Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; December 27, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
Anthony Sutera filed a lawsuit against Schering Corporation, claiming his termination violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the New York Human Rights Law. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Schering, concluding that the company provided a sufficient basis for Sutera's dismissal. Sutera appealed, arguing that he established a prima facie case of age discrimination and that there were genuine issues regarding whether Schering's reasons for his termination were a pretext for discrimination. The Court of Appeals found merit in Sutera's arguments, vacated the lower court's judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Sutera had been employed by Schering for over thirty years as a sales representative. His job involved marketing pharmaceutical products and required strict compliance with regulations concerning the distribution of samples to physicians. The issue leading to his termination arose when his supervisor discovered signed but unsubmitted Focus Cards in his car, some dated weeks or months prior. After questioning Sutera, discrepancies in physician signatures were noted, and three physicians provided statements asserting that the signatures on the unsubmitted cards were not theirs. Sutera was terminated on July 31, 1992, due to these signature irregularities, although he later obtained a statement from one doctor suggesting that a disputed signature might be genuine.
Sutera, aged sixty-six at his discharge, had a base salary of $47,300, received commissions, participated in profit sharing, and received six weeks of vacation and ninety days of sick leave annually. In contrast, newly hired sales representatives earned about half of his salary, did not receive commissions or profit sharing, and had only two weeks of vacation and limited sick leave. Sutera was replaced by a younger employee with a lower salary. He filed his complaint on August 23, 1994, and a discovery schedule was set, with deadlines for document production and responses. However, Schering filed for summary judgment on December 27, 1994, before discovery began, leading to the abandonment of the discovery schedule. The district court granted Schering’s motion on March 7, 1995, dismissing Sutera's complaint, prompting his appeal.
The standard for reviewing the grant of summary judgment is de novo, requiring that there be no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must draw reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), discharging an individual based on age is unlawful. The burden-shifting analysis from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green applies, where the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination, after which the defendant must provide a legitimate reason for the employment decision. If successful, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that this reason is a pretext for discrimination.
Plaintiff has successfully established a prima facie case of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), meeting the required elements: he is a member of the protected age group (66 years old), qualified for his position, discharged, and the circumstances suggest age discrimination. His qualifications include over 31 years of experience and recent accolades, including the Distinguished District Representative of the Year Award. Additionally, he claims age-related harassment from his supervisor, an unfavorable performance evaluation despite his accolades, rejection of early retirement offers, and replacement by a younger employee at a lower salary.
Following the plaintiff's establishment of a prima facie case, the burden shifted to the defendant, Schering, to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge. Schering cited Sutera's alleged forgery of physician signatures as the reason for termination.
Once the defendant articulated this reason, the plaintiff had the opportunity to demonstrate that the provided rationale was a pretext for discrimination. The plaintiff is not required to prove the employer's reasons were false but must show that discriminatory motives were at least one of the factors influencing the employment decision. The determination of whether discrimination occurred rests with the trier of fact, who will evaluate the evidence presented.
The district court granted Schering's motion for summary judgment, preventing Sutera from presenting his case, concluding that Sutera's alleged forgery of physician signatures was not a pretext for discrimination. This conclusion was reached without referencing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework or confirming whether Sutera established a prima facie case. The court dismissed Sutera's claims based on the assertion that using a signature not from a physician or their staff violated both law and company policy.
Sutera had the opportunity to interview involved physicians, with two not altering their stance. However, he did not adequately explain the presence of outdated and improperly signed cards in his car. The court believed Schering provided sufficient evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Sutera's termination, which no rational fact-finder could dispute.
The summary judgment was challenged on two grounds: First, the court's characterization of Sutera's actions as violative of statute and policy lacked evidentiary support, as Schering’s investigation focused only on the authenticity of signatures on unsubmitted cards found in Sutera's car, not on submitted cards. Sutera claimed the cards were there because he deemed them unfit for submission, and keeping them did not violate any laws or company policies.
Second, Schering argued Sutera admitted that some submitted cards might have been signed by unauthorized individuals. However, Sutera contended that Schering's management had witnessed and accepted the practice of obtaining physician signatures through office personnel. Schering's evidence included statements to physicians that suggested their policy might not require the physician's direct signature, allowing for the inference that their rationale for Sutera's termination could be seen as pretextual. Thus, a rational trier of fact could potentially find Schering's reasons for Sutera's discharge to be unsubstantiated.
The district court failed to provide Sutera with an opportunity to prove that the alleged forgery of physicians' signatures was not the actual reason for his dismissal, but rather a pretext for discrimination. Sutera argues that discovery would have allowed him to obtain evidence supporting his claim that Schering's policies allowed his method of obtaining signatures on Focus Cards. According to established legal precedent, a party opposing a summary judgment must have the chance to discover essential information for their case. In this instance, summary judgment was granted before any discovery occurred, preventing Sutera from adequately demonstrating that Schering's stated reason for his termination was pretextual. Therefore, the order for summary judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Additionally, claims against Schering-Plough Corporation were dismissed by mutual agreement, and similar reasoning applies to claims under the New York Human Rights Law.
