Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; February 5, 2001; Federal Appellate Court
Appellants have established standing to challenge the Navy's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) but lack sufficient taxpayer standing for state law claims in federal court. The case concerns the planned future use of the closed Long Beach Naval Station, located on Terminal Island, which includes historically significant buildings designed by architect Paul R. Williams. These structures have ties to World War II and qualify for the National Register of Historic Places. At the time of the complaint, the Naval Station served as a habitat for several bird species, including two federally endangered species, the California least tern and California brown pelican, as well as the black-crowned night heron protected under the Migratory Bird Act. Following its closure announced in 1991 and the cessation of operations in 1994, the Navy began preparations for the site’s conversion into a commercial marine terminal, which involved demolishing historic buildings, destroying ornamental trees, and dredging shallow water habitats. The appellants, a group of local birdwatchers and environmentalists, oppose these plans. According to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act (DBCRA), the Secretary of Defense must consider local redevelopment plans before disposing of surplus military property and must prepare a decision document compliant with NEPA, which mandates an EIS for significant federal actions affecting the environment. The City of Long Beach was designated as the Local Reuse Authority, with the Navy Properties Reuse Committee (NPR) tasked with developing a reuse plan. The birdwatchers claim that the NPR prematurely chose a marine terminal project to be leased to the Chinese Overseas Shipping Company without adequately exploring other reuse options.
In September 1996, the Board of Harbor Commissioners approved an environmental impact report for a marine container terminal at the Naval Station, following California Environmental Quality Act requirements. In April 1998, a joint final environmental impact statement (FEIS) was issued by the Navy and the City of Long Beach, assessing four alternatives: the marine container terminal, an auto terminal, an institutional campus, and a 'no project alternative.' Birdwatchers challenged the FEIS, claiming it inadequately addressed the environmental impacts of the marine terminal proposal and that the range of reuse project alternatives was unreasonably narrow. In May 1998, the Navy approved a plan to convert the station into a container terminal. A complaint was filed on June 15, 1998, against the City of Long Beach and the Navy, alleging state law violations concerning the use of public assets and contesting the adequacy of the FEIS under NEPA. The district court denied temporary restraining orders and ultimately dismissed the complaint for lack of standing but allowed for amendments. After the birdwatchers filed an amended complaint and further unsuccessful motions, the City began demolishing the station in October. By December 8, the court denied a preliminary injunction and dismissed the case without leave to amend due to lack of standing. By May 1999, the historic structures and bird habitats had been destroyed. Long Beach and the Navy argued the appeal was moot because the buildings had been razed, asserting that a case becomes moot when it no longer presents a live controversy. The burden of proving mootness is significant, focusing on the potential for effective relief rather than the specific relief sought initially. Previous rulings, including one concerning NEPA in West v. Secretary of the Department of Transportation, support that challenges can remain relevant even after some project phases are completed.
The central issue in mootness cases revolves around whether changes in circumstances have eliminated the possibility of meaningful relief. Courts have established that effective relief can still be granted even if the original conditions have changed. For instance, additional environmental reviews or the potential closure of a project can provide recourse. Past rulings, such as in Gordon, affirm that a case is not rendered moot simply because the alleged violations have ceased; if effective relief remains possible, the controversy persists. Similarly, challenges to projects, like housing developments or water diversions, are not moot if adverse effects can still be mitigated. In NEPA cases, it is critical to prevent entities from circumventing legal requirements by completing actions before litigation. Therefore, defendants bear a significant burden to prove mootness.
In the current case regarding the Naval Station, the birdwatchers acknowledge that the destruction of historic buildings cannot be undone. However, if additional environmental reviews are mandated, the defendants could explore alternatives to mitigate habitat damage, such as creating new nesting areas. Thus, the demolition does not render the case moot. Regarding standing under NEPA, the Navy argues that the birdwatchers lack standing to challenge the environmental impact statement. To establish standing, plaintiffs must demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury that is actual or imminent, traceable to the defendant's actions, and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling.
A plaintiff must demonstrate that their alleged injury falls within the 'zone of interests' protected by NEPA when suing under the Administrative Procedure Act. The birdwatchers have met this prudential standing requirement, as their interest in preserving the historic and natural environment of the Naval Station aligns with NEPA's protective aims. The assessment of standing will next consider whether the birdwatchers fulfill Article III's requirements, specifically the 'injury in fact' criterion. NEPA is characterized as a procedural statute, and the birdwatchers claim a 'procedural injury' by contesting the Navy’s Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS).
To establish injury in fact for procedural claims, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the challenged procedures are intended to safeguard a specific, threatened interest. In NEPA cases, this involves a 'geographic nexus' between the claimant and the impacted area. Despite the procedural nature of their claim, the birdwatchers must show an invasion of a concrete interest, which they assert pertains to their enjoyment of the natural environment and birdwatching at the Naval Station.
The Supreme Court recognizes that environmental plaintiffs can adequately claim injury by asserting that they use the affected area and that their aesthetic and recreational experiences will be diminished by the contested actions. Importantly, proximity to the area is not a prerequisite for establishing concrete injury; habitual use and credible plans for future use can suffice.
The birdwatchers have substantiated a concrete interest sufficient to demonstrate injury in fact, as illustrated by the allegations of Anne Cantrell, who has frequently visited the Naval Station to observe bird habitats and asserts that habitat removal would directly impair her enjoyment. Other plaintiffs similarly report regular visits to observe bird habitats, even from outside the closed station, and express intentions to continue these visits.
Plaintiffs Cantrell and Larkey assert that their prior visits and future plans to observe birds and nesting areas near the Naval Station substantiate their recreational and aesthetic interests, which they claim will be harmed by the removal of trees and habitat. Their statements indicate a concrete and particularized injury, satisfying the injury in fact standard necessary for standing. However, the Navy contends that the plaintiffs lack standing because they do not possess a legal right to access the closed station or observe from beyond its boundaries. The district court agreed, suggesting that the aesthetic interest of viewing from an adjacent property does not constitute a legally protected interest.
Despite this, the court emphasizes that plaintiffs do not need a formal right of access to establish injury, as enjoyment from nearby land suffices. Citing precedents, including Laidlaw, the court argues that actual physical entry is not required to demonstrate injury, focusing instead on whether the plaintiffs' interests are concrete and distinct from the general public's. The requirement for a legally protected interest need not be a substantive property or contract right; rather, it suffices that the challenged action adversely affects the plaintiffs' aesthetic or ecological surroundings. The analysis references Animal Lovers Volunteer Association, Inc. v. Weinberger to illustrate the appropriate approach to standing, despite it predating Defenders of Wildlife.
Plaintiffs lacked standing in ALVA to challenge the Navy's goat eradication on San Clemente Island due to the island's inaccessibility and the absence of a direct sensory impact on their environment. The court indicated that standing could be established if plaintiffs demonstrated an aesthetic or ecological impact, but ALVA could not show such a geographic nexus or concrete injury. In contrast, the current plaintiffs allege a specific aesthetic injury due to the Navy's actions, claiming their ability to view birds from accessible areas will be severely diminished. The Navy's argument, presented during oral arguments, that there is no injury because the birds themselves haven't been harmed, was rejected; standing requires injury to the plaintiff, not the environment. The reuse plan threatens 26 acres of bird habitat, directly impacting the plaintiffs' enjoyment of birdwatching. The court clarified that requiring proof of environmental harm for standing conflates jurisdictional issues with merits. The birdwatchers fulfill the injury requirement under Article III. Once injury in fact is established under NEPA, the causation and redressability standards are less stringent. The court referenced *Defenders of Wildlife*, noting that individuals with procedural rights can assert these rights without meeting typical redressability standards, and emphasized that the birdwatchers do not need to prove that the EIS would lead to the abandonment of the terminal plans to establish their standing.
Plaintiffs challenging the Forest Service's grazing permit are not required to prove that the state would deny water quality certification to meet the redressability requirement. Previous case law indicates that uncertainty regarding the impact of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on agency decisions does not negate standing. Birdwatchers, seeking to enforce a procedural right under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), have standing to contest the adequacy of the Navy's Final EIS despite the inability to show that a revised EIS would lead to a different outcome.
Regarding taxpayer standing, the birdwatchers claim standing under § 526(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure to address state law issues concerning waste of government funds and misuse of trust assets. While California courts interpret § 526(a) broadly, allowing taxpayers to sue for misappropriated funds regardless of their source, these state-level standing provisions do not satisfy the stricter federal Article III standing requirements. To proceed in federal court, a plaintiff must demonstrate a direct injury linked to the alleged misuse of tax dollars. The birdwatchers have not met this requirement, leading to the affirmation of the district court’s dismissal of their state law claims. The federal standard requires a clear connection between taxpayer status, tax expenditures, and the challenged governmental action, which the birdwatchers failed to establish.
A plaintiff must demonstrate a direct injury related to the expenditure of tax dollars to establish standing; in this case, the birdwatchers failed to show such injury regarding the destruction of the Naval Station and the construction of a marine terminal. Their claims centered on construction costs and potential financial losses of the Port of Long Beach, which operates on its own revenues and does not receive tax dollars. The birdwatchers’ allegations regarding state law claims lacked a clear connection to tax dollars, consisting mainly of vague assertions about waste of funds across various entities without specific ties to taxpayer money. While they cited Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 526(a) to assert standing, the court noted that this statute only allows for injunctive relief and does not satisfy the injury requirement of Article III for standing in federal court because it does not provide for monetary relief. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the birdwatchers’ state law claims. However, the dismissal of their NEPA claim was reversed, allowing for a remand to the district court for further proceedings. The ruling acknowledged that while NEPA does not provide a private right of action, parties can enforce its requirements through the Administrative Procedure Act, and that procedural standing does not require imminent substantive environmental harm. The birdwatchers’ claims regarding access to the Naval Station under state tidelands trust were not addressed, as they did not influence the standing issues at hand.
