that a property manager could recover fees despite performing leasing services, arguing this indicates that leasing activities do not constitute the vocation of leasing. However, the court did not address whether Zale was in the vocation of leasing, and there was insufficient evidence to support claims that Zale's services were exclusively leasing. Consequently, applying the same reasoning to Rubenson is unsupported, as she was indeed engaged in the vocation of leasing, which precludes her from claiming compensation under the License Act.
The plaintiff contends that she should be compensated for services rendered after obtaining her license, specifically for maintaining communication with a representative of Peat-Marwick and preparing a space usage survey. However, Section 7 of the relevant statute prohibits recovery for services defined as “real estate salesman” unless the individual was licensed before offering to perform or securing any promise or contract for compensation. The plaintiff's complaint appears to seek compensation based on a commission formula from a written agreement, rather than restitution for unjust enrichment related to her survey preparation and communications. Allowing her claim would effectively compensate her for leasing services that she offered prior to her licensing in May 1977. Consequently, the circuit court's judgment is upheld.
