Sturgeon v. Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange
Docket: No. 79-154
Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; November 7, 1979; Illinois; State Appellate Court
Plaintiffs, a father and son, sued the defendant for $5,000 in medical expenses under an automobile insurance policy. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs after both parties filed for summary judgment, and later denied the defendant's motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the sole issue is whether the vehicle driven by the son, David Sturgeon, at the time of the accident was covered by the insurance policy in question.
The insurance policy was originally issued to Clifford and Katharyn Sturgeon and included coverage for two vehicles, but was amended to add their unmarried son David as an operator. David acquired a 1958 Chevrolet with his own funds during the policy period, but the policy was never amended to include this vehicle, nor was any premium paid for its coverage. The accident occurred on May 8, 1977, while David was driving the unlisted Chevrolet, resulting in injuries and medical expenses exceeding the policy limit.
The trial court found David to be an "assured" and the 1958 Chevrolet to be an "owned automobile" under the policy, thus obligating the defendant to cover the medical expenses. The defendant agrees that David is an assured but disputes that the 1958 Chevrolet qualifies as an owned automobile. The relevant policy provisions define an "owned automobile" as one specifically described in the policy and for which a premium was charged. The court determined that the 1958 Chevrolet does not meet this definition, as it was not described in the policy and no premium had been paid for its coverage. The plaintiffs’ interpretation that the policy language modifies "assured" to include David was rejected.
The addition of David Sturgeon as an occasional driver for the 1969 Chevrolet resulted in an increase in the 'Excess Medical Payments' premium from $6 to $13, while the premium for the 1975 Oldsmobile remained unchanged. Premiums are linked to specific automobiles in a policy, meaning that coverage cannot be construed as applying to individuals ('assured') rather than automobiles. The policy's wording implies that coverage is tied to the 'automobile described in this policy for which a premium has been paid.' The plaintiffs’ interpretation contradicts the policy’s classification and rating system, which considers factors like the operator's age and usage of the automobile.
Despite the rule favoring liberal construction of ambiguous terms against the insurer, the proposed meaning by the plaintiffs does not hold. The 1958 Chevrolet is not covered under paragraph (a) since it was not owned by the named assured, Clifford Sturgeon, nor does it qualify under paragraph (c) as it was not a replacement for an owned vehicle. Additionally, it does not meet the definition of a 'temporary substitute automobile' in paragraph (d), as it was not being used as a substitute for either of the insured vehicles.
The policy’s Medical Payments coverage specifies that it applies to the named assured and relatives for injuries sustained while occupying either an owned or non-owned automobile, provided permission for use is granted. David Sturgeon, not being the named assured (his father Clifford was), is not covered under this provision. Thus, the claim is barred as the 1958 Chevrolet does not meet any of the policy’s conditions for coverage.
'Relative' is defined as a household resident of the named assured, excluding anyone who owns a private passenger automobile. David Sturgeon, a relative residing with his father, owns a 1958 Chevrolet and therefore does not qualify for benefits under the policy. The policy delineates two classes eligible for medical expense coverage: the named assured and certain resident relatives, neither of which includes Sturgeon due to his car ownership. The policy explicitly limits liability to avoid extending coverage to family members who own vehicles while residing with the named assured. It also notes exclusions for bodily injuries sustained while occupying a vehicle owned by the assured or a household resident unless it qualifies as an 'owned automobile.' Sturgeon’s vehicle does not qualify as a 'temporary substitute vehicle' and thus is not a 'non-owned automobile.' Plaintiffs' argument that they should have received coverage for Sturgeon while driving his car lacks merit, as the insurer's liability does not extend to vehicles owned by listed operators without prior notice of increased risk. Consequently, the circuit court's summary judgment favoring the plaintiffs is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
