People v. S. M.

Citations: 93 Ill. App. 3d 105; 48 Ill. Dec. 690; 416 N.E.2d 1212; 1981 Ill. App. LEXIS 2076Docket: No. 79-1636

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; February 5, 1981; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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On April 28, 1978, a 14-year-old minor respondent shot and killed two teenage boys, Michael Truppa and Robert Paulish, and wounded two others, Michael Gale and Russell Peterson, in a high school parking lot. He faced charges of murder, aggravated battery, and unlawful use of a weapon. Prior to trial, he pleaded guilty to unlawful use of a weapon. Following the trial, he was adjudicated delinquent for two counts of voluntary manslaughter and two counts of aggravated battery, resulting in his commitment to the Illinois Department of Corrections.

The respondent appeals, arguing that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting in self-defense and that the trial court's dispositional order was unsupported by the evidence or constituted an abuse of discretion. Witnesses, all students at the high school, testified about the events leading to the shooting. The respondent had invited friends to his home before heading to the high school parking lot around 10 p.m. after obtaining a gun to hunt raccoons. 

Prior to the incident, the victims had been drinking and eating before arriving at the parking lot. As the respondent conversed with other students, a station wagon carrying the victims approached. Witnesses provided conflicting accounts about whether the vehicle was headed directly toward the respondent. After he yelled a remark at the car, Gale, one of the victims, exited the vehicle and approached the respondent, who then pulled out his gun, with witnesses reporting different actions regarding how he handled the weapon.

Truppa and Rick Johnson exited a station wagon, where witnesses heard onlookers urging Gale to leave the respondent alone. The respondent, backed into a fenced parking lot, was pursued by Gale, Truppa, Paulish, and Peterson, who threw objects at him, missing. Despite the respondent's pleas for them to "stay away," the boys formed a semicircle around him. As the respondent attempted to escape, he yelled for help, prompting four witnesses to seek assistance from a teacher. The respondent then fired a warning shot into the air, although Peterson did not hear it. As the four boys continued to approach, the respondent shot Peterson from about five feet away, followed by rapid shots at Truppa, Paulish, and Gale, who were approximately six feet away. Peterson was jogging about 10 to 15 feet from the respondent when he was hit. Johnson observed the events, noting that Truppa attempted to kick the gun from the respondent's hands before being shot. Debbie Heider, a witness, saw the boys chasing the respondent and forming a semicircle around him. At the time of the incident, Truppa and Paulish were 16 years old, Gale and Peterson were 15, and the respondent was 14. The boys had known each other for years, while the respondent had only a brief acquaintance with Gale. The respondent testified on his own behalf.

Seven witnesses testified to the respondent's reputation as a peaceful, law-abiding citizen, with no evidence presented to counter this. The fact-finder could choose to believe the State's evidence over that supporting the respondent. The key issue was whether the State disproved the respondent's self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt, as the respondent had raised this defense. According to Illinois law, a person may use deadly force if they reasonably believe it is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. The court noted that whether a person acted in self-defense depends on the circumstances and is for the trier of fact to decide. The court must reverse a conviction if it has grave doubts about the accused's guilt. If the fact-finder finds the accused subjectively believed deadly force was necessary but that belief was unreasonable, a verdict of voluntary manslaughter is appropriate. Conversely, if the belief is deemed reasonable, the accused should be acquitted.

In this case, the conviction of voluntary manslaughter indicates that the fact-finder believed the respondent thought deadly force was necessary. The court examined whether the State proved the respondent’s belief was unreasonable. Evidence showed the respondent attempted to avoid confrontation, apologized, and retreated. Gale, a known wrestler, pursued him, prompting the respondent to display his weapon. The respondent's fears were supported by Gale's companions' behavior and the fact that they were undeterred by the gun. The respondent made multiple attempts to flee and did not confront the boys, even calling for help and firing a warning shot.

Four boys, Truppa, Peterson, Paulish, and Gale, advanced on the respondent while intoxicated, outnumbering him 4 to 1. Despite being shot, Truppa, Gale, and Paulish continued their approach, leading to the conclusion that the respondent’s belief in an immediate threat to his life was reasonable. The State argued that the respondent’s actions were unjustified, particularly regarding the multiple shots fired. However, evidence indicated that the shots were fired in rapid succession, without a sufficient pause to suggest the respondent could have determined he was no longer in danger. Established case law supports that initial justification for using force is not negated by subsequent shots unless a reasonable person would recognize the threat had ended. The court found that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent acted without self-defense. Consequently, the judgment of delinquency for two counts of voluntary manslaughter and two counts of aggravated battery was dismissed, the commitment to the Illinois Department of Corrections was vacated, and the case was remanded for a hearing regarding the unlawful use of a weapon. The decision was reversed and remanded with concurrence from the judges.