United States v. Carlton Darden, United States of America v. Carla Simone Seals, United States of America v. Michael Williams, United States of America v. Raymond Amerson, United States of America v. Gerald Douglas Hopkins, United States of America v. Jerry Lee Lewis, United States of America v. Noble Laverne Bennett

Citations: 70 F.3d 1507; 43 Fed. R. Serv. 321; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 32696Docket: 93-3448

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; November 21, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves multiple appellants, including Jerry Lee Lewis, who were part of a criminal racketeering enterprise known as the Jerry Lewis Organization (JLO), which controlled significant drug trafficking in north St. Louis for over ten years. Lewis, positioned as the leader, allegedly maintained control through violence, including murder of competitors and threats. The JLO operated under the guise of the Moorish Science Temple of America (MSTA), where Lewis served as Grand Sheik, indicating a close relationship between the two entities. A grand jury indictment in January 1991 led to numerous arrests, with a superseding indictment following in September 1992. The trial lasted nearly nine months, resulting in guilty verdicts for all seven appellants on charges of conducting a criminal racketeering enterprise under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), with six also convicted of conspiracy under § 1962(d). Lewis faced additional convictions for multiple violent crimes related to the racketeering, while Amerson was convicted of two counts of violent crimes. The District Court imposed life sentences on all appellants.

Jerry Lee Lewis and Noble Laverne Bennett appeal their convictions, while Carlton Darden, Carla Simone Seals, Michael Williams, Raymond Amerson, and Gerald Hopkins challenge both their convictions and sentences. The appellants present forty-two issues across seven briefs totaling over 620 pages, with the government's response comprising 336 pages. The court accepts these lengthy submissions due to the trial's complexity and extensive record. Ultimately, all appellants' convictions are affirmed, along with the sentences for Darden, Seals, Williams, Amerson, and Hopkins.

The appellants contend the District Court should have granted their motions for acquittal on Counts I and II, arguing the evidence did not support the jury's verdicts. The court evaluates this based on the evidence favoring the guilty verdicts and the reasonable inferences drawn. For a conviction to be reversed on insufficient evidence, no plausible construction supporting the jury's verdict can exist.

All seven appellants were charged with conducting a criminal racketeering enterprise under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (Count I) and conspiring to do so (Count II) from April 1978 to September 1992. All were convicted on Count I, while Bennett was acquitted on Count II. To prove a substantive RICO offense (Count I), the government must demonstrate the existence of an enterprise affecting commerce, the defendant's association with it, participation in its affairs, and engagement in at least two predicate acts. For the conspiracy charge (Count II), the government must additionally show an agreement to participate in the enterprise's affairs, which can be established through circumstantial evidence.

The appellants specifically argue the evidence was inadequate to establish the existence of a single enterprise and its distinct structure, with Darden, Seals, Amerson, and Hopkins questioning their association with the charged enterprise, and Lewis disputing the evidence of his managerial role within it. The court will also consider several other arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence.

Appellants claim that the evidence presented did not substantiate the existence of a single enterprise as charged in the indictment, but rather indicated two parallel enterprises that later merged into a third. Conversely, the government asserts that the JLO was consistent throughout the indictment's timeframe, with individuals like Noble Bennett participating in short-term criminal activities associated with it. Although the government acknowledges that Bennett led a separate criminal enterprise for part of the period, it contends that after its collapse, he and his associates joined the JLO.

To ascertain the presence of multiple conspiracies versus a single large conspiracy, the Court evaluates the totality of circumstances, including the activities involved, locations of alleged events, identities of conspirators, and the timeframe of actions. The Court concludes that the evidence strongly supports the existence of a single conspiracy throughout the indictment period, despite variations in personnel.

The indictment charges twenty-four individuals (including nine defendants and fifteen unindicted co-conspirators) with engaging in a criminal racketeering enterprise aimed at profiting from the distribution of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, while also protecting the operation from competition and law enforcement. Specific acts of racketeering cited include murder and threats of murder, felony drug dealings under state law, and violations of federal drug laws. The enterprise reportedly utilized methods such as possession and distribution of controlled substances, firearm-related activities, and various communication tools to facilitate drug distribution, murder concealment, and witness intimidation to obstruct justice.

At trial, the government presented testimonies from various individuals involved in the alleged drug trafficking enterprise known as the JLO. Key witness Rudy Weaver, who joined the MSTA while incarcerated, indicated that members of the Bennett enterprise, including Lewis, Williams, Amerson, and Darden, were engaged in drug distribution in St. Louis. Weaver actively recruited members for a drug-dealing faction of the MSTA and, after his release, began selling cocaine in Kansas City, receiving supplies from Ronnie Thomas, a St. Louis MSTA member and cousin of Lewis. In 1987, Weaver relocated to St. Louis and connected with the JLO, arranging meetings with Jerry Lewis and others to facilitate cocaine sales, primarily at a convenience store managed by Hopkins.

Weaver's role escalated, leading him to learn about the JLO's criminal activities, including murders, and strategies to enhance drug sales while evading law enforcement and outmaneuvering competitors. His testimony indicated that the JLO remained operational through 1990 and continued even after significant arrests in January 1991. Notably, principal cocaine supplier Juan Alfaro Gonzalez attempted to deliver cocaine to Weaver in February 1991, unaware that Weaver was cooperating with authorities, resulting in Gonzalez's arrest.

Ronnie Thomas testified about his longstanding involvement in drug sales with Lewis and described Lewis's control over their drug distribution operations since at least 1978. He corroborated Weaver's account regarding the information-sharing practices among JLO members aimed at protecting their operations and discussed the group's laundering of money through legitimate businesses. Thomas emphasized the JLO's reliance on violence to safeguard the organization, detailing post-shooting meetings to assess incidents.

Michael Lewis, Jerry Lewis's brother, testified about his involvement with the JLO from 1980-81, confirming Jerry's leadership in directing the drug trade. He noted the use of pay phones and pagers for communication to avoid detection and described how JLO members were armed and committed murders against perceived informants or threats to their interests.

Earl Parnell, a distributor for Bennett, testified about extensive drug and weapon exchanges with Lewis before 1988, highlighting a collaborative "stash pad" for illegal substances used by both the JLO and Bennett organizations. In May 1988, Bennett's supplier failed, prompting him to source heroin from the JLO and sell it through dealer George Noel, leading to Bennett's enterprise functioning as a distribution arm of the JLO. George Noel corroborated Parnell's testimony regarding a meeting in summer 1987 where both organizations agreed to collaborate on drug sales. Additional testimonies indicated that the JLO operated as a single entity during the indictment period, with intertwined activities and continued operations even after key leaders were jailed. Investigators noted the organizations were "intertwined" and “commingled extensively.” Following the indictment, the JLO maintained its operations through intimidation, sham ordinations for jail visits, and attempts to secure perjury from defense witnesses. The evidence presented satisfied the government's requirement to demonstrate the JLO as a unified enterprise throughout the indictment timeframe. 

Appellants Darden, Hopkins, and Bennett contended that the government did not prove a distinct enterprise separate from the necessary structure for committing predicate acts. However, the government maintained that the evidence sufficiently established the RICO enterprise elements. The required proof included a common purpose, organization of participants functioning as a unit, and an ascertainable structure distinct from the conduct of racketeering. The appellants appeared to concede the first two elements but contested the existence of a distinct structure. The government argued that the jury could reasonably determine the JLO's distinct structure, a position the court supported, citing overwhelming evidence.

The government does not need to present the enterprise's by-laws or certificate of incorporation to establish an ascertainable structure of an association-in-fact; it can often be demonstrated through the actions of the enterprise. Evidence may simultaneously support both the pattern and enterprise elements of racketeering charges. An enterprise's existence must extend beyond merely committing the charged predicate offenses, and it must oversee and coordinate various racketeering activities.

The Superseding Indictment charged the defendants with a pattern of racketeering involving predicate acts such as murders and drug dealing, both state and federal. Evidence showed that the JLO engaged in oversight and coordination to protect their drug operations and improve tactics against rivals, including holding reviews post-violence. Jerry Lewis was identified as a key leader overseeing the JLO's activities from the late 1970s until his incarceration in 1991, supporting the distinct structure requirement for RICO charges.

Defendants Gerald Hopkins and Carlton Darden argued for acquittal, claiming insufficient evidence of their membership in the enterprise. Hopkins contended that the government only proved a "mere association" without demonstrating his knowledge of the drug activities. Darden and others did not present specific arguments. Nonetheless, the court considered the evidence implicating each defendant in the JLO activities. The government needed to prove that each defendant associated with the enterprise, participated in its affairs, engaged in a pattern of racketeering, and for Count II, manifested an agreement to participate. The jury found sufficient evidence to support these elements, and the court upheld the verdict.

The evidence presented establishes a strong basis for the jury's verdicts against Carlton Darden, Gerald Hopkins, and others related to the JLO for racketeering activities. 

1. **Carlton Darden**: Testimony from Michael Lewis indicates Darden's long-term involvement with the JLO, starting in the early 1980s, where he was a leader in drug trafficking. Darden continued his activities into the late 1980s, distributing cocaine and engaging in drug purchases. Notably, he had significant drug money stored in his home and was aware of the violent nature of the JLO, having participated in violent acts against rivals and expressing concern over informants. His actions, including multiple drug transactions and agreements to procure drugs, demonstrate his commitment to the JLO and its operations.

2. **Gerald Hopkins**: Described by Jerry Lewis as a "hitman," Hopkins was implicated in serious criminal activities, including the 1985 murder of a deputy sheriff, for which he and others allegedly plotted and executed the killing. Testimony also links him to the planning of the murders of rival drug dealers in 1987 and 1988, as well as involvement in surveillance operations leading to violence against those rivals. Witness accounts solidify his active participation in JLO-related murders and the organization's violent agenda.

Overall, the testimonies and documented actions of both Darden and Hopkins illustrate their deep involvement in the JLO's racketeering activities, contributing to the jury's findings of guilt on the specified counts.

Hopkins was heavily involved in the JLO's drug trade, engaging in cocaine distribution in competition with Billy Patton’s organization, allegedly undercutting Patton's prices. Key events include a meeting at a Ponderosa restaurant where Hopkins and Jerry Lewis agreed to supply cocaine to Rudy Weaver, who later obtained cocaine from Hopkins at his convenience store. The jury confirmed that the government proved Hopkins's possession of cocaine with intent to distribute on several dates, undermining his claim of ignorance regarding the JLO's activities.

Carla Seals, Hopkins's girlfriend, also played a significant role in the drug operations. Testimonies indicated that she had access to Hopkins's pager during drug transactions and had dealt cocaine to Weaver and Earl Parnell, with arrangements made through Jerry Lewis. Seals reportedly traveled to Chicago to procure cocaine and assisted in breaking down larger quantities for distribution. The jury established that Seals possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute during her arrest with Hopkins, supported by evidence of multiple bags of cocaine found in her possession.

Beyond drug activities, Seals was implicated in the murders of Ronald Anderson and Billy Patton. Testimonies indicated her participation in planning Anderson's murder and involvement in the logistics of the crime, including delivering the murder weapon. She also aided in locating Patton through connections with his family, further evidencing her complicity in violent criminal enterprises associated with the JLO.

Evidence establishes that Seals knowingly participated in the criminal enterprise associated with the JLO. Raymond Amerson's criminal ties to Jerry Lewis date back to the early 1980s; he joined the JLO around 1980-1981 and was involved in significant drug trafficking. Witness Michael Lewis confirmed Amerson's role in selling drugs and laundering money, while Rudy Weaver testified that Amerson instructed him on drug concealment techniques and participated in drug distribution activities at the JLO's Star and Crescent Market in 1988-1989. 

Amerson was also implicated in violent acts, including witness intimidation and multiple murders, such as Bruce "Hat" Henry and Billy Patton, a rival drug dealer. Testimonies indicated he celebrated these killings with other JLO members. The evidence firmly supports that Darden, Hopkins, Seals, and Amerson were associated with, agreed to participate in, and engaged in the JLO's racketeering activities.

Additionally, appellants argued insufficient pleading and proof of a pattern of racketeering activity due to failure to demonstrate two predicate acts within the statute of limitations, which the court rejected. Darden and Bennett contended that the narcotics conspiracy charged was identical to the RICO conspiracy, which the court refuted, stating that the elements of each offense differ. The narcotics conspiracy is deemed a valid predicate act under RICO. The jury found sufficient evidence supporting the narcotics conspiracy among the appellants from 1978 to 1992, and thus their claims did not warrant relief.

Darden and Bennett contend that the government did not establish their involvement in a pattern of racketeering activity as required for a RICO offense. Bennett was found guilty of participation in a narcotics conspiracy and multiple instances of cocaine possession, but argues that mere possession cannot constitute a predicate act under RICO. The court agrees with this point but notes that Bennett's involvement in the conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute satisfies the requirement of a pattern of racketeering. 

Darden challenges the sufficiency of evidence for a pattern of racketeering, asserting that his actions—attempted murders, multiple cocaine distribution attempts, and leadership in drug trafficking—demonstrate such a pattern related to the JLO's objectives. Additionally, Darden raises a statute of limitations defense, arguing that the prosecution is barred under the federal five-year limit applicable to RICO cases. The court clarifies that for a RICO prosecution under Sec. 1962(c), a predicate act must occur within five years of indictment, while for Sec. 1962(d), an indictment remains timely if the conspiracy's objectives were not abandoned within that timeframe. Since sufficient evidence indicates Darden committed a predicate act in 1989, his statute-of-limitations claim is dismissed.

The Grand Jury returned the original indictment against Darden on January 9, 1991, related to acts committed in furtherance of the JLO's RICO conspiracy. Carla Seals contested the sufficiency of evidence for her involvement in racketeering, but the jury found sufficient evidence of her possession of cocaine with intent to distribute on June 28, 1987, and her participation in the JLO's narcotics conspiracy, establishing the required pattern of racketeering activity. Gerald Hopkins claimed insufficient evidence for his involvement in the attempted murder of Andrea Patton, but did not challenge the jury's findings regarding his cocaine possession and conspiracy to murder Deputy Sheriff Antar Tiari, among others. Testimonies from Ronnie Thomas and Michael Lewis supported the jury's conclusion regarding Hopkins's participation in the attempted murder. Jerry Lewis argued that the government did not demonstrate his management of a RICO enterprise through racketeering, presenting three points: insufficient evidence of a pattern, unfair evidence from plea bargains, and failure to meet the direction test from Reves v. Ernst. The evidence overwhelmingly supported the jury's findings against Lewis for various drug-related crimes and multiple conspiracy and murder charges, confirming his engagement in a pattern of racketeering activity in support of the JLO.

Appellants Bennett, Darden, Seals, and Williams claim that the District Court wrongly denied their requests to sever their trials from their co-defendants. The review of such a denial is based on whether there was an abuse of discretion that caused significant prejudice. The court first assesses the propriety of joinder under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8. If joinder is deemed proper, the court can still grant a severance under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 if a defendant proves they are prejudiced by the joint trial. 

The appellants argue that joinder was improper under Rule 8 or that the denial of severance under Rule 14 was an abuse of discretion due to a "spillover" effect from evidence against co-defendants and the loss of relevant testimony. However, the court found joinder was appropriate since the indictment linked the defendants and counts, and not every defendant needs to be charged with each offense. 

For a severance to be warranted, the defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the joint trial. The appellants' claims of prejudice are largely speculative. For instance, Williams noted conflicting defense theories without explaining how they conflicted with his own. The presence of generally antagonistic defenses does not automatically necessitate a severance. 

Bennett, Seals, and Williams also argued that the evidence against them was minimal compared to their co-defendants, leading to prejudicial spillover. This argument was deemed flawed since they were indicted as part of a RICO conspiracy, making them accountable for the actions of their co-defendants in furtherance of that conspiracy. Consequently, all evidence related to the conspiracy would be admissible against them even in separate trials.

In United States v. Hattaway, the court addressed Darden's claim that he was prejudiced by the absence of co-defendant Bennett's testimony, which was not supported by sufficient evidence of exculpatory value. To warrant a severance based on a co-defendant's assertion of the Fifth Amendment, a defendant must show that the lost testimony would be substantially exculpatory, a standard that Bennett's affidavit did not meet. The affidavit indicated only that Bennett was present at the crime scene but did not contradict the government's evidence of Darden being the shooter. The court emphasized the strong governmental interest in joint trials for members of a criminal enterprise, citing efficiency and the comprehensive presentation of evidence to juries as key benefits. Since the appellants failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the joint trial, the court upheld the District Court's decision to deny their motions for severance. Additionally, the court rejected claims regarding the admissibility of co-conspirator statements, affirming that a preliminary hearing was not necessary to determine their admissibility. The court distinguished its position from that of the Fifth Circuit and upheld the trial court's discretion in procedural matters regarding co-conspirator statements.

Appellants contend that the court improperly admitted certain statements as they do not qualify as co-conspirator statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and constitute hearsay. However, they specifically identify only two sets of statements, which limits the Court's review to those. The Court reviews evidentiary rulings for abuses of discretion, reversing only if an improper ruling significantly affects a defendant's rights.

Bennett argues that Parnell's testimony about Bennett's attempt to acquire cocaine is inadmissible hearsay, but these statements are admissible against Bennett since they are his own. Bennett lacks the standing to challenge the admissibility of Parnell's statements against other defendants. Darden adopts Bennett's argument, prompting an analysis under the co-conspirator rule.

Lewis asserts that audio recordings of conversations between Willie Dixon and Earl Parnell are inadmissible. The recordings, made while Parnell was a government informant, involve Dixon, who is alleged to have participated in conspiracies with Bennett, Williams, and Lewis. The government claims these statements are co-conspirator statements and not hearsay. For admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the government must show a conspiracy existed, the declarants were co-conspirators, and the statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Court has already determined a conspiracy under the RICO statute existed, and the appellants do not dispute their involvement in the narcotics conspiracy that underpins the RICO charges. The only remaining issue is whether the declarants were part of the same conspiracies and whether the statements were made in furtherance. Darden, by aligning with Bennett, challenges the admissibility of Bennett's statements, but the government has established Bennett's membership in the charged conspiracy.

The government established by a preponderance of the evidence that Bennett's statements were made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy involving narcotics. On December 10, 1988, Bennett informed Parnell about his efforts to acquire a kilogram of cocaine from Jerry Lewis and requested Parnell's assistance with the transaction. The Superseding Indictment, which charged a narcotics conspiracy led by Jerry Lewis from 1978 to 1992, undermines Bennett's claim that his statements were irrelevant to the conspiracy.

Lewis contested the admissibility of tape recordings of conversations between Willie Dixon and Earl Parnell. For these recordings to be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), both declarants must be co-conspirators and their statements must further the conspiracy. The evidence confirmed that Dixon was a participant in the charged conspiracy, thus his statements were appropriately admitted since they advanced the conspiracy. The standard for furtherance of the conspiracy is interpreted broadly, allowing for past event narrations if they help plan future actions or keep co-conspirators informed of ongoing issues.

Lewis dismissed much of the recorded content as "gossip," which does not inherently render it inadmissible. The District Court's decision to admit Dixon's statements was upheld. However, Parnell's statements were ruled inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because he was a government informant at the time and not a co-conspirator, aligning with precedents that exclude statements made by informants after they cease to be part of the conspiracy. Despite this error in admitting Parnell's statements, it did not warrant a reversal of Lewis's or Carlton Darden's convictions, emphasizing that defendants are entitled to a fair trial, not necessarily a perfect one.

The admission of Parnell's statements in the Parnell-Dixon recordings did not affect the substantial rights of Lewis or Darden, as supported by overwhelming evidence of their guilt. Appellants raised several issues regarding jury-related procedures, including claims of racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, empaneling an anonymous jury, additional security measures, refusal to strike Juror 66 for cause, refusal to recuse itself following a newspaper article about a government witness's safety, and inconsistent note-taking permissions for jurors. 

Specifically, the government used a peremptory challenge to exclude Juror 99, a young black woman, which defense counsel argued was unconstitutional. The prosecutor justified the strike by citing Juror 99's lack of participation during voir dire and her demographic background, suggesting that young black females tend to be sympathetic to drug-related defendants. The District Court acknowledged the prosecutor's reasons were not racially neutral but allowed the strike based on other non-racially biased reasons provided. Appellants argued this was an error, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibits racially motivated jury challenges.

Gender is deemed an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality, similar to race, as established in *J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.* Peremptory challenges exercised for discriminatory reasons require the trial court to determine if the challenging party would have made the same strike regardless of improper motivations, as outlined in *Jones v. Plaster*. A district court's finding regarding the racial discriminatory purpose of a peremptory challenge can only be overturned if clearly erroneous. The trial judge is uniquely positioned to assess the credibility and demeanor of the prosecutor.

In the case discussed, the prosecutor provided several race-neutral and gender-neutral reasons for striking Juror 99, alongside one non-neutral reason. The District Court concluded that the latter was not determinative, as the prosecutor had struck other jurors with similar profiles who were white, indicating that valid, neutral reasons supported the strike. Consequently, the court found no clear error in its ruling.

Regarding the empanelment of an anonymous jury, appellant Bennett argued that it created a biased impression of the defendants and violated their Sixth Amendment rights. The court acknowledged the potential for prejudice but noted that cases considering anonymous juries have generally upheld their use under appropriate circumstances without infringing on the right to an impartial jury.

The Second Circuit establishes that empaneling an anonymous jury requires strong justification, including a demonstrated need for juror protection and measures to mitigate prejudicial effects on the defendant. In reviewing district court decisions on this matter, a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard applies. In this case, the district court's decision to protect jurors' anonymity was upheld due to the presence of multiple factors indicating a need for such protection. These factors included: the defendants' involvement in a violent organized crime enterprise, potential threats to jurors, past attempts by defendants to interfere with judicial proceedings, the likelihood of severe penalties upon conviction, and extensive media coverage that could expose jurors to intimidation. Each of the nine defendants had a history of violent crimes and faced life sentences, contributing to the court's conclusion on the necessity of anonymity. The district court also implemented reasonable precautions to prevent undue prejudice, such as referring to jurors by numbers to limit media inquiries. The court's voir dire was deemed sufficient to ensure the jury's impartiality despite the anonymity.

A thorough review of the record confirms that a comprehensive voir dire was conducted, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in empaneling an anonymous jury. Appellant Amerson argued that various security measures during the trial suggested the defendants were dangerous, compromising the right to an impartial jury. These measures included a significant presence of security personnel, magnetometers for entrants, inspections of defense attorneys' belongings in juror view, assembling the jury in a secret location, and transporting jurors and defendants with heightened security, including armed guards, police vehicle convoys, helicopter surveillance, and snipers. While security measures can be inherently prejudicial, not all measures that highlight a defendant's perceived danger are unconstitutional. Courts have historically granted trial courts broad discretion in security matters, requiring defendants to demonstrate actual prejudice from such measures. In this case, the District Court's security decisions were justified given the violent nature of the defendants' alleged criminal enterprise. Similar security measures have been upheld in past cases, including armed guards and metal detectors, and the courtroom security personnel in this instance were unarmed and not overtly uniformed.

In United States v. Faul, the Eighth Circuit upheld security measures in a trial, referencing the Second Circuit's endorsement of secure transportation for jurors and armed guards in United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, a case involving serious crimes. The current case involved charges deemed more numerous and violent than those in Maldonado-Rivera, supporting the District Court's decision to implement similar security measures. The jury’s impartiality was evidenced by their acquittal of two defendants and selective findings on the charges against the others, indicating that the security did not compromise their objectivity. 

Regarding Juror 66, concerns were raised after he observed individuals he believed were members of the Moorish Science Temple nearby. After consulting with attorneys, the court found no bias, as Juror 66 asserted that his observation would not affect his impartiality and had not discussed it with other jurors. The motion to strike him for cause was denied, with the court maintaining discretion over juror removal. The record supported the court’s decision, as Juror 66 reiterated his impartial stance.

Concerns were raised regarding the security of the jury, expressed in a manner that demonstrated no bias against the defendants. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to remove Juror 66, referencing a similar case where a juror's remarks were deemed non-prejudicial. After the court instructed the jury to disregard media coverage, a local newspaper reported the judge's warning about potential threats to a government witness, Michael Lewis-Bey. The court discussed this with the defendants and attorneys outside of the jury's presence, clarifying that the warning did not mention the defendants. When questioned, jurors indicated they had not seen or heard any related media coverage, and the court reinforced the importance of reporting any external discussions about the case. The defendants argued that the court should have individually questioned each juror about exposure to the article and considered self-disqualification. However, the court is granted broad discretion in assessing the impact of media coverage on jurors, and as no juror reported exposure during collective inquiries, further questioning was not mandated.

The excerpt addresses the propriety of a district court's collective inquiry into jurors' exposure to media coverage during a trial. It references several case precedents to support the conclusion that while individualized inquiries are preferred, collective inquiries are not inherently an abuse of discretion. The district court questioned jurors about their exposure to a specific article and received no affirmative responses, which indicated that jurors felt comfortable answering collectively. This led to the determination that the collective inquiry did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Additionally, the excerpt discusses an argument regarding Judge Gunn’s potential bias and the standards for judicial disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455. The court noted that disqualification is warranted only when a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, particularly if bias stems from an extrajudicial source. The Supreme Court clarified that opinions formed during proceedings do not typically justify bias claims unless they reflect deep-seated favoritism. In this case, the district court demonstrated impartiality, particularly in its handling of sensitive information regarding a witness in the witness protection program, which did not suggest bias against the defendants.

The court found no evidence of bias against the defendants that would warrant disqualification, as there was no indication of "deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism" from the trial judge. Regarding jurors' note-taking, the District Court allowed jurors to view exhibits on designated days and take notes, but prohibited note-taking during witness testimonies to prevent any juror from dominating deliberations based on their notes. This procedure aligns with the discretion permitted to trial courts, and is supported by precedent where note-taking was limited to specific trial phases. The complexity of the trial justified the court's restrictions on note-taking. 

Additionally, the appellants challenged the admission of certain evidence, including documents and scrapbooks seized under search warrants at the residences of alleged gang members. They contended that the District Court abused its discretion in admitting these items, which included police reports, newspaper articles related to drug trafficking, and DEA reports regarding a government witness. The court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed under a deferential standard, reversing only if improper rulings affect the defendants' substantial rights or significantly influence the verdict.

The items in question, including police and DEA reports, were discovered in the homes of the appellants or their relatives, not taken from law enforcement files, as emphasized by the government. The appellants claim these exhibits are inadmissible hearsay; however, the government contends they are not hearsay since they were not introduced to prove the truth of their contents, aligning with Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c). The District Court concurred, recognizing the materials as evidence of the JLO's intelligence-gathering operations and their association with the defendants, relevant to the RICO offenses in the Superseding Indictment. Witness testimony clarified that the exhibits were presented to demonstrate association rather than to validate the statements made within them, thus not constituting hearsay. Additionally, the District Court instructed the jury to limit the use of such evidence strictly to the purposes outlined in court guidelines, reducing the risk of misuse concerning prior acts. Gerald Hopkins argued for the exclusion of certain exhibits revealing his criminal background, particularly police reports with mug shots, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which prohibits using prior crimes to demonstrate character. However, the court reasoned that the evidence was used to establish associations and intelligence activities rather than to imply prior criminality, thus not violating Rule 404(b). Bennett and Darden also noted that while relevant evidence can be excluded under Rule 403 if its prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value, the burden lies with the defendant to show that the evidence's probative value is substantially outweighed by potential unfair prejudice, challenging the admissibility of police reports without sufficient support from case law.

Exhibits presented by the government were crucial in demonstrating the defendants' connection to the drug trade and their information-seeking behavior regarding competitors and law enforcement. The JLO's access to police and DEA reports indicated a high level of organization and concern for security. The appellants did not convincingly argue why these exhibits were unfairly prejudicial; specifically, Darden merely stated the prejudice was "obvious," yet the court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the exhibits.

Carla Seals challenged the admission of a photograph (Government's Exhibit 371) depicting a large sum of money on her bed, claiming it lacked relevance and was unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. However, the court concluded the photo was relevant as it suggested Seals or an associate had access to significant cash, contradicting their claims of having no legitimate income sources. While the evidence was prejudicial, the court found no explanation of how it was unfairly prejudicial, thus upholding its admission.

Government witness Ronnie Thomas, under a plea agreement, testified about his involvement in several crimes, including ten unindicted murders. He implicated some defendants, including Jerry Lewis, in these murders. Appellant Darden argued that the District Court erred in allowing testimony about these unindicted crimes, invoking Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which restricts the use of evidence of other crimes to prove character conformity.

Evidence may be admissible for purposes such as establishing motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake. A district court has discretion in determining evidence admissibility, which is typically only reversed if the evidence is irrelevant to trial issues. In conspiracy trials, this discretion is particularly broad. The court upheld the admission of testimony from Thomas regarding unindicted crimes, as it clarified the benefits of his plea agreement. The government clarified that Thomas understood he would not be prosecuted for these crimes. A confederate's guilty plea is admissible to establish a witness's credibility and counter credibility attacks during cross-examination. The defense focused on Thomas's unindicted crimes during cross-examination, which weakened their appeal against the evidence's admission. The jury was instructed not to use prior similar acts to determine the defendants' guilt. Given these considerations, the court exercised its discretion appropriately in admitting Thomas's testimony. Additionally, Earl Parnell, a government witness and former participant in criminal activities, became an informant in 1988.

Parnell, as an informant, participated in discussions about the enterprise's criminal activities, subsequently debriefing with government agents, which led to the preparation of DEA reports that detailed his accounts. He reviewed these reports for his testimony and identified relevant reports at the government's request, referring to them to refresh his memory. The reports were not admitted into evidence nor available to the jury. Appellant Bennett argued that the District Court erred by allowing Parnell to reference these reports. The court's decision to permit a witness to refresh their memory with writings prepared by others is within its discretion, supported by case law, including *United States v. Boyd* and *United States v. Church*. The DEA reports were based on Parnell's own accounts, justifying their use to refresh his recollection as per Federal Rule of Evidence 612. The District Court found no abuse of discretion.

Bennett also claimed the court erred in limiting the cross-examination of Parnell regarding the DEA reports. The court allowed parties to ask if Parnell was aware of specific information in the reports but did not permit a detailed review of the reports during cross-examination. Defendants could call their own witness to examine the reports if needed. Rule 612 allows for the production of writings used to refresh a witness's memory, but access is limited to relevant portions. The court permitted the defendants to access the entire DEA reports through another witness, restricting cross-examination to what the witness could recall.

The court aimed to streamline the trial process by preventing defense attorneys from requiring a witness to sift through extensive documents during questioning, thus avoiding delays. This decision was deemed not an abuse of discretion. Bennett contended that the testimony of jailhouse informant George Noel, which implicated him in plans to intimidate government witnesses, should be excluded on Sixth Amendment grounds. Bennett argued that his statements were obtained in violation of his right to counsel, as established in Massiah v. United States. However, the court found no evidence that Noel was acting as a government informant at the time Bennett made his statements, concluding that Bennett's rights were not violated.

Darden, Hopkins, Lewis, and Seals raised challenges to several jury instructions provided by the District Court, asserting that the court has broad discretion in formulating these instructions. The court will uphold the instructions if they adequately convey the applicable law. The appellants' main concerns focused on the jury instructions related to the RICO offenses in Counts I and II of the Superseding Indictment, specifically regarding Instructions 11, 12, 15, 16, 32, and 33. Instruction 11 outlines the government's burden for Count I, while Instructions 12-16 detail the elements of the offense. The appellants claimed Instruction 11 was as flawed as Instructions 12, 15, and 16, which were also challenged. Instruction 12, which defined an "enterprise," was criticized by Lewis and Hopkins for potentially broadening the indictment's charges, infringing on their Fifth Amendment rights. The court found their claims incorrect regarding the nature of the indictment's charges.

The indictment charged the appellants and others as an "associated in fact" enterprise without clarifying if they formed a "legal entity." There is no variance between the Superseding Indictment and Instruction 12, which describes both legal and non-legal associations. The District Court did not misuse its discretion in presenting Instruction 12 to the jury. Appellants Lewis, Darden, Seals, and Hopkins contend that the District Court erred by giving Instruction 15, which addresses an element of a RICO offense: participation in the conduct of the enterprise. This instruction specifies that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant conducted or participated in the enterprise's affairs, encompassing necessary acts for its operation. Participation does not require control or profit-sharing, but must be knowing. The appellants argue that the instruction is flawed due to the omission of "in the conduct of" on three occasions and that it contradicts the Supreme Court's Reves decision regarding the necessity of some operational involvement. However, the court did use "participate in the conduct of" in the instruction and the Reves case supported the operation-and-management test for proving a defendant's involvement. The District Court correctly included this test in Instruction 15.

Participation in the operation or management of an enterprise is not confined to top-level management; it includes lower-level participants acting under upper management's direction. The legal framework established in Reves clarifies that involvement in the enterprise’s operation is sufficient for liability under the RICO statute, without necessitating control over the enterprise. The District Court's instruction to the jury accurately reflects this principle, as it emphasizes that liability extends beyond just top managers to include those who manage or operate under their guidance. Jerry Lewis's argument, claiming that control is a prerequisite for liability, misinterprets Reves, particularly citing a dissenting opinion rather than the majority ruling. The majority established that the government must prove participation in the enterprise's direction rather than control. The District Court’s instruction effectively delineated the liability of operators and managers from that of mere participants, aligning with the evidence that indicated Lewis was the primary controller of the enterprise while others operated under his direction. Therefore, the instruction was appropriate and adequately communicated the government's burden, confirming that the court did not err in its charge to the jury.

Several appellants contest Instructions 32 and 33, which outline the essential elements of the RICO conspiracy charges in Count II of the Superseding Indictment. Their objections focus on the omission of the verb "conduct" and the operation-and-management test, which have been previously addressed in relation to Instructions 15 and 16. Additionally, appellants argue that the instructions incorrectly allowed the jury to convict based on proof of the narcotics conspiracy in Count I as a predicate act for the RICO offense. Instruction 33, particularly criticized for its lack of clarity, states that the government must prove an agreement existed among individuals to participate in an enterprise affecting interstate commerce through racketeering activity, referencing Count I. The instruction's phrasing should more accurately associate with Count II to clarify that the government needed to demonstrate a conspiracy to violate the RICO statute as detailed in Count II. Despite these flaws, the court determined that the instruction sufficiently conveyed the government's burden and did not warrant reversal.

Darden specifically challenges Instruction 33, arguing it should have emphasized that the jury could only consider the acts and statements of the particular defendant in determining conspiracy membership. However, the court found this concept adequately communicated within Instruction 33 and affirmed that similar language was present in Instruction 58, rendering Darden's argument unpersuasive.

The court also reviewed and dismissed challenges to other jury instructions (6, 14, 25, 45, 46, 47, 66, and 67), concluding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in providing these instructions. Overall, the jury instructions, when viewed collectively, were deemed to fairly and adequately represent the applicable law, justifying the District Court's decisions.

Additionally, several appellants claimed the District Court erred in refusing their proposed jury instructions. A defendant is entitled to such instructions if they are timely requested, evidence-supported, and legally accurate. The court has reviewed the rejected proposed instructions and found them lacking.

The District Court's discretion in formulating jury instructions was upheld, as the instructions provided were deemed adequate even if not in the exact form requested by the appellants. Some requested instructions were either unsupported by evidence or misstatements of law, justifying the court's refusal to give them. For sentencing, the court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while the application of guidelines is reviewed de novo. The court may consider relevant information for sentencing without adhering to trial evidence rules, provided it is reliable.

In sentencing Carla Seals, the court determined she was accountable for the murder of Ronald Anderson, which was not included in her indictment but was relevant to her RICO convictions. This finding resulted in a base offense level of forty-three, leading to a mandatory life sentence. Seals contested the sufficiency of evidence supporting her accountability for the murder, arguing that the evidence presented was not credible. Despite her claims, some evidence indicated her involvement, including testimony from Ronnie Thomas, who stated that Seals was present during a meeting where the murder weapon was loaded and subsequently delivered. Seals argued that this testimony was contradicted by other evidence and questioned Thomas's credibility, as he is a known serial killer and admitted perjurer. However, the court noted that when evidence allows for multiple interpretations, the factfinder's decisions cannot be deemed clearly erroneous.

A district court's credibility assessments are rarely overturned as clear error, as established in *United States v. Cabbell* and *United States v. Coppock*. In Seals's case, the district court favored the testimony of Ronnie Thomas over Seals's claims about contradictory evidence, determining that Seals was accountable for Ronald Anderson's murder. This finding, supported by a preponderance of evidence indicating Seals aided the murderers, leads to her life sentence which is affirmed, rendering her other arguments concerning drug offenses and attempted murder moot, as the offense level remains at 43 due to her accountability for Anderson's murder.

In Darden's appeal, he argues against being held accountable for 213 kilograms of cocaine supplied by Juan Alfaro Gonzales. The court concluded that the evidence supported the finding that this amount was a reasonably foreseeable result of Darden's co-conspirators' actions in a jointly undertaken criminal activity. Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), a defendant can be held accountable for all reasonably foreseeable actions of co-conspirators, without needing direct participation in the distribution of all the drugs. Darden's substantial commitment to the conspiracy is a key factor in determining his accountability for the total drug amount, regardless of direct knowledge of the quantity involved.

Evidence supports the District Court's conclusion that Darden's co-conspirators' distribution of at least 213 kilograms of cocaine was a foreseeable act in their joint criminal enterprise. Key testimonies from Michael Lewis, Rudy Weaver, and Ronnie Thomas indicated that Darden was a leading figure in the JLO's drug trafficking from the late 1970s to the early 1980s. Lewis noted that Darden and Raymond Amerson-Bey handled most of the drug distribution. Despite a decline in Darden's role over time, no evidence shows he withdrew from the conspiracy. In fact, testimony revealed Darden's continued involvement, including participation in meetings regarding the cocaine trade in the mid-1980s and selling cocaine from 1987 to 1989, coinciding with the trafficking of the 213 kilograms.

Weaver, involved in the distribution, testified that he sold Darden cocaine during 1987 and 1988, with Darden intending to resell it. Additionally, Darden's commitment to the conspiracy was underscored by his involvement in two attempted murders to protect the organization. Witnesses testified that he shot Rochelle Bartlett in 1980 and assisted in hunting down rival dealer Lidell "Bud" Green in 1981. The jury found Darden guilty of participating in the drug and murder enterprise, committing attempted murders, and two drug offenses involving cocaine in 1987 and 1989. Given this substantial evidence, the District Court's finding that Darden was accountable for the foreseeable drug distribution was not an error.

Further, the District Court applied a two-level enhancement to Darden's drug offenses for weapon possession. Darden challenged this, arguing he was not present at the trafficking events and thus no weapons were involved. However, under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(b)(1), a two-level enhancement applies if a dangerous weapon was present during a drug offense, unless it is improbable that the weapon was connected to the crime. The established legal standard for applying this enhancement has been upheld in previous cases, supporting the District Court's decision.

A district court is required to determine by a preponderance of the evidence that a weapon is not clearly improbable to be linked to criminal activity. In the case of Darden, he is held accountable for at least 213 kilograms of cocaine due to his involvement with the JLO drug organization, which made the total amount foreseeable to him. The possession enhancement for weapons is justified as evidence indicates Darden regularly carried firearms during drug-related activities. Testimonies from Michael Lewis and law enforcement confirm Darden's possession of loaded guns while engaged in drug trafficking, including an incident where he shot an individual on behalf of a co-conspirator. The enhancement reflects the heightened risk of violence when drug traffickers are armed, fitting the purpose of U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1.

Additionally, the District Court applied a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1, which is applicable when a defendant willfully obstructs justice during legal proceedings. Darden's claim that there was insufficient evidence for this enhancement is rejected. The guideline specifies that false testimony under oath regarding a material matter can lead to such an enhancement, provided the falsehood is willful rather than accidental. The court acknowledges its authority to assess and confirm that Darden lied to the jury, thereby supporting the application of the obstruction enhancement.

The District Court determined that Darden committed perjury by denying his involvement in the attempted murder of Rochelle Bartlett. Despite Darden's claim that other evidence supports his testimony, the court found credible the testimonies of eyewitnesses Earl Parnell, George Noel, and Bartlett, who all stated that Darden shot Bartlett on April 16, 1980. The jury concluded that the government proved Darden's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the court supported this finding by stating there was a preponderance of evidence that Darden lied under oath. The court emphasized its decision was not punitive towards Darden for exercising his right to testify. Citing United States v. Briggs, the court noted that conflicting testimonies can justify adjustments in sentencing, which applies to Darden due to his perjury related to the attempted murder and drug offenses. 

Darden also argued for a downward departure in sentencing due to his alleged minor role in the crime. However, as the District Court was aware of its authority to grant such a departure, this issue is not subject to appellate review. Ultimately, the court upheld Darden's life sentence. Additional issues raised by the appellants included claims of constitutional vagueness in the indictment, improper government remarks during opening statements, acceptance of plea agreements from co-conspirators, Double Jeopardy concerns, exclusion of potential jurors, and limitations on arguments presented to the jury.

The court affirmed the District Court's rulings on several claims, including the limitation of defendants' closing arguments to sixteen hours, the denial of Amerson's Rule 17(b) motions for subpoenas and travel expenditures for defense witnesses, and the allowance of government reminders to witnesses about potential perjury charges. The appellants’ arguments were deemed without merit, and only one ruling was identified as erroneous, which was not prejudicial. Consequently, the convictions and sentences of the appellants were upheld. 

Circuit Judge Heaney concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with the affirmation of convictions for several defendants but expressing concerns regarding Carla Simone Seals' life sentence. He criticized the admission of irrelevant testimony from Ronald Thomas regarding unrelated murders, arguing it prejudiced Seals, who was not charged with murder. He also contested the relevance of testimony from George Noel about heroin trafficking, which he believed should have been excluded based on Federal Rule of Evidence 403 due to its unfair prejudicial impact.

Despite these evidentiary concerns, Heaney acknowledged that the overwhelming evidence of the defendants' guilt warranted affirming their convictions, as established by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding harmless errors. However, he insisted that Seals' sentence be reversed due to non-compliance with sentencing guidelines.

Seals was sentenced to life imprisonment for her alleged participation in the first-degree murder of Ronnie Anderson and the attempted murder of Lorenzo Petty, despite not being charged with these offenses. The district court based its findings on conspiracy-related narcotics offenses, determining her accountability for distributing 213 kilograms of cocaine, which resulted in a base offense level of 38, increased by two levels for firearm possession. The judgment raises concerns about sentencing individuals for murder or attempted murder without a conviction following a jury trial, highlighting that federal guidelines allow such sentencing only if there is a preponderance of evidence of participation. In this case, the evidence was insufficient to support the court's findings regarding Seals' involvement in the murder or attempted murder. The only evidence presented was testimonies suggesting she delivered guns, which does not demonstrate a conscious purpose or deliberate intent to kill. The record lacks proof of her knowing involvement in these violent acts, reinforcing that mere transportation of firearms does not warrant a murder conviction.

Seals' knowledge and intent regarding the guns and their use were not established, resulting in insufficient evidence to support a first-degree murder conviction. Consequently, the district court's findings related to the murder of Anderson and the attempted murder of Petty must be overturned, and Seals' life sentence and lesser sentence cannot be upheld. The remaining evidence pertains to Seals' involvement in narcotics offenses, for which her sentence is contingent on the drug quantity attributable to her under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1. A co-conspirator is accountable for all acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy only if they are within the scope of the agreement and reasonably foreseeable. The court highlighted that it has previously rejected the automatic attribution of all drugs involved in a conspiracy to each participant. Instead, an individualized assessment of reasonable foreseeability is required, considering whether the individual benefited from their co-conspirators' actions, rather than mere awareness of the overall drug activity. In this case, the district court failed to conduct such an individualized assessment for Seals, instead assigning her the same drug quantity as other conspiracy members—213 kilograms of cocaine—without sufficient supporting evidence. Only three overt acts were attributed to Seals, involving unspecified amounts of cocaine in 1987, and the trial did not provide evidence to support the conclusion that 213 kilograms were reasonably foreseeable to her.

Seals' trial lacked sufficient evidence to assess her benefit from drug sales or her involvement beyond three transactions, making it impossible for the district court to properly determine her sentence. The court must make factual findings regarding foreseeability, which is essential under the guidelines, despite the potential burden this may impose. Consequently, the case should be remanded for the district court to evaluate these factors and re-sentence Seals. Additionally, the district court incorrectly increased Seals' offense level by two points for firearm possession, as the only evidence of her gun possession did not occur during her drug offenses, failing to justify an upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(b). While the majority opinion supports affirming the convictions of all defendants, it contends that Seals' life sentence is inappropriate, requiring a remand for re-sentencing due to insufficient evidence for murder or attempted murder charges, and the need for an individualized assessment of the drug quantity reasonably foreseeable to her. The excerpt also details the historical context of the Moorish Science Temple, founded by Timothy Drew in 1913, outlining its teachings and the adoption of hyphenated surnames by its members, while clarifying that the appellants were indicted under their legal names. Issues raised by the appellants without sufficient argumentation or record citation were deemed abandoned, and specific claims regarding the existence of a narcotics conspiracy and membership in a RICO conspiracy were rejected. Amerson's claims regarding severance were waived due to lack of specific argumentation on how the district court's decision prejudiced him.

The decision to sever a defendant's trial from that of co-defendants is determined based on factual circumstances rather than established precedent. The Second Circuit does not maintain a blanket presumption against joinder in lengthy trials, contrary to claims by Darden and Seals; rather, it suggests that prosecutors must justify joinder if trials exceed four months. Williams did not demonstrate that specific co-conspirator statements were inadmissible, and the court found sufficient evidence of a single conspiracy.

Regarding jury selection, of twenty-eight potential jurors, the government used peremptory challenges to remove both white and black jurors, undermining claims of systematic discrimination. The issue of using an anonymous jury was previously addressed in United States v. Lee, where the court found no prejudice since the jurors' names were disclosed to defense attorneys. The District Court's reliance on extensive documentation from the government prior to trial supported security measures, including the use of an anonymous jury.

Appellants also contested the District Court's Instruction 16, mirroring objections made to Instruction 15, which have been resolved by prior rulings. The Supreme Court case Reves clarifies the understanding of "control" in enterprise contexts, rejecting a D.C. Circuit conduct test that necessitated significant control. Additionally, while the dissent claims a lack of evidence regarding Seals' participation in a murder, Seals herself acknowledged her involvement in the related conspiracy discussions.

Seals transported a gun used by Thomas to kill Anderson, but she contests the District Court's reliance on this evidence, suggesting that alternative evidence contradicts her involvement. Seals concedes that the evidence, if credited, is sufficient unless the Court overturns the District Court's credibility determinations. Additionally, Seals and other defendants argue against being held accountable for 213 kilograms of cocaine, but this is moot since they were found accountable for first-degree murder, which Seals challenges but has been decided against her. The guidelines set a base offense level of 43 due to the murder, resulting in a mandatory life sentence, rendering the drug quantity arguments irrelevant. Darden's accountability for unspecified amounts of various drugs and certain enhancements related to attempted murder do not affect his sentence, as his adjusted offense level remains at 43. Appellant Jerry Lewis raises new issues in his reply brief, which are not considered due to procedural defaults. At sentencing, Seals' counsel objected to findings linking her to the Thomas murder and the attempted murder of Petty. The sentencing court acknowledged Seals' involvement with dangerous individuals and the serious nature of the offenses but failed to provide specific findings necessary to justify a murder sentence, relying instead on the jury's conspiracy verdict.