United States v. Warren Harding McNamara Jr.

Citations: 74 F.3d 514; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1569; 1996 WL 42111Docket: 95-6126

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; February 2, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

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Warren Harding McNamara, Jr. was convicted on July 19, 1993, for illegally structuring financial transactions to evade currency reporting requirements, resulting in a 21-month prison sentence, three years of supervised release, and a $4,000 fine. After not appealing his conviction or sentence, McNamara filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, citing ineffective assistance of counsel and an intervening change in the law regarding the willfulness element of unlawful structuring. The district court found merit in his claims, vacated his sentence, and ordered a new trial, asserting his counsel should have objected to the jury instruction based on the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in United States v. Ratzlaf, which addressed the willfulness requirement.

However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, concluding that McNamara's counsel was not ineffective for adhering to the existing circuit law at the time of the trial or for being unaware of the certiorari. The court clarified that under the antistructuring law, a defendant does not need to have specific knowledge of the illegality of their actions for a conviction. The Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in Ratzlaf established that proof of a defendant's knowledge of their illegal conduct is necessary for a conviction under the structuring statute, necessitating a jury instruction to that effect.

Following the Supreme Court's Ratzlaf decision, the district court determined that McNamara's trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to preserve an appeal issue regarding the willfulness element of an instruction, reasoning that counsel should have been aware of the Supreme Court's examination of this element, which could impact the case's outcome. This ruling was based on the premise that a lawyer must stay informed of legal developments that might affect their client's case. However, in reviewing a similar case, Kornahrens, the court found that trial counsel is not constitutionally ineffective for not anticipating changes in the law, even when relevant issues are under scrutiny by the Supreme Court. In Kornahrens, the attorney's adherence to established South Carolina law was deemed acceptable despite the pending Supreme Court review. The court cited several precedents affirming that attorneys are not expected to predict changes in law before they occur. In McNamara's case, the court concluded that his counsel had no grounds to object to the jury instruction based on the prevailing circuit law and that adequate trial preparation was demonstrated. Consequently, the district court's finding of constitutional deficiency was deemed erroneous.

McNamara's Sec. 2255 motion sought to vacate his sentence based on the substantive rule established in Ratzlaf, but the district court failed to evaluate his ability to retroactively apply this rule. The appellate court determined that a comprehensive analysis of Ratzlaf's retroactive application to McNamara's case is crucial and thus remanded the matter to the district court for further proceedings. The court reversed the district court's order, reinstated McNamara's sentence, and instructed the district court to consider the retroactive application of Ratzlaf. Additionally, the district court had instructed the jury on willfulness based on precedent from Rogers, without objections from either party, and noted that other circuits had aligned with this ruling prior to McNamara's trial. In assessing ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, the district court found that McNamara suffered prejudice due to his counsel's performance. However, the appellate court disagreed with the district court's determination of deficient performance, rendering the prejudice assessment unnecessary.