Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education

Citations: 77 Ill. App. 3d 389; 32 Ill. Dec. 781; 1979 Ill. App. LEXIS 3395; 395 N.E.2d 1162Docket: No. 77-423

Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; October 10, 1979; Illinois; State Appellate Court

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An appeal was made regarding a Circuit Court order that clarified the appointment procedures for principals in the Chicago public school system. Plaintiffs, who were principals and individuals on the 1970 and 1974 eligibility lists, filed a complaint on June 12, 1975, arguing that the board of education's use of local nominating committees violated the School Code, which mandates that appointments must be based on merit. The School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 122, par. 34. 84) stipulates that appointments in cities over 500,000 should follow merit principles. Historically, from 1917 until 1970, principals were appointed based on their rank from examination scores. In 1970, the board shifted to involving local committees, which rated candidates without considering their rank on the eligibility list. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that these new procedures violated both state and federal constitutional provisions and requested that appointments be made strictly according to rank order from the eligibility lists. 

On September 28, 1976, the trial court allowed community organizations and school parent councils to intervene. Following various hearings, the court ruled on December 20, 1976, affirming the intent of the Otis Law to eliminate favoritism in principal selection. It found that the rank order system was problematic as it excluded community input and that the nominating committees lacked clear standards. The court ordered that appointments must be merit-based according to the School Code but determined that until a uniform community input system was established, principals should be appointed in rank order starting from the oldest eligibility list (1970).

Intervenors appealed an order mandating the board to appoint principals based on rank order until a uniform community input system was established. They later moved to dismiss their appeal due to mootness, which was granted. Plaintiffs contested the order allowing flexibility in using rank order as the sole merit criterion for principal appointments and also appealed the intervention of community organization members and school parents councils. 

On October 1, 1977, section 34.8.2 was added to the School Code for large cities, allowing local nominating committees in principal selections. This section mandates that the general superintendent may seek nominations from a committee, which must consider candidates from the eligibility list or those seeking transfer, ensuring non-discrimination. The board can set rules for these committees, requiring at least 60% of members to be parents or guardians from the relevant school. 

The unchanged section 34.84 continues to focus on merit-based appointments. Key issues for review include: 1) whether 'for merit only' necessitates rank order appointments, 2) whether the new section 34.8.2 repeals the rank order requirement, and 3) the appropriateness of allowing intervention by community organization members. Historically, the board had the authority to employ or reject applicants without specified reasons, a stance upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court. However, the Otis Law requires merit-based appointments, though 'for merit only' remains undefined in the School Code. The plaintiffs assert that the historical practice supports the interpretation that 'for merit only' implies rank order appointments, prompting an examination of statutory construction principles due to the lack of clear definitions or legislative history.

The doctrine of contemporaneous construction is deemed an effective method for interpreting the phrase "for merit only." This doctrine allows the meaning of ambiguous statutes to be clarified by examining their interpretation by relevant executive officers, courts, and the public over time. Key factors for the reliability of such interpretations include their origin from credible sources, their proximity to the statute's enactment, and their longevity and acceptance. Notably, if a statute receiving a contemporaneous interpretation is subsequently reenacted, that interpretation is presumed correct.

In the case at hand, the statute mandates the appointment of principals based on merit. From 1917 to 1970, the board consistently interpreted this as requiring appointments by rank order. This interpretation was reliable, coming shortly after the statute's enactment and enduring for approximately 53 years. Moreover, the legislature reenacted this provision in 1945 and 1961 while the interpretation was in place.

The conclusion drawn is that section 34.84 of the School Code necessitates rank order appointments from the eligibility list for principal positions. Although a conflicting decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Webster v. Redmond suggested that no property right to an appointment existed under Illinois law, it did not address the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, which is pivotal to this case. Consequently, the court does not align with the Seventh Circuit's decision, emphasizing that federal court rulings are not binding on Illinois courts.

Additionally, the board posits that the introduction of section 34.8.2, which permits nominating committees to select principals, indicates that "for merit only" does not imply rank order appointments.

The board cites the rejection of a bill by the House Elementary and Secondary Education Committee that aimed to define "for merit only" as "an order of standing on eligible lists" as supporting their position. However, they argue that the committee's failure to act does not carry the same weight as a rejection by the full legislature. They reference relevant case law, highlighting that the enactment of section 34-8.2 of the School Code did not repeal the existing requirement for merit-based appointments in section 34-84, as implied repeals are generally disfavored unless the new law is fundamentally inconsistent with the old. The board maintained procedures from March to October 1970 for appointing principals in rank order while considering local nominating committees' recommendations.

The report details a selection process that involved local communities, allowing schools to rotate candidates from the eligibility list for principal vacancies. However, the attractiveness of candidates to selection committees did not always adhere strictly to their rank. In 1971, 52 principal appointments were made from the eligibility list, with specific monthly breakdowns provided. The board's approach balanced compliance with statutory rank-order requirements and the specific needs of schools.

Intervenors argue that considering the unique needs of diverse Chicago schools is crucial for selecting the most qualified candidates, suggesting that the original legislative intent for rank-order appointments may no longer be relevant. The judgment from the Circuit Court of Cook County, which allowed the board to deviate from rank-order criteria, is reversed. The case is remanded with instructions for the board to appoint principals strictly in rank order from the eligibility lists, starting with the 1970 list. The court did not address the plaintiffs' claims regarding the intervention of community organizations and parents. The ruling is reversed and remanded for compliance with these directives.