Zambrano v. Immigration & Naturalization Service

Citation: 282 F.3d 1145Docket: No. 00-16191

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; March 6, 2002; Federal Appellate Court

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The case addresses whether a court can reevaluate subject matter jurisdiction for awarding fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) after a prior dismissal for lack of jurisdiction has become final. The court concludes that it cannot. Plaintiffs are appealing the district court's denial of fees related to a class action challenging regulations enforced by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). After the initial dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiffs sought fees under the EAJA, which the district court denied again based on jurisdictional grounds. 

The case originated as a class action against INS regulations concerning the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), spanning ten years across three courts. In 1988, the district court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss and granted preliminary injunction and class certification for two groups of individuals. In 1989, the court issued a partial summary judgment favoring Plaintiffs, invalidating the challenged regulations and enjoining their enforcement, preventing Defendants from denying work authorizations to or deporting class members. 

Defendants appealed, but the Circuit Court affirmed the district court's decisions. The Supreme Court later vacated this judgment and remanded for reevaluation in light of its opinion in Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs. Inc., which identified additional jurisdictional barriers. The Supreme Court ruled that claims from members who had not applied for legalization were not ripe, while claims from timely filers could only be addressed in Circuit Courts after a final deportation order. Although the Supreme Court's ruling limited relief for many applicants, it acknowledged potential jurisdiction for late filers who were "front-desked."

Front-desking refers to plaintiffs who were informed at the "front desk" of an INS office that the regulations would prevent their applications from being approved, thus barring them from applying. This class has ripe claims since they experienced a concrete impact from the challenged regulation. The Supreme Court recognized that while those directly front-desked have clear claims, others who were constructively front-desked might also demonstrate that the policy significantly influenced their decision not to apply, potentially rendering their claims ripe.

Following the Supreme Court's remand for lower courts to assess claims of those who were front-desked, the case returned to the district court in August 1993. After unsuccessful settlement attempts, Defendants sought to dismiss the complaint, arguing that all claims were invalid under the Supreme Court's ruling. Plaintiffs amended their complaint by removing Class One and introducing new claims, three of which were novel procedural challenges. The court dismissed a claim regarding public charge regulations due to a lack of identified class members with ripe claims but allowed the new claims to proceed.

Subsequently, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) affected the court's jurisdiction over the case, leading Defendants to request dismissal of the amended complaint. However, the district court ruled that IIRIRA § 377 aligned with the Supreme Court's ripeness determination and found that some claims met exceptions to the jurisdictional bar, thus allowing them to continue. In June 1997, after a denial of reconsideration for the dismissal motion, Defendants appealed and sought a stay of interim relief orders, which was denied in August 1997. The Ninth Circuit's opinion on January 16, 1998, effectively ended the claims of both the CSS and Zambrano Plaintiffs.

The enactment of § 377 was intended by Congress to eliminate federal court jurisdiction over claims from aliens who did not file applications due to the front-desking policy, even if they were not directly subjected to it. The court emphasized that only class members who were actually front-desked could raise claims related to the Defendants' application procedures. A broader interpretation of § 377 would contradict Congress's goal to end litigation on this matter. Following this, Plaintiffs attempted to add two individuals who had been front-desked as class representatives, but their motion was denied due to the district court lacking jurisdiction while Defendants’ appeal was pending. The Ninth Circuit later vacated the district court’s orders and remanded the case for dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' subsequent requests for rehearing and appeal concerning the denial of intervention were also dismissed. They did not seek Supreme Court review nor file a new complaint. In seeking fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), the district court denied the motion, citing lack of jurisdiction over the underlying action as a barrier to awarding fees. The appeal that followed addressed the standard of review for the denial of attorney’s fees, which is based on whether the district court abused its discretion and whether it correctly interpreted the EAJA's jurisdictional requirements. For the court to award fees under the EAJA, it must have had jurisdiction over the underlying action, as this is a prerequisite for any fee award.

Fee-shifting statutes do not independently confer subject-matter jurisdiction. This principle has been upheld in multiple cases, including Branson v. Nott, where it was established that if a district court lacks jurisdiction over the substantive claim, it also lacks the authority to award attorney's fees under fee-shifting statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Similarly, in In re Knight, the 9th Circuit reversed a fee award because the underlying action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, confirming that the fee-shifting provision of ERISA does not grant jurisdiction. In Latch v. United States, it was determined that Section 7430 of the tax code does not provide an independent jurisdictional basis, thus barring fee awards when the underlying tax claim lacked jurisdiction. The decisions in these cases highlight that jurisdiction must exist independently of the fee-shifting provisions, a concept that applies equally to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Since the plaintiffs' underlying action was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and this dismissal is final, the EAJA cannot supply the jurisdiction that was absent initially. Plaintiffs' argument for reconsideration of jurisdiction during the fee request phase, citing Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Authority v. EPA and Antosh v. Federal Election Commission, is flawed as those cases did not involve prior jurisdictional dismissals; the issue of jurisdiction was presumed to exist in those contexts.

The district court's decision on jurisdiction in the current case is final and cannot be reexamined, as established in Knight, which asserts that a party cannot raise jurisdiction issues after failing to appeal a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court accepted the district court's finding of lacking jurisdiction, which aligns with principles of issue and claim preclusion, meaning that any determinations made in a final judgment are conclusive in subsequent actions between the same parties.

The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs' class action following this Court's vacating of its prior orders and remanding the case for dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The dismissal became final and unappealable when the Plaintiffs did not seek a writ of certiorari after a rehearing was denied.

The Plaintiffs claim that amendments to amnesty law, signed into law by former President Clinton on December 21, 2000, retroactively restored subject matter jurisdiction over their case. These amendments allow eligible class members in specific class-action legalization cases a new chance to apply for lawful permanent residence. The relevant legislation includes H.R. 4942, which provides appropriations and a new application opportunity for certain class members, and H.R. 4577, which extends these benefits to Zambrano class applicants.

The Plaintiffs argue that the LIFE Act retroactively conferred jurisdiction on the district court for awarding fees under the EAJA. However, a comprehensive reading of the LIFE Act reveals that Congress intended to provide eligible class applicants with a new opportunity to submit applications, which must adhere to new requirements, rather than retroactively restoring jurisdiction. The new provisions allow eligible applicants from specified class actions a one-year period to apply for lawful permanent residence, commencing from the date the INS issues final regulations, required within 120 days of the LIFE Act's enactment.

New applications under the LIFE Act must meet specific requirements, including that applicants entered the U.S. before January 1, 1982, and resided unlawfully until May 4, 1988. Eligible individuals are those who filed claims for class membership before October 1, 2000, following court orders in related cases. The legislation's retroactive repeal of § 377 was intended to eliminate jurisdictional barriers for new amnesty provisions, not to grant the district court jurisdiction for awarding fees. Plaintiffs’ assertion that Congress's repeal vested the district court with jurisdiction is flawed; it would require Congress to overturn a final judgment, which is impermissible. The finality of judicial decisions prevents retroactive legislative changes from altering the legal standing of past cases. In this instance, Congress repealed § 377 after a final judgment was issued and subsequent to the denial of an EAJA application. Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity for EAJA awards applies only in courts with jurisdiction over the action, and there is no independent jurisdiction granted under the EAJA. The Court's prior order confirmed the lack of jurisdiction in the district court regarding the Plaintiffs' action. Although Congress can waive preclusion defenses against itself, such actions are valid only when creating new forums for claims, as clarified by the Supreme Court in the Sioux Nation case. The Court emphasized that new legislation does not question the finality of earlier judgments but allows for the enforcement of new legal rights in a new context.

Congress provided a forum for a new judicial review of the Black Hills claim, based on findings from the Court of Claims and applicable legal principles, without evaluating the merits of prior decisions or interfering with their finality. The Court of Claims retains the authority to reaffirm its 1942 judgment regarding the claim's non-cognizability under the Fifth Amendment, depending on its review of facts and law. The interpretation of statutes must adhere to constitutional principles. The legislation does not reverse the Court's prior determination of lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the Zambrano class-action and solely offers a new venue to present the claim under different legal standards. Congress did not grant jurisdiction for fee awards in concluded litigation, and interpreting the LIFE Act as retroactively restoring jurisdiction in the Zambrano case would be unconstitutional; thus, such an interpretation is avoided. The earlier dismissal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction is binding for fee awards under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), rendering the previous dismissal a final judgment. The appeal did not address specific INS regulations regarding public charges as they were deemed immaterial. Class One included timely filers, while Class Two consisted of late filers. The plaintiffs did not seek fees for work after 1993, and the discussion did not extend to Congress's authority to eliminate fee eligibility through a retroactive, jurisdiction-stripping statute. Ultimately, § 377 of IIRIRA removed the district court's jurisdiction over the underlying action.