Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; May 17, 1978; Illinois; State Appellate Court
Van Remsen was charged with two counts of disorderly conduct, stemming from incidents involving Rick Salomon and his wife, Janet Lynn Salomon. After a bench trial in the Winnebago County Circuit Court, he was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to 60 days in jail, with credit for time served, and placed on two years of probation. Van Remsen appealed the conviction, raising two primary issues: the constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted and the fairness of the trial considering the admission of evidence regarding other offenses.
Count I alleged that Van Remsen made a harassing phone call to Rick Salomon with the intent to annoy, violating section 26—1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code. Count II charged him with acting in an unreasonable manner that alarmed Salomon and provoked a breach of the peace, in violation of section 26—1(a)(1). The underlying dispute involved a compensation issue related to a script submitted by Van Remsen to Mrs. Salomon, leading to numerous contacts, including phone calls and letters. Despite being told to cease communication, Van Remsen contacted the Salomons on June 23, 1976, leaving a note and making a phone call that the complainant characterized as harassment.
The appeal highlighted the peculiar exchanges during the trial, including the defendant's request to dismiss his counsel, which the court denied. The trial included Van Remsen's claims of unusual communications with Mrs. Salomon via television, contributing to the bizarre nature of the proceedings.
The court has reviewed the record and finds no disputed facts. The defendant argues for the first time on appeal that his disorderly conduct conviction must be reversed because the statute under which he was convicted (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 26—1(a)(2)) was declared unconstitutional in People v. Klick (1977). The defense cites People v. Koppen (1975), asserting that the court can apply the ruling on unconstitutionality to subsequent appeals, even if not raised in the trial court. The State agrees, acknowledging that the statute's definition of disorderly conduct as making annoying phone calls infringes on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court concludes that the conviction must be overturned based on fundamental justice, despite the constitutional issue being raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the legislature has since deleted subsection (a.2) of section 26—1 and established separate provisions for telephone harassment.
Regarding count II, the defendant claims he was denied a fair trial due to the introduction of prejudicial evidence of unrelated offenses. He argues that evidence of prior calls and encounters with the complainant's family confused the trial judge and was unduly prejudicial. The State contends the evidence was relevant to establish intent and that any error in its admission was harmless. Generally, evidence of other crimes is inadmissible unless relevant to intent, motive, identity, or absence of mistake, and appellate courts typically defer to the trial court's discretion in balancing probative value against prejudicial effect. The court will next assess the merits of the defendant's arguments concerning count II.
Evidence of the defendant's prior contacts with the complainant and his family was deemed proper and relevant to demonstrate the defendant's intent and the unreasonable nature of his conduct on June 26, 1976. Even if the admission of this evidence was considered erroneous, any such error was deemed harmless, as the trial presented sufficient evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant did not contest the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the verbal harassment and threats made against Rick Salomon, which constituted disorderly conduct. There was no indication that the trial court was influenced by any allegedly improper evidence in its verdict. Consequently, the court affirmed the conviction for disorderly conduct under count II, reversed the conviction under count I, and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the conviction in count I. The judgment from the circuit court of Winnebago County is thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
