People v. Bowen

Citations: 87 Ill. App. 3d 221; 408 N.E.2d 993; 42 Ill. Dec. 284; 1980 Ill. App. LEXIS 3402Docket: No. 78-1159

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; July 25, 1980; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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Mr. Justice Wilson delivered the court's opinion, affirming the trial court's decision after the defendant was convicted of murder and arson, receiving a sentence of 100 to 150 years. On appeal, the defendant raised five arguments: (1) the involuntariness of his confession, (2) the trial court's refusal to provide involuntary manslaughter instructions, (3) exclusion of expert witness testimony, (4) denial of reading a witness list to jurors, and (5) the need for remand based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Dunaway v. New York. 

The case involved a fire on July 2, 1977, at the Booth residence, resulting in the deaths of three children from the defendant's spouse, Evelyn Bowen, who lived there at the time. The defendant was seen at the scene shortly after the fire and inquired about the children’s whereabouts. He was taken to the police station voluntarily, receiving Miranda warnings, which he acknowledged by signing a waiver. During questioning, he denied involvement in the fire, volunteered for a polygraph test, and was not detained or threatened by officers. The polygraph indicated deception regarding his statements about the fire. Despite this, the defendant maintained his innocence during a subsequent interrogation. The court found no errors in the trial proceedings and upheld the conviction.

Chief Gehrke reviewed the defendant's account regarding the events of July 1-2, 1977. The defendant initially denied involvement in the fire but, after Gehrke's appeal for honesty, he broke down and confessed to starting it by igniting curtains at the Booth house with a cigarette lighter. Gehrke confiscated the lighter as evidence and informed Detective Peters to alert the State's Attorney. The defendant, not under arrest at the time of his confession, was later advised of his rights by Assistant State’s Attorney Mark Tobias, who took a written statement from him. The next morning, the defendant expressed remorse, attributing his actions to pressure from his estranged wife, Evelyn. After a review of his confession by Assistant State's Attorney Colin Simpson, the defendant reaffirmed its truth. He subsequently filed motions to quash his arrest and suppress his statements, but the trial court found that his arrest occurred post-confession and that the confession was voluntary and made after waiving Miranda rights.

In the trial, Mrs. Bowen testified about her tumultuous relationship with the defendant, including his threats to kill her if she pursued a divorce. She recounted incidents of physical aggression, including an attempt to drag her to bed and a violent outburst involving a cedar chest. Following a series of escalating conflicts, Mrs. Bowen moved out with her children. On June 25, 1977, after noticing their youngest child, Mark, was missing, she confronted the defendant at his home to retrieve him. The situation escalated when the defendant damaged her car in an attempt to re-enter the house, leading to a tense standoff.

Mrs. Booth reported an incident to the police and returned to the defendant's house with Mrs. Bowen to complete an accident report. During their departure, Officer James Coakley overheard the defendant threatening to harm Mrs. Booth and her children. Subsequently, on June 27, 1977, the defendant called Mrs. Bowen, threatening to kill her and her children if they attempted to contact him. On July 1, 1977, Mrs. Bowen obtained a temporary restraining order against the defendant to prevent him from seeing the children that weekend. Later that day, after an angry confrontation regarding insurance papers, the defendant forcibly entered Mrs. Bowen's home, prompting her to call the police.

Witnesses provided further accounts of the defendant's threats. Mrs. Booth received threatening calls from the defendant, including a threat to burn down her house and harm her and Mrs. Bowen. The defendant's friend’s sister, Rebecca Gilliland, reported that the defendant, while intoxicated, expressed anger towards his wife and threatened to harm the children if he could not have them.

The fire that resulted in the deaths of three of the defendant's children originated in the front bedroom of the house, with no evidence of accelerants found. Reverend Fred Moore, who spoke to the defendant after the fire, noted that the defendant was visibly distressed and repeatedly denied setting the fire. However, he later expressed uncertainty about a signed confession, suggesting he was told he had committed the act.

The defendant argued that his confession was coerced, claiming he only confessed after being urged by Chief Gehrke to "make peace." The court rejected this argument, referencing the totality of circumstances to assess the voluntariness of the confession. Citing the case of People v. Wipfler, the court clarified that a confession is admissible even if it follows a request for honesty, as long as it is made freely and without coercion.

Defendant voluntarily returned to the police station and acknowledged his rights without being arrested or coerced. He had previously viewed his children's remains, showing initial emotional distress but quickly regaining composure. The court found no psychological coercion affecting his statement. The trial court's determination of a statement's voluntariness is upheld unless it contradicts the evidence's manifest weight. 

Defendant argued the trial court erred by denying an involuntary manslaughter instruction, claiming evidence suggested the fire was unintentional or meant to scare his family. However, the court rejected this claim, noting a lack of evidence for recklessness. Testimony from Reverend Moore indicated that defendant used a lighter to see in a dark room but does not imply recklessness since he did not check if the curtain ignited. Evidence showed defendant made threats to kill or burn his family and admitted to intentionally striking the curtain while aware of people inside the house.

The trial court also excluded the testimony of Dr. Richard Ney, a defense expert, due to an objection regarding the hypothetical question's omission of facts. Dr. Ney was asked to consider a scenario involving a 35-year-old man with a troubled background who had been drinking heavily and was questioned about the fire that killed his children. The details included his calm demeanor during initial questioning, subsequent distress, and accusations of murder. The court's exclusion of Dr. Ney's testimony was based on the lack of sufficient evidence to support a claim of involuntary manslaughter.

The defendant was interrogated for over an hour by a police chief, during which he was accused of murdering his children and encouraged to confess. Following this, he provided a confession to the police. The case Wirth v. Industrial Com. established that in Illinois, hypothetical questions do not require all material facts to be included. The opposing party can address omitted facts during cross-examination, and the trial judge can require the question to be reframed if deemed unfair. Although the trial court may have incorrectly excluded a defense expert's testimony, there was no indication that the defendant was prejudiced by this exclusion. The appellate court's role is to assess whether any errors affected the outcome of the trial, not to ensure a flawless record. 

The defendant also claimed the trial court erred by not reading the list of witnesses to the first panel of jurors, but no objection was raised during voir dire or before the jurors were sworn in. Previous cases cited by the defense were distinguished on grounds of potential juror bias affecting a defendant's rights, which was not applicable in this instance. The court exercised its discretion, determining that failing to read the witness list did not introduce bias. Under Supreme Court Rule 234, the court's discretion in conducting voir dire is upheld unless there is an abuse that compromises the defendant's right to an impartial hearing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case. Additionally, in People v. Flowers, the trial court had the discretion to conduct a re-voir dire based on juror behavior, reinforcing the principle that the refusal to question jurors is not necessarily erroneous unless discretion is improperly applied.

Defendant argues that the principles established in Dunaway v. New York (1979) necessitate a remand to evaluate whether his statements were obtained during an unsupported custodial interrogation. In Dunaway, the Supreme Court found that the defendant's fourth and fifth amendment rights were violated when he was seized for questioning without probable cause, as he was involuntarily at the police station and physically restrained from leaving. However, in the current case, the court determined there was no Dunaway violation, as the defendant voluntarily went to the station for questioning and was informed he could leave at any time. Additionally, he confirmed to the assistant State’s Attorney that his confession was voluntary. The evidence indicated no factual disputes regarding the defendant’s voluntary presence and subsequent confession, leading the trial court to correctly deny the motion to suppress. Consequently, the court concluded that Dunaway does not apply in this instance. The ruling is affirmed, with judges Sullivan and Lorenz concurring. The excerpt also references Sections 9.3(a) and 4.6 of the Criminal Code of 1961, defining involuntary manslaughter and recklessness, respectively.