Jerry Jensen, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated Reginald Pierce Richard Duff Al Wilson Harold Crisp Laddie Dittrich Gus Dawson Victor Carter George Carter Michael Kane Ernest L. Sims Mohamed Abdul Hafiz El-Tabech and Victor Luna, Appellees/cross-Appellants v. Harold W. Clarke, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Director of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services and Frank X. Hopkins, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Warden of the Nebraska State Penitentiary, Appellants/cross-Appellees

Citations: 73 F.3d 808; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 341Docket: 95-1105

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; January 10, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

In the case of Jensen v. Clarke, a class of inmates at the Nebraska State Penitentiary (NSP) challenged their confinement conditions, specifically the practice of double celling, claiming it violated the Eighth Amendment. They also argued that the policy of holding both inmates responsible for contraband found in a double cell infringed on their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. An 18-day evidentiary hearing was conducted, after which the District Court, following the magistrate judge's recommendations, rejected the due process claim but found that the way double celling was implemented did violate constitutional protections. The NSP, a maximum security prison housing violent offenders, was characterized by high levels of violence, which were exacerbated in double cells due to factors such as noise, poor ventilation, lack of privacy, and the contraband policy. The case has been remanded for further consideration based on the precedent set in Farmer v. Brennan.

Double celling and overcrowding at the Nebraska State Penitentiary (NSP) do not inherently violate the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment rights, as the District Court explicitly rejected claims to that effect. Instead, the court identified a substantial risk of harm arising from the assignment of incompatible cellmates, which the defendants were found to have been deliberately indifferent to. The court ruled that while double celling is not unconstitutional per se, the manner in which it was executed posed avoidable risks of violence to some inmates, thus violating the Eighth Amendment.

The case is not final and appealable after the District Court’s liability determination, as clarified by the defendants' attempt to appeal prematurely. A remedial plan was required from the defendants, followed by a delay before its adoption and the awarding of attorney fees to the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court's decision in Farmer v. Brennan, which is pertinent to the liability assessment, occurred during this period.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits 'cruel and unusual punishments,' obligating prison officials to maintain humane confinement conditions, including protecting inmates from violence by others. To establish an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, inmates must show they faced substantial risks of serious harm and that prison officials were aware of and disregarded those risks. This subjective standard is essential, as only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain falls under Eighth Amendment violations.

Before the Farmer decision, the Court evaluated failure-to-protect claims based on a standard requiring proof of a pervasive risk of harm to inmates and a failure by prison officials to respond reasonably to that risk. A 'pervasive risk of harm' was established when violence and sexual assaults occurred frequently enough to instill reasonable fear in inmates and alert officials to the need for protective measures. Under this earlier standard, plaintiffs only needed to show that officials 'knew or should have known' about a substantial risk to inmate safety.

However, the District Court's liability determination in this case, based on the 1992 standard, does not align with the subjective-state-of-mind requirement of deliberate indifference established in Farmer. While the District Court's language suggested an understanding of the Farmer standard, it ultimately shifted to a standard that implied liability based on the obviousness of risk, which is inconsistent with Farmer's rejection of that notion.

Thus, the case is remanded to the District Court to determine whether the defendants were actually aware of and disregarded a substantial risk to the plaintiffs' safety, as mandated by Farmer. The Court retains jurisdiction to review the District Court's findings on remand. Additionally, an existing injunction requires defendants to implement a plan to prevent random assignments of incoming inmates to double cells without assessing compatibility.