Court: Appellate Court of Illinois; January 14, 1976; Illinois; State Appellate Court
The court affirmed the trial court's order discharging the defendant due to the prosecution's failure to bring him to trial within the statutory period prescribed by section 103.5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The defendant was initially taken into custody on May 8, 1974, for burglary and was held for 75 days before being discharged on July 26, 1974, when a motion for nolle prosequi was granted. He was re-indicted on August 9, 1974, and taken into custody again on August 16, remaining incarcerated for an additional 56 days before being discharged on October 10, 1974. In total, he spent 131 days in custody without trial.
The central issue was whether the initial 75-day period counted towards the 120-day requirement due to the nolle prosequi. Previous cases indicated that the tolling of the statutory period due to a discharge, like nolle prosequi, depends on whether the defendant contributed to the delay. In analogous cases, such as People v. Placek and People v. McAdrian, the courts did not reach a conclusion on tolling because the defendants did not demand a speedy trial. The ruling emphasized that the defendant here did not cause or manipulate the proceedings in a way that would justify tolling the statute. Ultimately, the court upheld the discharge, concluding that the prosecution had not adhered to the statutory time limits.
The record does not indicate that the nolle pros and subsequent re-indictment were deliberate attempts to circumvent the statute. The relevant statute focuses on the time from commitment to trial, not the indictment date. The defendant was in custody for 75 days before the initial indictment was dismissed, and after re-indictment, there were 45 days remaining to bring him to trial, which did not occur. Under the statute, the defendant is entitled to discharge unless the delay is attributable to him. Citing precedents, the court finds that discharging the defendant does not constitute a mockery of justice, and thus affirms the judgment. Additionally, the statute mandates that individuals in custody for alleged offenses should be tried within 120 days unless delays are caused by the defendant.
