UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lung Van NGUYEN, Defendant-Appellant

Citations: 73 F.3d 887; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9664; 95 Daily Journal DAR 16819; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 35577; 1995 WL 747756Docket: 94-10268

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; December 19, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

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Lung Van Nguyen appeals his conviction for unlawfully bringing aliens into the U.S. at a non-designated port, violating 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1324(a)(1)(A). The Ninth Circuit Court found that the district court did not instruct the jury on a crucial element of the offense, leading to a reversal of the conviction. 

Nguyen's arrest was part of a federal investigation into a major alien smuggling operation, suspected to involve two fishing vessels, the 'Angel' and the 'Pelican', which were surveilled leaving Moss Landing, California, and later rendezvousing with a mother ship carrying about 280 Chinese nationals. Upon the Angel's return on June 2, 1993, more than one hundred aliens were discovered aboard. 

Nguyen, who claimed he was merely the boat's mechanic unaware of the smuggling scheme, was indicted alongside three co-defendants for conspiracy and alien smuggling offenses. During the trial, he argued he had no knowledge of the illegal activities until it was too late to withdraw from participation. He testified that he was directed by another individual, 'Danny', who was steering the Angel and instructed him to change course to meet the mother ship for the off-loading of aliens.

Nguyen expressed suspicion that individuals boarding the Angel were illegal aliens but refrained from intervening due to fear of armed crew members. Although he did not receive explicit threats, he feared harm if he attempted to stop the smuggling. Nguyen claimed he made over five attempts to contact the Coast Guard via the Angel's radio, but it was unresponsive; a Coast Guard agent later indicated that the radios had short-range limitations. Nguyen requested that the jury be instructed to convict him only if it found he knowingly brought aliens into the U.S. to evade the INS, but the court rejected this and allowed conviction for knowingly bringing illegal aliens into the country. The jury acquitted him of conspiracy but convicted him under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1324(a)(1)(A), which imposes penalties for bringing any alien to the U.S. outside designated ports of entry. Nguyen argued that a literal interpretation of the statute lacked a mens rea requirement, asserting that the court should have required proof of criminal intent. The court emphasized that defining the elements of a crime is a legislative function and examined the statute's language, which does not explicitly require intent to evade the INS or intent to bring the alien into the U.S., only that the defendant knew the person was an alien and brought them in at an unauthorized location.

The absence of a specified mental element in the statute does not imply that Congress intended to eliminate the traditional mens rea requirement for criminal liability. Supreme Court precedents indicate that more than a mere omission is needed to justify removing this requirement, as a fundamental principle of criminal law is that an individual should possess an "evil-meaning mind" alongside an "evil-doing hand." The belief that a crime necessitates intent is a longstanding principle in legal systems, particularly Anglo-American jurisprudence, where the presence of mens rea is considered the norm and any absence of it is generally disfavored.

In resolving ambiguities regarding Congress's intent to require mens rea, courts will imply such an element, adhering to the rule of lenity, which favors defendants in unclear statutory interpretations. This approach ensures that criminal laws provide clear warnings about prohibited conduct and maintain a balance among legislative, prosecutorial, and judicial powers.

The government contends that the legislative history of section 1324(a)(1)(A) indicates Congressional intent to waive the mens rea requirement. This section, amended by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, previously criminalized activities related to bringing undocumented aliens into the U.S. The statute gained significant attention in the early 1980s during the "Freedom Flotilla" incidents, which involved numerous indictments against defendants transporting undocumented Cuban nationals seeking asylum in the U.S.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed indictments against defendants, ruling that the government could not prove a fraudulent entry into the U.S. under section 1324(a)(1) since the defendants had delivered Cuban nationals directly to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials. The Eleventh Circuit upheld this dismissal, focusing instead on the necessary state of mind for a violation of section 1324(a)(1). The court emphasized that criminal intent is a fundamental element of serious crimes unless explicitly removed by Congress. It concluded that the defendants acted with the intent to comply with the law by bringing the aliens to INS officials, thus precluding prosecution.

The government contended that section 112 of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) aimed to criminalize the conduct of individuals involved in operations like the Mariel boatlift. While the legislative history supports this view, the court disagreed with the government's assertion that Congress intended to eliminate the mens rea requirement. The government cited a House Report suggesting the amendment aimed to address shortcomings in prior cases (Anaya and Zayas-Morales), but the court pointed out that the core issue in those cases was the lack of criminalization for bringing undocumented aliens to INS officials for asylum, which the amended statute does not resolve.

The legislative history referenced by the government relates specifically to Congress's enactment of section 1324(a)(2), which criminalizes the misdemeanor of bringing aliens into the U.S., rather than section 1324(a)(1)(A), the felony offense in question. The Committee on the Judiciary recognized the need to address gaps in existing law, highlighted by cases such as Anaya and Zayas-Morales, asserting that without the threat of criminal prosecution, there would be insufficient deterrence against the transport of undocumented aliens, potentially leading to significant resource expenditures for processing them.

The bill clarifies that individuals knowingly transporting undocumented aliens can face criminal prosecution if they are aware of the alien's status or are willfully blind to it, with penalties of up to $5,000 and one year in jail per transaction, barring aggravating circumstances. It also escalates penalties for knowingly bringing any aliens (documented or undocumented) to locations other than designated ports of entry, with a maximum fine of $10,000 and five years imprisonment per alien.

The history indicates that section 1324(a)(2) was added to criminalize actions similar to those during the Mariel boatlift, and it expands section 1324(a)(1)(A) to include the act of bringing any alien into the U.S. unless the entry occurs at a designated port. However, the legislative history does not support the notion that Congress intended to eliminate the mens rea requirement for felony offenses under section 1324(a)(1)(A).

Interpreting the statute otherwise could lead to criminalizing innocent conduct, such as a boat operator bringing a permanent-resident alien to a non-designated port, risking severe penalties. The intent of Congress, as shown in the legislative history, was not to criminalize innocent actions. Courts have emphasized avoiding interpretations that would yield absurd results or criminalize broadly innocent conduct.

Prior to 1986, section 1324(a)(1) required proof of general intent to commit an illegal act, reflecting common law principles. Although Congress expanded the statute in 1986 to criminalize the unauthorized transportation of aliens into the U.S., there is no indication that Congress intended to eliminate the mens rea requirement inherent in common law offenses. Therefore, a conviction under section 1324(a)(1)(A) necessitates proof of criminal intent.

The government contends that the district court properly instructed the jury on the necessary mens rea. However, this assertion is only partially correct. The jury was informed to find knowledge of the misdemeanor statute's elements, not the required criminal intent for section 1324(a)(1)(A). The defendant, Nguyen, argued for an instruction emphasizing the need for proof of intent to evade the INS, which the district court rejected, opting instead for the government's instruction that inaccurately suggested the need for unlawful entry.

The district court instructed the jury that it could convict Nguyen based on knowledge that he brought an alien into the U.S. unlawfully. While the court aimed to convey that some form of guilty mind was necessary, it failed to clarify that criminal intent must be demonstrated. This error stemmed from conflating the misdemeanor and felony provisions related to alien transportation. Consequently, the jury was misled, as it was instructed on the knowledge requirements of the misdemeanor statute instead of the criminal intent required by section 1324(a)(1)(A). The jury should have been directed to find that Nguyen knew the individuals were aliens and that he intended to violate the law by off-loading them at unauthorized locations. Both knowledge and criminal intent are essential for a proper conviction.

The government is required to prove each element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt for a lawful conviction, as established in *In re Winship* and *United States v. Gaudin*. In the case of Nguyen, the jury was not instructed on the need to find criminal intent, which is a necessary element for conviction. This omission was deemed significant and not harmless, necessitating a reversal of Nguyen's conviction and a remand for a new trial.

To convict someone under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) for bringing an alien into the U.S. at an unauthorized location, the government must demonstrate that the defendant acted with criminal intent. The court noted that the district court's failure to instruct the jury on this essential element was a critical error. The public welfare offense doctrine does not apply to this statute, as it is not considered a public welfare statute and carries severe penalties, undermining any argument that it should be treated as such. The potential penalties under the statute are significant, with possible imprisonment of up to five years per alien, further emphasizing the necessity of proving intent. The court concluded that criminal intent is an integral element of the offense, affirming the need for its explicit consideration in jury instructions.