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Deborah R. Morris v. United States
Citations: 73 F.3d 216; 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 342; 1996 WL 9607Docket: 95-2803
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; January 11, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
The appeal in Morris v. United States centers on whether the government's plea bargain agreement, which stated it would "take no position" on a downward departure motion based on aberrant behavior, restricted cross-examination of a defense psychologist during sentencing. The court found no error in allowing cross-examination to clarify agreed facts. Deborah R. Morris set fire to her husband's bed after discovering his infidelity, leading to an indictment for assault with intent to commit murder. A plea bargain replaced the indictment with a lesser charge, and Morris admitted to the offense's elements in a stipulation that acknowledged it involved more than minimal planning. The plea agreement required the government to recommend a sentence at the lower end of the guideline range and not oppose a motion for a downward departure based on aberrant behavior. At sentencing, a clinical psychologist testified that Morris’s situation was consistent with being a battered spouse. The prosecution cross-examined the psychologist to refocus the discussion on the specific incident of marital infidelity rather than broader spousal abuse. The defense objected, claiming this contradicted the plea agreement. The court noted that there is no established precedent in this Circuit regarding the limits of "taking a position" on guideline departures during sentencing. It ruled that the prosecution's cross-examination was appropriate to ensure the inquiry remained aligned with the agreed-upon facts, thereby allowing the court to present the true circumstances of the case. An agreement 'not to take a position' does not restrict the prosecutor's ability to question witnesses to prevent the defense from broadening its motion beyond the agreed statement of facts regarding spousal abuse. The mention of spousal abuse and 'post traumatic stress disorder' in the psychologist's report was not included in the stipulated facts. A 'single act of aberrant behavior' is defined as spontaneous and thoughtless, with the defense arguing that marital infidelity triggered a spontaneous reaction from the wife. However, as the defense began to expand its argument to include other behaviors of the alleged victim, the prosecution was entitled to cross-examine to ensure the defense remained within the agreed facts and did not generalize the claims to a broader context of domestic violence. The court reviewed the record carefully due to the unique nature of the case and found no abuse of discretion by the district court in permitting reasonable cross-examination. The decision is affirmed.