Svendsen v. Herget National Bank

Citations: 90 Ill. App. 3d 582; 413 N.E.2d 205; 45 Ill. Dec. 872; 1980 Ill. App. LEXIS 4265Docket: No. 80-36

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; November 26, 1980; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Armida L. Bonjean, at her death, left behind a will executed on December 30, 1976, which bequeathed most of her estate to Mark Ghidina, Norma Craig, and Craig's children, while specifically disinheriting her siblings, Alice Svendsen, Ann Puhal, and Gentile Ghidina. Following her death, the disinherited siblings filed a petition claiming Bonjean lacked testamentary capacity due to insane delusions at the time of the will's execution. The circuit court found that her delusions stemmed from a misunderstanding of her family's support related to her mental health and subsequently voided the will.

The court referenced the Probate Act, which stipulates that individuals over 18 with sound mind can bequeath property. Testamentary capacity requires the ability to recognize natural heirs, understand property, and formulate a distribution plan. Disinheritance alone does not indicate a lack of capacity; however, the petitioners focused on the possibility that Bonjean's disinheritance was influenced by insane delusions. The legal standard defines an insane delusion as a belief without evidence that no rational person would hold, and such delusions must impact the will's creation.

Even if a testator holds an insane delusion, a will may remain valid if the testator has knowledge of their property and beneficiaries and has a coherent distribution plan. The law presumes individuals to be sane until proven otherwise, placing the burden of proof on those challenging testamentary capacity. Thus, the petitioners needed to demonstrate that Bonjean's decision to disinherit was rooted in an irrational belief.

Disinheritance motivated by prejudice or animus can be upheld if there is a rational explanation behind it, thereby not meeting the burden of proof to contest a will. Testamentary capacity remains intact even if the testatrix has negative feelings towards her family, provided those feelings are rationally justified. Armida L. Bonjean’s disinheritance of her siblings does not lack rational basis, given her tumultuous life experiences marked by an unhappy marriage, mental health struggles, and multiple suicide attempts. Bonjean endured a 19-year troubled marriage, briefly separated from her husband, and sought mental health treatment for severe depression following his suicide. Her antagonism towards her family escalated to the point where they sought her involuntary commitment, although doctors found her mentally stable and not certifiable. Despite her family’s stated altruistic intentions in pursuing her treatment, Bonjean perceived their actions as hostile. She later managed a gift shop successfully until health issues prompted her resignation.

Mrs. Bonjean's relationship with her siblings deteriorated significantly after 1973, contrasting sharply with their previous cordiality. Throughout this period, she expressed her views to public officials, advocating for the right to die for non-psychotic individuals and criticizing the potential for familial intimidation through involuntary commitment under the Mental Health Code. Mrs. Bonjean died from cyanide ingestion on December 5, 1977, at age 64. The petitioners argue that her estrangement from her siblings, who only sought to help her, could not be rational. However, the court disagrees, noting that suicide or attempted suicide does not automatically indicate insanity. The court finds a rational basis for Mrs. Bonjean's hostility towards her family, stemming from their attempts to have her committed, which she perceived as a threat to her autonomy. This hostility is not deemed a product of delusion. The court concludes that the evidence does not support the petitioners' claims to invalidate the will and finds their procedural challenge regarding the notice of appeal insufficient. Consequently, the prior court's decision is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this ruling. BARRY and STOUDER, JJ. concur.