Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; August 20, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
Angelica Garduño Arpin appeals a district court's summary judgment favoring Santa Clara County, its Sheriff's Department, and Officers R. Stone and D. Barnes (collectively "County Defendants") on claims of false arrest and imprisonment, excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, assault and battery, and unlawful strip search. Additionally, she appeals the dismissal of her claims against Santa Clara Valley Transportation Agency (SCVTA) and bus driver Ronald Ruiz (collectively "Transit Defendants"), which include similar allegations of false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, and violations of common carrier duties. Jurisdiction is established under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and the appeal was timely filed. The court found errors in the district court's dismissal of Arpin's false arrest and imprisonment claims against Ruiz, Stone, and Barnes, as well as her state law claims against the Transit Defendants, leading to a reversal of those dismissals. However, all other claims were deemed without merit, affirming the district court’s decision regarding them.
In the background, Arpin's complaint arose from an incident on June 25, 1996, when she boarded an SCVTA bus and presented an expired senior/disabled bus pass. After the bus driver, Ruiz, demanded additional identification and accused her of cheating, he contacted the Sheriff's Department. Officers Stone and Barnes arrived, leading to Arpin's alleged wrongful arrest. Allegations include Ruiz making a false report of battery against Arpin, Stone searching her purse without consent and breaking her eyeglasses, and handcuffing her with excessive force. Arpin disputes the claims of battery and the manner of her treatment during the incident.
Arpin was detained by Officer Stone and taken to Elmwood Jail, where she underwent a strip search by female sheriff's officers, who allegedly subjected her to humiliating actions. During her detention, she experienced harassment due to her Mexican-American status. Criminal charges against her were dismissed three months later, after which her claims for damages against SCVTA and the Sheriffs Department were rejected. Arpin filed a lawsuit, leading to motions to dismiss by the Transit Defendants and the County Defendants, resulting in the dismissal of claims for false arrest and false imprisonment. Summary judgment motions were filed, culminating in the district court granting summary judgment on most claims, except for a failure to train claim and an unlawful strip search claim against the Sheriffs Department, which required further briefing. Ultimately, the court granted summary judgment on all remaining claims, favoring the defendants. Arpin appealed the decision, but did not argue several claims in her opening brief, resulting in their waiver. Summary judgment is reviewed de novo, requiring the nonmoving party to present specific facts to show a genuine issue for trial; mere evidence is insufficient for opposing summary judgment.
The district court's summary judgment was reviewed concerning Arpin's claims for excessive force, assault and battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, breach of common carrier’s duty of care, and unlawful strip search. The court found Arpin did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate her arrest was unlawful or that her detention was excessively lengthy; however, the County Defendants were still entitled to summary judgment on the state law claims of false arrest and false imprisonment.
Under California law, false arrest is a form of false imprisonment, defined as violating another's personal liberty without lawful privilege. According to California Penal Code Section 847, peace officers are protected from claims of false arrest or imprisonment if the arrest was lawful. Arpin was arrested without a warrant for battery against transportation personnel and resisting arrest. A warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor is lawful if the officer has reasonable cause to believe a misdemeanor was committed in their presence. Since Officers Stone and Barnes arrived after the alleged battery, they could not lawfully arrest Arpin for either charge.
The County Defendants claimed that the bus driver, Ruiz, executed a citizen’s arrest for battery, which is permissible under California law if the misdemeanor occurred in the citizen's presence. A citizen's arrest can be implied from actions like summoning police or pointing out the suspect, without needing specific language. Therefore, the legal standing of Arpin's arrest hinges on whether the citizen’s arrest by Ruiz was valid.
Arpin's complaint alleges that Ruiz contacted the Sheriff's Department, leading to the arrival of Officers Stone and Barnes, who were informed by Ruiz that Arpin had touched him. Ruiz filed a battery report against Arpin in her presence. Despite Arpin’s claims, the facts indicate that Ruiz effectively arrested Arpin and tasked Officers Stone and Barnes with taking her into custody. Case law suggests that a citizen's arrest can be inferred even if the citizen does not explicitly state an intention to arrest, and peace officers accepting a citizen’s arrest are not liable for false arrest or imprisonment, as they are protected under California law when receiving a charged individual. Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment to Officers Stone and Barnes regarding false arrest and unlawful imprisonment claims, which also extended to the County and the Sheriff's Department due to the officers' immunity.
Regarding the excessive force claim, the district court determined that Officers Stone and Barnes had probable cause to detain Arpin. The court noted that Arpin did not refute the officers' account of her non-compliance during the handcuffing process, which led to the use of additional force. The excessive force claim is evaluated under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard, requiring a balance between the nature of the intrusion and governmental interests. The assessment of reasonableness is based on the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, considering factors such as the severity of the crime, the suspect's threat level, and whether the suspect is resisting arrest. Importantly, the absence of probable cause does not justify resistance unless the officer acts in bad faith or provocatively.
Officer Stone's Incident Report reveals that Arpin refused to provide her Transit Identification when requested and did not comply with his instructions regarding her purse. After warning her of potential arrest, Officer Stone attempted to handcuff Arpin when she resisted by stiffening her arm. He used physical force to restrain her, ultimately handcuffing her without causing injury. Stone deemed his force reasonable under the circumstances, citing case law that supports the use of force when an individual resists arrest. Arpin failed to provide specific factual disputes against Officer Stone's account, with her only rebuttal being a vague claim of non-resistance, which does not contradict Stone's description of events.
Arpin's claims of injury lack evidentiary support, as she did not present medical records to substantiate her assertions. Consequently, the court found that she did not meet her burden of proof regarding the unreasonableness of the force used or the existence of any injuries, leading to the granting of summary judgment in favor of the County Defendants on her unreasonable force claim.
Her state law claims of assault and battery also failed for the same reasons, as California law requires proof of unreasonable force causing injury. Without evidence of such force or resultant injury, her claims could not succeed.
Regarding the strip search, Arpin acknowledged that such searches for minor offenses violate the Fourth Amendment unless reasonable suspicion exists. However, she did not allege that Officers Stone or Barnes were involved in the strip search, which was conducted by unnamed female officers. Thus, Stone and Barnes were not liable for any constitutional violations stemming from the search. Arpin claimed liability against the County and the Sheriff's Department based on policy, but the absence of direct involvement from Stone and Barnes limits their liability.
The county policy prohibits strip searches of individuals arrested for misdemeanors unless the arresting officer deems it necessary and has a specific suspicion of contraband. Arpin failed to provide evidence that this policy was not in effect or that the strip search was improperly conducted. Instead, Arpin attempted to dispute the facts by referencing the defendants’ counsel arguments regarding the nature of her arrest for violent misdemeanors, which do not constitute evidence capable of creating a factual dispute. Consequently, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for the County Defendants, as Arpin did not demonstrate any triable issues regarding the strip search's compliance with established policies.
Regarding the motion to dismiss, the court reviews such dismissals de novo under Rule 12(b)(6), affirming that all factual allegations must be accepted as true and reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Conclusory allegations and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. A dismissal is justified only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot establish any facts to support their claim.
On the issue of appeal timeliness, the Transit Defendants contended that Arpin's appeal was untimely as it was filed after the December 7, 1998, dismissal order. However, it was determined that the dismissal was not final until all claims against all parties were resolved, which occurred on April 22, 1999. As no Rule 54(b) certification was issued, Arpin's appeal, filed on May 21, 1999, was timely.
Lastly, Arpin alleged false arrest and imprisonment claims against Defendants Ruiz, Stone, and Barnes under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed these claims, noting that the Fourth Amendment does not apply merely because a person is acting on behalf of the government, contrasting it with the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983.
The Fourth Amendment applies only to government actions that qualify as a "search" or "seizure." For a non-law enforcement government actor, like Ruiz, to be held to the Fourth Amendment, it must be shown that he acted to assist governmental functions rather than for personal reasons. Arpin's complaint alleges that Ruiz, a bus driver for a county agency, engaged in a dispute with her regarding her identification. Following this dispute, Ruiz called law enforcement and falsely reported that Arpin had battered him, leading to her arrest by Officers Stone and Barnes. The allegations suggest that Ruiz acted with the intent to enforce county policy against Arpin, thereby implicating the Fourth Amendment in this context. If Ruiz's report was indeed false, it would constitute an unreasonable seizure of Arpin’s person, violating her Fourth Amendment rights. The complaint also claims that Officers Stone and Barnes violated Arpin’s rights by arresting her without probable cause, as they did not conduct an independent investigation into the claims made by Ruiz. Arpin asserts that Officer Stone failed to identify himself or explain her arrest and did not allow her to present her side before taking her into custody.
Officers Stone and Barnes may have arrested Arpin solely based on Ruiz's unverified allegation, which raises questions about their probable cause due to a lack of independent investigation into the claim. Evidence outside the complaint, including witness interviews, is not permissible in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The complaint does not establish a claim against the SCVTA, the Sheriff's Department, or the County for violating Arpin's Fourth Amendment rights, as constitutional claims require a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. A local governmental entity can be sued under this statute only if a constitutional violation was enacted through an official policy or custom. Arpin's complaint does not allege that her arrest was in accordance with any official policies of the SCVTA or Sheriff's Department, and while she claims her strip-search was policy-driven, there is no similar assertion regarding her arrest. Consequently, the district court properly dismissed her Fourth Amendment claims against these entities.
Conversely, Arpin adequately alleges a state law claim for false arrest or false imprisonment against Ruiz, referencing a California Court of Appeal precedent that holds an accuser liable if they knowingly provide false information to induce an arrest. The complaint suggests that Ruiz made false statements to the police, implying he intended to confine Arpin. Additionally, Arpin’s claim for false imprisonment against the SCVTA is supported by the doctrine of respondeat superior, as Ruiz was employed by the SCVTA at the time of the incident, acting within the scope of his employment during the dispute over Arpin’s bus identification.
Allegations in Arpin's complaint indicate that each Defendant acted as an agent for one another and that they, including the SCVTA, falsely arrested and imprisoned her. This supports a claim of vicarious liability for the SCVTA under the respondeat superior doctrine, as federal liberal pleading standards allow for claims based on sufficient allegations, even if the specific term "respondeat superior" is not used. The court referenced several cases affirming that liability does not hinge on authorization of an employee's actions but rather on whether those actions occurred within the scope of employment. The district court erred by dismissing Arpin's state law false imprisonment claim against the Transit Defendants.
Conversely, Arpin's claims of assault and battery against the Transit Defendants lack merit, as her complaint does not assert that Ruiz inflicted any harmful or offensive contact. The only alleged harmful contact involved Officers Stone and Barnes' use of excessive force during her arrest, and there is no evidence that Ruiz assisted or encouraged this action.
Regarding common carrier claims, the district court correctly dismissed them because Arpin did not establish a breach of duty under Cal. Civ. Code § 2100, given that any injuries occurred after she voluntarily exited the bus. The court also appropriately declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her claim under § 2103 due to its novel nature, which Arpin did not contest.
In conclusion, the district court's dismissal of Arpin's false arrest and imprisonment claims against Ruiz, Stone, and Barnes, as well as her state law claims against Ruiz and the SCVTA, has been reversed. The dismissals of her assault and battery claims and common carrier claims are affirmed. The district court's summary judgment is also upheld, with each party responsible for their own fees and costs. Arpin was considered under arrest due to the citizen's arrest made by Ruiz.
