United States v. Juan Ramon Matta-Lopez, AKA Matta-Ballesteros, AKA Juan Ramon, AKA El Negro, AKA Juan Ramon Matta

Citations: 73 F.3d 371; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 40875; 1995 WL 759201Docket: 90-50053

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; December 25, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

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Juan Ramon Matta, also known by several aliases, appeals his conviction for conducting a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) and drug-related charges, including conspiracy to distribute cocaine and multiple counts of distribution and possession. The appeal is under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit, which affirms the conviction.

The case stems from a significant cocaine operation in Van Nuys, California, dismantled by DEA agents in September 1981. From January to September 1981, the organization sold 1,347 kilograms of cocaine valued at over $73 million. The government presented evidence linking Matta as the leader and supplier of the operation, asserting that he was also known as 'El Negro' or 'Jose Campo.' 

Key evidence included ledgers and phone records showing transactions involving cocaine deliveries and payments exceeding $23 million. Additionally, personal documents connected to Matta were found at the crime scene, including a phone book with coded numbers that matched his wife's business. Testimony from a courier and Hector Barona, a former drug smuggler in witness protection, further established Matta’s role. Barona described being recruited by an associate of Matta to import cocaine and provided details of shipments and communications that corroborated the government’s case against Matta, including calls and interactions linked to the drug operation. 

Overall, the evidence presented at trial firmly established Matta's involvement in the criminal enterprise and drug distribution activities.

Telephone toll records indicated that Barona made calls from his phone to a Bogota, Colombia number during a specified timeframe. In November 1981, Barona traveled to Cali, Colombia, following Acosta's directions to a house identified as 5-55 Guadalupe Avenue, which was listed in the local phone book as the business address of Matta's wife. There, Barona encountered a man who introduced himself as Jose Campo; Barona later identified this man as Matta during the trial. The jury found Matta guilty on all counts, resulting in a life sentence without parole on the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) count and concurrent fifteen-year sentences on substantive counts, with an alternative fifteen-year conspiracy sentence contingent on a potential appeal reversal of the CCE conviction.

Matta appealed, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction because he was forcibly taken from Honduras for trial. This argument was previously rejected in United States v. Matta-Ballesteros. Matta also claimed his speedy trial rights were violated due to delays from the unsealing of the indictment to his arrival in the U.S. and subsequent arraignment. However, the appellate court did not address this claim, noting that Matta had not adequately raised it in the district court, which had denied his motion without prejudice.

Matta further contended that the district court improperly admitted coconspirator statements, arguing insufficient evidence to establish his connection to the conspiracy and challenging specific statements on the grounds of timing and attribution. The court disagreed, indicating that such statements, while not definitive proof, could still demonstrate Matta's involvement. Matta's objections to the admission of certain evidence were found lacking, particularly regarding testimony about two attempted cocaine shipments occurring after the indictment’s specified period.

Matta's statements to Barona qualify as party admissions under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), as established in United States v. Zavala-Serra. The court upheld the admission of these statements, even those made post-conspiracy, as they pertain to Matta's knowledge and involvement in the conspiracy, supported by a limiting instruction from the district court. 

Matta's objections to Barona's testimony primarily focus on the admissibility of subsequent bad acts under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), arguing that the testimony is prejudicial due to Barona's alleged lack of credibility. However, the credibility of witnesses is determined by the trier of fact. Barona's testimony was corroborated by additional evidence, including pilots, drug ledgers, and telephone records, which reinforced his account of drug importations. The district court’s limiting instruction mitigated any potential unfair prejudice under Rule 403.

Regarding the admission of statements by unindicted coconspirator Acosta, any error in their admission was deemed harmless, as they duplicated existing evidence. Matta also contested the admission of two documents (Government Exhibits 27 and 9B), arguing that handwriting analysis failed to link them to any coconspirator. These documents, found in a coconspirator's possession, contained phone numbers associated with Matta’s wife’s business and names linked to the conspiracy. The district court allowed these documents as evidence to establish connections among the individuals involved, consistent with precedent that permits hearsay declarations for limited purposes, as seen in United States v. Sanchez-Lopez and United States v. Mazyak.

Evidence may be admitted if it is relevant, authentic, and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice, as per Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Documents were admitted in this case to demonstrate association, found in a drug-related apartment or discarded by a coconspirator. The district court provided a limiting instruction to reduce undue prejudice, and thus did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. Any potential error in admission was deemed harmless as the notations in the documents were duplicative of other admitted evidence.

To admit coconspirator statements, the government must establish the existence of a conspiracy and the defendant's connection to it by a preponderance of evidence. While coconspirator statements are typically considered unreliable, a slight connection to the conspiracy suffices for their admission. Testimony from Barona indicated that he imported cocaine from Matta and delivered it to Zapata-Serna, corroborated by pilot testimonies regarding flights during the conspiracy. Additional evidence linked Matta to the Van Nuys drug operation. 

Matta challenged the admission of a 1981 Cali phone directory and a Venezuelan passport. The phone directory was deemed admissible under Rule 803(17) as it contained relevant business information related to Matta. Witness testimonies supported its reliability. The Venezuelan passport, containing Matta's photograph and a false name, was also admitted; it suggested he was not merely a legitimate rancher. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting either piece of evidence.

The admission of Matta's passport was deemed harmless as it did not affect his substantial rights. Matta's motions for acquittal and a new trial were denied on several grounds: insufficient evidence of his connection to the conspiracy, improper jury instructions regarding the conspiracy count, prejudicial publicity, and new evidence identifying another drug trafficker as "El Negro." The court found sufficient evidence for the conspiracy conviction, noting that the government only needed to demonstrate a "slight" connection between Matta and the conspiracy. Barona's testimony identified Matta as the drug supplier, and the jury's assessment of Barona's credibility was upheld. Additional corroborating evidence included testimonies from pilots and documentation linking Matta to the conspiracy.

The court ruled that the jury instructions were appropriate, and the pretrial publicity did not warrant a presumption of bias since jurors claimed they could remain impartial. The relevance of an article about another drug trafficker did not merit a new trial, as it was cumulative and unlikely to change the verdict. Matta's argument regarding a violation of his Confrontation Clause rights due to limitations on cross-examination of Barona was rejected, as the court deemed the excluded inquiries non-probative. Matta had ample opportunity for cross-examination, preserving the jury's ability to assess Barona's reliability. Lastly, Matta's claim of prosecutorial vouching was not considered plain error, as the district court intervened to clarify the prosecutor's statements regarding documentary evidence.

The prosecutor's statement that notations in drug ledgers are reliable does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct that would render Matta's trial fundamentally unfair. Additionally, the prosecutor's speculation regarding Barona's potential cross-examination was not considered vouching, and any associated error was not deemed plain error affecting the fairness of the trial. The prosecutor’s comment about the government's risk in plea bargains was a response to Matta's criticism and also did not amount to plain error. Matta's argument against sentencing on both the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) count and the underlying substantive offenses is rejected; while sentencing on both a CCE count and a predicate conspiracy count is not permitted, sentencing on a CCE offense alongside underlying substantive offenses is allowed. The district court properly sentenced Matta to life without parole on the CCE count, concurrent fifteen-year sentences for the substantive offenses, and an alternative fifteen-year conspiracy count sentence, contingent upon a possible reversal of the CCE conviction on appeal. The ruling is affirmed and not subject to publication or citation in this circuit except as specified by 9th Cir.R. 36-3.