Delmas R. Hose, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant, Virginia Hose v. Chicago Northwestern Transportation Company, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee
Docket: 94-3300
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; January 29, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
A jury awarded Delmas R. Hose $1,333,279.31 for personal injuries under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) due to negligence by Chicago Northwestern Transportation Company (CNW). Hose, a welder at CNW from 1976 to 1991, was exposed to toxic manganese fumes and dust without adequate safety measures. After reporting memory loss and a fall due to leg weakness in April 1991, Hose was instructed to take sick leave until medically cleared. He filed a lawsuit against CNW in April 1992, alongside state law claims against Stoody Deloro Stellite, Inc. and Arcair Company, which were settled prior to trial. The jury found CNW 90% at fault and Hose 10% contributorily at fault, with no fault assigned to Stoody or Arcair. CNW's motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial were denied. On appeal, CNW contested the admissibility of expert testimony, the sufficiency of medical causation evidence, and certain jury instructions. Hose cross-appealed regarding the contributory negligence finding. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decisions. Notably, Dr. Carol Angle diagnosed Hose with manganese encephalopathy, a conclusion supported by neurologist Dr. Jan Golnick, leading to a reevaluation of Hose's medication.
Manganese encephalopathy, a form of dementia linked to chronic manganese exposure, often results in impaired motor control. CNW disputes the expert testimony of Hose's physicians under the Daubert standard, which requires the trial court to ensure that scientific evidence is both relevant and reliable. Relevant evidence must connect scientifically to the case, while reliable evidence must be grounded in scientific methods rather than speculation. The admissibility of expert medical evidence is reviewed for clear abuse of discretion, with plain error applied if objections are not properly raised. Erroneous admission of expert evidence does not warrant reversal if deemed harmless.
CNW challenges Dr. Naresh Gupta's testimony regarding a PET scan of Hose’s brain, which Dr. Golnick ordered for diagnostic purposes. Dr. Gupta stated that the PET scan ruled out conditions like alcoholism, stroke, and Alzheimer's while being consistent with manganese encephalopathy. CNW sought to exclude this evidence, arguing it lacked scientific reliability and relevance. The district court admitted the testimony, acknowledging its relevance in excluding alternative diagnoses and its limited scope. The court found no abuse of discretion in this decision, as ruling out alternative diagnoses is a valid medical approach and the PET scan is reliable for assessing brain function. The pre-litigation ordering of the PET scan further supports its scientific validity.
Additionally, CNW challenges Dr. Richard Andrews's testimony regarding a polysomnogram that assessed Hose for sleep disorders, which was also ordered by Dr. Golnick. Dr. Andrews indicated that the sleep disorder was consistent with exposure to a toxic substance.
CNW raised an objection to the admission of Dr. Andrews's deposition testimony only when plaintiff's counsel intended to present it at trial, arguing that the polysomnogram used to assess manganese encephalopathy was scientifically unreliable and irrelevant. CNW supported its objection with a statement from Dr. Angle indicating ambiguity in distinguishing between toxic and non-toxic sleep disorders. Despite this, the district court allowed the deposition, noting that Dr. Korn would testify on the relevance of sleep disorders in encephalopathy cases.
The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the polysomnogram evidence, as Dr. Angle's statement did not invalidate the sleep study but acknowledged the complexity of sleep disorders. Although Dr. Andrews's testimony indicated that the polysomnogram could not definitively diagnose manganese encephalopathy and that sleep disorders could arise from various causes, CNW was permitted to argue the testimony's weight to the jury.
CNW also contested Dr. Angle's opinion linking Hose's symptoms to manganese exposure, claiming it relied on the truthfulness of Hose and his wife's accounts. However, the court affirmed that any concerns regarding the factual basis of an expert's opinion pertain to credibility rather than admissibility, emphasizing that the opposing party can challenge this through cross-examination. Dr. Angle's opinion was deemed sufficiently supported by patient history, laboratory findings, clinical examinations, and MRI results.
Furthermore, CNW had ample opportunity for cross-examination, where Dr. Angle acknowledged her skepticism regarding the patient's history but still observed distinct physical symptoms indicative of manganese encephalopathy. Nonetheless, she admitted that Hose's wife was already convinced of manganese poisoning prior to their discussions.
The district court directed the jury to assess the accuracy of the plaintiff's reported "subjective symptoms" and allowed them to evaluate the credibility of Hose and his wife regarding his condition. The admissibility of expert testimonies from Dr. Angle and Dr. Gupta was challenged by CNW, who questioned the sufficiency of medical evidence related to causation. Dr. Kevin Nelson, a radiologist, provided evidence of manganese in Hose's brain, ruling out other potential causes for his injuries. Dr. Golnick diagnosed Hose with manganese encephalopathy, suggesting a toxic origin, and Dr. Thomas Korn supported the diagnosis, stating Hose suffered from encephalopathy, potentially toxic.
CNW argued that merely having expert opinions favorable to Hose is insufficient, claiming that Hose's experts did not adequately refute its experts' assertions regarding manganese encephalopathy. CNW contended that Hose did not exhibit the disabling physical symptoms or clinical signs of Parkinson's disease typically associated with manganese encephalopathy and argued for judgment as a matter of law.
However, the evidence presented indicated that manganese encephalopathy does not require clinically verifiable signs of Parkinson's disease, though such signs are commonly seen. Dr. Angle and Dr. Snyder testified that the symptoms of manganese encephalopathy extend beyond those found in Parkinson's disease, with Dr. Angle noting that manganese patients often experience personality changes and emotional instability before physical symptoms arise.
The record did not establish that manganese encephalopathy must produce more severe disabling symptoms than those exhibited by Hose. Testimony indicated that Hose experienced a lack of control over his movements, corroborated by observations from his supervisor, who noted incidents of his leg collapsing, and by neurologist Dr. Ohr, who found clumsiness and diminished sensation on Hose's right side. Observations from Dr. Riedler and Dr. Angle confirmed Hose's difficulties walking and tremors. Hose himself reported struggles with grasping objects and frequent falls, supporting the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence of physical impairment.
Evidence does not support CNW's claim that manganese encephalopathy symptoms must be symmetrical. Dr. Nelson noted variability in symptoms between body sides, while Dr. Angle clarified that one-sided symptoms are atypical but do not rule out manganese poisoning. Hose exhibited most symptoms on his right side, but had a tremor in both hands and sensory deficiencies in his left leg, indicating symptoms are not confined to one side.
Furthermore, the evidence challenges the assertion that manganese encephalopathy does not lead to progressive deterioration. Dr. Snyder mentioned patients can experience worsening symptoms, with contradictory evidence limited to a specific patient demographic. Dr. Angle acknowledged that while she initially deemed Hose stable, progressive stages can occur in many cases.
Disagreements among medical experts on diagnosis and causation necessitate jury evaluation of conflicting evidence. A jury verdict is upheld if supported by reasonable inferences favoring the prevailing party.
CNW also contested the exclusion of evidence regarding Hose's initial state law claims against Stoody and Arcair and their settlement. The district court deemed this evidence unduly prejudicial, allowing CNW to introduce blame against these parties instead. The jury was instructed to consider their responsibility without clear abuse of discretion by the court.
Additionally, CNW aimed to introduce the settlement amount to demonstrate Hose's ability to afford depression treatment, countering claims regarding his inability to pay for care. However, Hose's wife testified he was currently receiving therapy. The court's decision to exclude the settlement amount was not an abuse of discretion, given the context.
CNW contests Jury Instructions 12 and 16, asserting they implied CNW's liability for Hose's injuries despite having provided reasonable warnings about welding hazards. Instruction 12 indicated that Hose demonstrated negligence if CNW failed to adequately warn him about the dangers of working with manganese rods and alloys. Instruction 16 stated that an employer is negligent for failing to warn, regardless of whether the danger is inherent to the business or if the employee could have avoided it had he been warned. The district court has broad discretion in creating jury instructions, and the review focuses on whether the instructions fairly presented the case issues to the jury. A single erroneous instruction does not necessitate reversal if the overall charge is sufficient. The court concluded that the jury instructions were appropriate, highlighting that CNW had a duty to exercise "ordinary" or "reasonable" care, and that the elaboration on "negligence" in Instruction 12 did not invalidate the instructions as a whole. The court also rejected CNW's claim that its duty to warn was contingent on Hose being able to change his behavior based on the warnings, noting that employees seek information about hazards for various reasons, not solely for immediate safety changes.
In Hose's cross-appeal regarding contributory negligence under FELA, he challenges the evidence supporting the district court's instruction and the jury's finding of ten percent contributory negligence. Under FELA, the burden of proof for contributory negligence lies with the defendant, and an instruction on this issue is warranted if there is any supporting evidence. However, if no evidence suggests a lack of due care by the plaintiff, submitting the issue to the jury is reversible error. Importantly, assumption of risk cannot serve as a defense under FELA; thus, evidence related solely to assumption of risk cannot substantiate a contributory negligence verdict. Nonetheless, evidence relevant to both contributory negligence and assumption of risk may still be considered.
Hose asserts that any fault attributed to him pertains to assumption of risk, as he knowingly performed his job duties under dangerous conditions, rather than to contributory negligence. In the case of Birchem, it was determined that an employee could not be held contributorily negligent for operating defective equipment in violation of safety rules if they exercised due care in its operation. The court emphasized that the employer has a non-delegable duty to provide safe equipment and a safe working environment.
However, evidence presented by CNW suggested that Hose did not consistently exercise due care for his own safety, supporting a finding of ten percent contributory negligence. Testimony indicated that Hose occasionally neglected to use the ventilation equipment provided by CNW, and his supervisor had to remind him to do so. Additionally, Hose admitted he may not have read warning labels, which allowed the jury to infer that he failed to utilize the safety measures adequately.
Hose countered that CNW was aware employees often did not use the ventilation equipment, suggesting the company allowed a dangerous condition to persist without consequence. Nevertheless, the supervisor’s reminders indicated that CNW did not condone Hose's negligence. Hose also claimed that the ventilation equipment was often ineffective, but he had a responsibility to report this issue to his supervisors, which he failed to do.
Hose argues that the railroad's negligence in failing to warn him about manganese hazards should absolve him of contributory negligence regarding his lack of ventilation equipment use while welding. He claims that without adequate warnings about the risks of welding fumes, his actions cannot be deemed negligent. However, the court finds that Hose's knowledge of the need for ventilation and precautions undermines his claim, as the failure to warn was about the scope of manganese risks rather than the absence of warnings altogether. Consequently, the court concludes that CNW's inadequate warnings do not excuse Hose's failure to follow the known safety practices. The judgment is affirmed.
Additionally, the document addresses the standards for expert testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically referencing the Daubert ruling, which established that challenges to the reliability of scientific evidence should typically be resolved before trial. In this case, the defense did not seek a pre-trial hearing on these issues, leading to an exchange in court where the defense acknowledged their intention to address concerns regarding expert testimony during the trial. The court emphasized the importance of early evidentiary challenges to allow for proper judicial oversight of expert testimony. The document also notes a distinction in the application of testimony standards, as evidenced by the differing contexts of expert opinions. Lastly, it recounts instances of objection raised by CNW regarding expert testimony about manganese encephalopathy, although it refrains from determining if these objections were properly preserved for appeal.
Section 703 allows experts to base their opinions on facts or data perceived or communicated to them before the hearing, provided such information is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in their field. In Hose's case, his wife reported symptoms attributed to alcoholism and stroke. Two doctors testified regarding Hose's condition: Dr. John Riedler, a psychiatrist, diagnosed him with toxic encephalopathy and depression, suggesting the depression may stem from dementia linked to the encephalopathy; and Dr. Jack Snyder, a toxicologist, indicated that manganese exposure from CNW's reclamation center significantly contributed to Hose's health issues. Additionally, Dr. Angle noted that the link between Parkinson's disease signs and manganese poisoning was overly generalized. CNW challenged the exclusion of evidence regarding health insurance provided to Hose but the court found no error in this exclusion, as related testimony was already presented. CNW also argued it should inform the jury about the settled status of non-present parties under Iowa law, relevant to its dismissed cross-claims against Stoody and Arcair. However, the court maintained that evidentiary decisions in FELA cases are governed by federal law, not Iowa law, thus rejecting CNW's argument.
