Jerry White v. Harry K. Singletary, Jr., Secretary, Department of Corrections

Citations: 70 F.3d 1198; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 33753; 1995 WL 713151Docket: 95-3604

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; December 3, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

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Jerry White, a state prisoner in Florida, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as he faced imminent execution scheduled for December 4, 1995. He requested a Certificate of Probable Cause and a stay of execution, which were denied by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The court referenced a comprehensive twenty-three page opinion from the district court, which detailed White's criminal history, including his conviction for robbing a grocery store and murdering a customer, and the subsequent affirmations of his conviction and death sentence by the Florida courts.

White's legal journey included a denied motion for postconviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, a denied habeas corpus petition by the Florida Supreme Court, and a previous unsuccessful federal habeas petition in 1990. Subsequent attempts to vacate his judgment of conviction and to obtain a stay of execution were denied by the state trial court and the Florida Supreme Court.

In his second federal habeas corpus petition, White raised five claims for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel and non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence; (2) failure of the state to provide access to his clemency investigation file; (3) denial of access to grand jury transcripts and juror names; (4) failure of the trial court to review materials allegedly containing exculpatory evidence; and (5) lack of legal representation for his clemency application. The court found that most of these claims were either successive, constituted an abuse of the writ under Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, or were procedurally barred.

White claims ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to present evidence regarding his low intelligence and troubled background during sentencing. He supports this with affidavits from the trial prosecutor, Francis Blankner, and defense counsel, Emmet Moran, highlighting Moran's poor health during the trial. Additionally, neuropsychologist Dr. Barry M. Crown's letter indicates that White exhibits both statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors. White contends this evidence should have been introduced, and he also alleges that the state's failure to provide collateral counsel with a Presentence Investigation (PSI) report showing his I.Q. of 72 violated Brady v. Maryland.

The district court found these claims to be successive to those raised in White's first federal habeas petition, where he previously asserted ineffective assistance based on similar grounds. White had introduced an affidavit from Dr. Macaluso regarding his substance abuse and Moran's health issues at that time, but he failed to show cause for revisiting these matters. Furthermore, the court ruled that the state’s failure to provide the PSI to collateral counsel did not violate Brady, as the report had been provided to trial counsel before sentencing.

In addition, White alleges that the state failed to disclose exculpatory evidence related to blood stains at the crime scene and statements from police officers and customers, which he argues support his trial testimony. However, the district court and Florida courts found no justification for relief based on these Brady claims, concluding that the outcome would not likely have changed with the "new" evidence presented. The court determined no further factual development or evidentiary hearings were necessary for these claims.

Lastly, White's second claim concerns the state's failure to provide his clemency investigation file, which he believes may contain exculpatory information. The Florida Supreme Court deemed this claim procedurally barred, and White did not demonstrate cause or prejudice to overcome this bar. Additionally, he failed to sufficiently allege that the information would prove his actual innocence regarding an offense punishable by death, leading to the claim not being considered.

Claim three arises from the state trial court's denial of the Petitioner's requests for grand jury transcripts, in-camera review of these transcripts, and the identities of the grand jurors. Claim four is based on the court's refusal to review exculpatory evidence presented by the Petitioner. Both claims are subject to dismissal for abuse of the writ because they were not raised in the initial federal habeas petition. Additionally, the district court determined these claims pertain to state law, thus not warranting habeas review under Beverly v. Jones, 854 F.2d 412, 416 (11th Cir. 1988). 

The fifth claim alleges that Florida violated the Petitioner’s rights by not providing legal counsel for his clemency petition. The district court correctly noted that there is no constitutional right to counsel in clemency hearings, as established in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756-57 (1991). Therefore, this claim is not cognizable in the postconviction context.

Given that this is the Petitioner's second section 2254 relief petition, that he has not shown actual innocence, and that the district court has not made reversible legal errors, the conclusion is that the Petitioner has not demonstrated a substantial denial of a federal right warranting relief. Consequently, the certificate of probable cause and the stay of execution are denied.

Additionally, the motion for a certificate is denied, the motion for a further stay is denied, and the request for oral argument is also denied. Judge Kravitch concurs, expressing concern that had evidence of the Petitioner's brain damage and low IQ been presented during sentencing, it could have influenced the jury's decision against imposing the death penalty. However, due to procedural hurdles from previous habeas petitions, this potentially valid claim will not be heard.