Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; March 4, 1981; Illinois; State Appellate Court
Delores Villarreal filed a personal injury lawsuit after falling on the stairs of a building owned by Harold Lederman and Richard Ringewald, resulting in a jury verdict of $7,500 in her favor. The jury found Villarreal not guilty of contributory negligence. The fall occurred on March 11, 1974, while she was performing her duties as a social worker. Villarreal, who weighed 275 pounds, noticed that the metal strips on the narrow steps were loose but not bent. During her descent, her shoe caught on a strip, causing her to fall despite holding the bannister and looking at the steps.
The defendants contended that the trial court erred by not directing a verdict in their favor and allowing Villarreal’s expert witness to testify. The building had been remodeled in 1969, with the stairs reported to be in good condition and no previous complaints about the metal strips. Testimony from both defendants indicated they had not observed any issues with the stairs. However, plaintiff's expert, Henry Mikolajczyk, testified that the stairway was hazardous due to the slippery aluminum nosing and improper installation, suggesting that such nosing should only be used on wider stairs. After the plaintiff rested her case, the trial court denied the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict. A defense witness, Estella Lopez, who was present during the incident, stated that the stairs appeared stable and the metal strips were firm.
Lopez had no prior complaints regarding loose metal stripping during her seven-year employment, and the plaintiff was the only individual to fall on the steps. The defendants claimed the trial court erred by not granting their directed verdict motion, arguing the plaintiff did not prove negligence on their part, nor did she show they had notice of any defect. The plaintiff countered that the defendants waived this error by presenting a defense and not renewing their motion after all evidence was presented. However, the court found it unnecessary to address the waiver, as the plaintiff provided sufficient evidence for the jury's consideration, supporting the trial court's decision to deny the directed verdict.
To recover for injuries as an invitee, the plaintiff needed to demonstrate that the premises were unsafe due to the owner's negligence or that a defect existed long enough for the owner to have constructive notice, without the invitee's lack of ordinary care contributing to the injury. The plaintiff testified that the stairways were narrow with loose metal stripping, which caught her heel and caused her fall, substantiated by an expert witness. The expert indicated that the metal stripping's inability to be securely fastened rendered the stairway dangerous and supported the existence of a defect sufficient to imply constructive notice on the defendants’ part. The issue of the plaintiff’s care at the time of the fall was deemed appropriate for jury evaluation.
The defendants also argued that the expert's testimony should not have been allowed, claiming that matters regarding stairway safety fall within common knowledge. However, it was established that the admissibility of expert testimony hinges on whether the witness possesses specialized knowledge that aids in resolving factual issues. The expert effectively clarified the danger posed by the metal stripping, justifying the court's decision to allow his testimony. Finally, the defendants' argument for a new trial based on the plaintiff's counsel's intended questions about stairway requirements under the Chicago Building Code was found to lack merit.
Before the expert witness testified, his deposition occurred in the judge's chambers, where the trial court ruled that the plaintiff could not introduce evidence regarding the stairway's status as a legal nonconforming use. During the expert's examination, the plaintiff's counsel inquired about the Chicago Building Code's maximum height for uninterrupted stairway rises. The trial court upheld a defense objection to this question and indicated a preference for no references to the Chicago Building Code. The plaintiff's counsel adhered to this directive; however, the expert witness mentioned the building code twice in his answers. The court sustained the defendants' objections and instructed the jury to disregard these references. Following the second mention, the court explicitly directed the witness not to discuss the building code further, which the witness followed. The court found no evidence suggesting that the plaintiff's counsel intended to elicit improper testimony regarding the building code, nor did it identify any prejudice to the defendants from the mentions. Consequently, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County was affirmed. RIZZI, P. J. and McGILLICUDDY, J. concur.
