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UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Ramon MATTA-BALLESTEROS, Defendant-Appellant
Citations: 71 F.3d 754; 95 Daily Journal DAR 15853; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9042; 43 Fed. R. Serv. 338; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 33475; 1995 WL 704693Docket: 91-50336
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; December 1, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros appeals his convictions for: 1) committing a crime of violence in aid of racketeering (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1959); 2) conspiring to kidnap a federal agent (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1201(c)); and 3) kidnapping a federal agent (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1201(a)). He argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction and made reversible errors during his trial. The Ninth Circuit Court affirms his convictions. Matta-Ballesteros was involved with a drug trafficking enterprise led by several Mexican nationals, including Felix-Gallardo, which operated in Guadalajara, Mexico, and earned substantial profits from cocaine trafficking. Following significant DEA seizures in 1984 that impacted their operations, meetings were held to discuss retaliating against the DEA agent responsible. The enterprise identified Special Agent Enrique Camarena as the target for kidnapping. Camarena disappeared on February 7, 1985, after leaving his office, and evidence indicates he was subsequently tortured and killed. Matta-Ballesteros checked out of a hotel in Guadalajara shortly after becoming aware of surveillance, and forensic evidence, including hair consistent with his, was found at the location where Camarena was held. On April 29, 1985, Matta-Ballesteros was arrested in Cartagena, Colombia, on charges unrelated to the kidnapping and murder of DEA agent Camarena. After being taken to Bogotá, he denied involvement in the murder but acknowledged having knowledge of it, citing fears for his safety. The U.S. sought his extradition for unrelated charges but failed to pursue a long-dormant escape charge, leading to his return to Honduras. On April 5, 1988, Matta-Ballesteros was forcibly abducted from his home in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, by U.S. Marshals, assisted by Honduran Special Troops. He was transported under duress to a U.S. Air Force Base and then to the U.S., where he was incarcerated within 24 hours. He alleges that he was beaten and tortured during this process, which the government disputes. Matta-Ballesteros petitioned unsuccessfully for a writ of habeas corpus and was later convicted in Florida on drug and escape charges. Following this, he faced charges in California related to the conspiracy to kidnap and kill Camarena. He was convicted of multiple charges, including conspiracy to commit violent acts and kidnapping, but acquitted of murder charges against a federal agent. Matta-Ballesteros contends that his abduction and mistreatment bar the district court from exercising jurisdiction over him, citing extradition treaties between Honduras and the U.S. He argues that a Supreme Court ruling establishes that such treaties prohibit prosecution without express terms against forcible abduction. However, the ruling clarifies that absent explicit prohibitions in the treaty, federal courts retain jurisdiction over foreign nationals. The treaties between the United States and Honduras do not explicitly limit extradition as the sole means for one country to gain custody of a foreign national for prosecution, as noted in Alvarez-Machain. The Supreme Court has consistently maintained that the method by which a defendant is brought to trial does not impact the government's right to prosecute, as established in cases like Ker v. Illinois and Frisbie v. Collins. Despite concerns regarding governmental conduct, the court retains jurisdiction over Matta-Ballesteros, as the relevant treaty does not prohibit his abduction. Attempts to broaden due process rights in foreign abduction cases, as seen in United States v. Toscanino, have been curtailed by Alvarez-Machain. In Toscanino, the court considered the possibility of dismissing an indictment based on extreme governmental misconduct, relying on supervisory powers articulated in earlier Supreme Court cases. However, the current court holds that dismissal based on supervisory powers is limited to three specific reasons: to remedy violations of recognized rights, to maintain judicial integrity, and to deter future illegal conduct. Dismissals under these powers are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Matta-Ballesteros's abduction by U.S. Marshals, although disturbing, does not meet the criteria for constitutional or statutory violations, nor does it warrant the invocation of supervisory powers due to a lack of "shocking and outrageous" governmental misconduct. The court referenced prior cases indicating that allegations of mistreatment must demonstrate extreme barbarity to justify dismissal of an indictment, which Matta-Ballesteros failed to establish. During a limited evidentiary hearing, the district court found insufficient evidence of torture, despite Matta-Ballesteros's claims and supporting materials like photographs and eyewitness declarations. Testimonies from U.S. Marshals contradicted his assertions of mistreatment. Although there is suspicion regarding his treatment, the district court's findings were plausible and supported by the evidence presented. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that the district court's determination on the alleged torture was not clearly erroneous and upheld its findings. The court determined that exercising supervisory powers to dismiss the case would be inappropriate, affirming that the district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining jurisdiction. Matta-Ballesteros contended that the evidence against him was insufficient for conviction. The standard for evaluating such challenges requires viewing evidence favorably for the government to ascertain if a rational jury could find the crime's essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. For conspiracy, the necessary elements include: an agreement to engage in illegal activity, an overt act furthering the conspiracy, and the intent required for the underlying offense. Connections might be inferred from the defendant's actions and proximity to illicit activities. After establishing a conspiracy, only a minimal link between the defendant and the conspiracy needs to be proven. Matta-Ballesteros was linked to the Guadalajara cartel and participated in planning the kidnapping of Camarena, with evidence indicating his involvement in the cartel's violent actions against Camarena. The jury found the testimony of Hector Cervantes-Santos credible, establishing Matta-Ballesteros's conspiracy involvement, and sufficient evidence supported his convictions for related substantive offenses due to the liability of conspirators for foreseeable crimes. Additionally, Matta-Ballesteros claimed the district court erred by not granting a new trial because jurors were aware of his prior convictions. A new trial may be warranted if extraneous information could have influenced the jury's verdict. The court's review of the district court's findings on jury misconduct is conducted for clear error. The district court denied Matta-Ballesteros's motion regarding juror access to extraneous information, determining the testimony of the single juror was not credible due to contradictions with his prior statements and other jurors' testimonies. The ruling on witness credibility is reviewed for clear error, and the court found no such error as the juror's vague statements did not substantiate claims of extraneous information affecting the jury's deliberation. Matta-Ballesteros also claimed errors in the court's handling of hair comparison evidence, arguing that the exclusion of his motion to exclude this evidence as untimely was improper, and that the admission of expert testimony on hair comparison was erroneous. The court's motion cut-off date was established for March 7, 1990, yet Matta-Ballesteros filed his motion on May 15, 1990, without valid justification for the delay. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(f). Additionally, the court found no basis for excluding the expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as Matta-Ballesteros's objections pertained to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. The jury was informed that microscopic hair comparison could not conclusively link the hairs found to Matta-Ballesteros, and both the prosecution's and his own expert addressed this point, allowing the jury to assess the evidence appropriately. Therefore, the district court's decisions regarding both the timeliness of the motion and the admission of expert testimony were upheld. Matta-Ballesteros further contends that the exclusion of certain evidence warrants a reversal of his conviction. Matta-Ballesteros contends that the district court incorrectly excluded two pieces of evidence: a psychologist's report and a presentence report, both of which he claims support his assertion of illiteracy. This illiteracy claim is relevant as it contradicts testimony from the government's main witness, Hector Cervantes-Santos, who stated that Matta-Ballesteros was seen reading police reports. The district court's exclusion of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The psychologist's report was excluded because the court found Matta-Ballesteros's statement about his illiteracy was not made for medical diagnosis or treatment purposes as required under Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). Matta-Ballesteros was mandated to see the psychologist but did not perceive any need for the consultation, indicating no incentive for him to be truthful, which supported the court's ruling. The presentence report was also deemed inadmissible to establish Matta-Ballesteros's illiteracy since no recognized hearsay exception applies, as established in relevant case law. Furthermore, Matta-Ballesteros argues that the court erred in excluding authenticated records from Guadalajara municipalities regarding the nonexistent marriage of Jorge Barba-Hernandez and the birth of Yuremi Barba-Hernandez, along with Barba-Hernandez's death certificate. These records are claimed to contradict Cervantes-Santos's testimony about Matta-Ballesteros attending related events. Matta-Ballesteros failed to demonstrate the absence of public records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(10) because he did not establish that relevant events occurred in one of the specified Guadalajara municipalities, given the existence of 2,800 other municipalities in Mexico where the marriage and birth might have taken place. Additionally, if only a religious marriage occurred or if parents did not register a child's birth, no records may exist. There was also no legal obligation for prior marriages to be documented on a death certificate, even if both were recorded in the same municipality. The court stated that evidence's relevance is contingent on factual conditions being met, allowing for admission subject to the introduction of sufficient supporting evidence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding records from these municipalities. Matta-Ballesteros contested the district court's admission of audiotape recordings of Camarena's torture and interrogation, arguing inadequate authenticity and chain of custody, and that the tapes were unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The court reviews such rulings for abuse of discretion. He misinterpreted the admission requirements for tape recordings, as established in United States v. McMillan, asserting that different standards apply when recordings are found in a defendant's possession. The audiotapes were obtained from a co-defendant, and under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a), authentication is sufficient if reasonable jurors could find for authenticity or identification. The district court did not abuse its discretion, as the government provided evidence showing no tampering with the tapes, and the speakers were involved parties, which was deemed adequate by precedent. The district court did not abuse its discretion regarding defects in the chain of custody for evidence, as the prosecution sufficiently demonstrated that the tapes were in substantially the same condition as when seized, allowing for their admission. A defect in the chain of custody impacts the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. The prosecution provided evidence tracing the tapes from the possession of Matta-Ballesteros's co-defendant to the trial, suggesting no significant defects. The probative value of the tapes was deemed greater than their prejudicial nature; they were used to rebut the defendants' claims about the timing of Camarena's injuries and to demonstrate the intent and motive of the kidnappers. The district court's limiting instruction further mitigated potential prejudice. The court has wide discretion in evidentiary rulings due to its direct observation of trial proceedings. Matta-Ballesteros's claim regarding the pretrial identification procedures was also addressed. The court evaluated the constitutionality of these procedures de novo, determining that the totality of circumstances did not indicate a substantial likelihood of mistaken identification. Cervantes-Santos had multiple opportunities to observe Matta-Ballesteros prior to the identification, and the pretrial photographic lineup was not impermissibly suggestive, as he was not informed that any specific individual in the photographs was Matta-Ballesteros. Thus, the identification process did not violate due process. The reliability of the in-court identification by Cervantes-Santos is supported by several factors: he had ample opportunity to observe Matta-Ballesteros during the crime, was attentive, accurately described the defendant's appearance years later, demonstrated certainty during the confrontation, and the six-year gap before identification does not undermine its reliability. Matta-Ballesteros contends that the district court wrongly quashed his subpoena for discovery regarding the alleged government authorization of the racketeering enterprise implicated in the indictment, and that this quashing led to the exclusion of relevant evidence. The court reviews such decisions for abuse of discretion, with underlying facts assessed for clear error. The defendants’ defense of public authority, based on a news article linking Felix-Gallardo, the CIA, and the Nicaraguan Contras, relied heavily on Lawrence Harrison's testimony, which ultimately lacked personal knowledge regarding CIA involvement in drug trafficking. The court found no evidence connecting the defendants’ actions to the government and determined that the subpoena was unlikely to yield relevant evidence. Consequently, it ruled that without a sufficient demonstration of relevance, the exclusion of evidence relating to CIA authorization was justified. Matta-Ballesteros also argued that the district court erred in denying his motion for severance, claiming that the joint trial was improper and prejudicial. Generally, defendants charged together are tried jointly, and the denial of severance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. A defendant must show clear and undue prejudice to warrant reversal, demonstrating that a fair trial was compromised. Matta-Ballesteros contends that he was unfairly tried alongside his codefendants, who faced different charges related to a separate racketeering enterprise. He argues that the introduction of evidence regarding three homicides and a marijuana operation, in which he was not involved, prejudiced his case. However, the court finds these arguments unsubstantiated, noting that the codefendants' charges were interrelated as they all conspired to commit violent acts aimed at drug enterprises with shared members and objectives. The court asserts that the term "transactions" has a broad interpretation and that the relationships among the charges exceeded mere factual similarities. Furthermore, the introduction of additional evidence against his codefendants does not invalidate the joinder. The jury was capable of compartmentalizing the evidence, aided by multiple instructions from the district court clarifying that certain evidence was not applicable to all defendants. Judicial economy permits reliance on the jury to adhere to these instructions, supporting the district court's decision to try Matta-Ballesteros as charged. Matta-Ballesteros also argues the jury was misinstructed regarding his liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1959, claiming the instruction allowed for a conviction based on uncharged crimes, which could undermine the unanimity of the verdict. However, the court concludes that the instruction was appropriate, as Count Four of the indictment explicitly charged him with aiding and abetting a violation of § 1959. The district court had previously dismissed Count Three, which was seen as duplicative of Count Four, further reinforcing the validity of the jury instructions provided. Count Three was dismissed by the district court, which ruled that Count Four included a conspiracy charge without adding any new crimes to the jury instructions. The jury was instructed that a unanimous agreement was necessary to find the defendant engaged in at least one type of conduct, satisfying the requirement for a unanimous verdict as supported by case law. Matta-Ballesteros claimed the instruction hindered the determination of his proper sentencing, but this claim was deemed insignificant. His assertion that a conviction for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 would lead to a lesser sentence disregards established precedent that holds conspirators liable for all substantive offenses committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Matta-Ballesteros faced the same potential sentence under § 1959, regardless of his role as a principal, aider, abettor, or conspirator. None of the alleged errors warranted relief, leading to the affirmation of the district court's judgment. Additionally, Circuit Judge Noonan noted the prolonged duration of the case, attributing it to complexities surrounding the jurisdiction stemming from the defendant's kidnapping by U.S. Marshals from Honduras. The case was clarified to not involve several scenarios, including the kidnapping of a defendant by private citizens or state police officers, military actions involving heads of state, violations of treaties or international law, protests from foreign sovereigns, or issues regarding Fourth Amendment rights and due process related to the defendant's abduction. The case involves the kidnapping of Matta in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, on April 5, 1988, by Honduran officers who forcibly took him from his home and transported him to the United States via the Dominican Republic. The U.S. Marshals were involved in the apprehension and custody of Matta, who was placed in a federal penitentiary within twenty-four hours of his abduction. The government does not dispute the occurrence of the kidnapping, but there are conflicting accounts regarding Matta's treatment during the incident. The act of kidnapping is characterized as a violent violation of personal security and liberty, which escalates in severity when it occurs in one’s home. Kidnapping becomes a federal offense when the victim is transported into the United States, and the crime persists until the victim is released. Historical context is provided through references to the Declaration of Independence, which highlights the historical significance of kidnapping, as well as international law, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and United Nations resolutions that denounce abduction and hostage-taking as forms of international terrorism. The conduct of the kidnappers, despite their possibly good intentions and status as U.S. law enforcement officers, is condemned due to the violence and impact of their actions on the victim. The involvement of U.S. agents in such an act raises significant concerns about individual freedoms being endangered by decisions made by officials within the Department of Justice. Historical precedents of state-sponsored kidnappings are referenced, including Israel's abduction of Adolf Eichmann, which faced international criticism, and the Gestapo's actions in the 1930s. The text emphasizes that the U.S. Marshals' actions to bring Matta to trial inherently connect the federal courts to the act of kidnapping. It argues against federal judges participating in such cases, likening the situation to piracy on the high seas, asserting that courts should not be complicit in unlawful acts. The excerpt highlights the need for government officials to adhere to the same legal standards as citizens, as failing to do so undermines the rule of law and public trust in government. The excerpt concludes by invoking Justice Brandeis's view that government conduct sets an example for society, underscoring the seriousness of maintaining lawful behavior by state officials. Government lawbreaking undermines respect for the law and promotes anarchy, suggesting that if the government justifies illegal actions to secure convictions, it risks severe consequences. The court has the inherent supervisory authority to dismiss cases to deter illegal conduct, even if the illegality is not tied to a constitutional or statutory breach. Judicial supervision extends beyond ensuring constitutional validity; it involves maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence in federal criminal justice. The Supreme Court's ruling in *McNabb v. United States* demonstrates that evidence obtained through lengthy, uncounseled interrogation can be excluded, as the admissibility standards are not limited to constitutional grounds. This principle remains relevant even in cases where constitutional prohibitions do not explicitly exist. The majority's relied-upon cases do not engage with supervisory powers, focusing instead on due process concerns unrelated to federal court conduct or the specific actions of U.S. Marshals. The court must exercise its supervisory powers to deter future misconduct by the marshals, who operate as a bureau within the Department of Justice and have law enforcement authority within states. The message emphasizes the necessity of upholding legal standards to prevent the erosion of judicial integrity and the rule of law. The United States Marshals Service is mandated by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 566(a) to ensure the security and enforce orders from U.S. District Courts, Courts of Appeals, and the Court of International Trade. They lack authority to abduct individuals from foreign countries, and any such action is subject to scrutiny if it aims to confer jurisdiction improperly. The case of Matta, who was abducted, tried, and convicted for drug offenses in the U.S., highlights that his continued imprisonment stems from a lawful conviction, not victimization from his earlier abduction. At the time of Matta's conviction, the U.S. was not a party to the Convention Against Torture, ratified in 1990, and this treaty's relevance has not been raised in court. The Eleventh Circuit did not dismiss the indictment due to a lack of request for supervisory authority over the Marshals, resulting in a waiver of that argument. Matta-Ballesteros, tried alongside others, faces claims of collateral estoppel regarding jurisdiction issues previously litigated in two federal circuits. However, the government fails to provide authority that these prior jurisdictional rulings hold preclusive effect in the current case. Cited cases primarily deal with collateral attacks on final judgments rather than independent jurisdictional challenges, indicating that the doctrine of res judicata, rather than collateral estoppel, is at stake, and no precedent establishes collateral estoppel for similar jurisdictional matters in unrelated cases. The court evaluates the applicability of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in light of the Toscanino ruling, which suggested that due process necessitates dismissal of cases involving pretrial illegality. The Toscanino court believed that the expansion of due process protections invalidated the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, which permits the government to use evidence obtained through illegal means. However, subsequent Supreme Court decisions, particularly in Alvarez-Machain, reaffirmed the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, indicating that a defendant's body is not a suppressible fruit and that illegal detention does not prevent the government from prosecuting. The court indicates that any potential dismissal of the indictment should rely solely on its supervisory powers. Russell’s citation of Rochin posits that due process could block the government from securing a conviction through judicial processes. However, Matta-Ballesteros's abduction does not violate constitutional or statutory provisions under the framework established by Alvarez-Machain, nor does it reach the threshold of a jus cogens norm, which encompasses universally binding principles in international law. Kidnapping, while serious, does not equate to egregious violations like torture or genocide, which are recognized as jus cogens norms. The court notes that civil damages may suffice as a remedy for alleged misconduct, referencing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. Additionally, Matta-Ballesteros's argument against intent to kidnap a specific individual is challenged by the precedent set in United States v. DePew, which upheld the existence of a conspiracy to kidnap based on the overall plan despite specific details being unfinalized. Camarena was identified as the target of the conspiracy, allowing for his conviction as an aider and abettor of a violent act under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1959, as well as for his kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1201(a)(5). Matta-Ballesteros challenged the district court’s findings about jury access to extraneous information, arguing that the court improperly examined jurors without counsel present and denied counsel the opportunity to question them. The district court has wide discretion in managing such inquiries and is not required to conduct extensive evidentiary hearings, as its primary duty is to ensure an appropriate process for assessing potential misconduct and its prejudicial impact. The district court provided transcripts of an in camera hearing and allowed counsel to suggest questions, which was deemed sufficient. The admissibility of recorded evidence requires proving several factors, including the recording device's capability, operator competence, recording authenticity, preservation, identification of speakers, and that the conversation was uninduced. The excerpt also notes that a defense based on CIA involvement in drug law violations is unlikely to succeed, as CIA agents cannot lawfully authorize such violations. Specific charges against Bernabe-Ramirez included hindering a federal prosecution by aiding in Caro-Quintero's escape, while charges against Vasquez-Velasco involved violence in aid of racketeering related to the murders of individuals mistaken for DEA agents.