Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; June 27, 2000; Federal Appellate Court
In 1998, Archibald R. Schaffer III was convicted of attempting to influence the Secretary of Agriculture, violating the Meat Inspection Act. The United States is appealing the district court's decision to grant Schaffer a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The court found that Schaffer lacked diligence in obtaining this evidence prior to his trial and concluded that it was unlikely to lead to acquittal upon retrial, resulting in a reversal of the district court's decision.
The relevant background indicates that in 1993, while Alphonso Michael Espy was Secretary of Agriculture, certain food safety initiatives affecting Tyson Foods International were in development. Don Tyson, Chairman of Tyson Foods, invited Secretary Espy to a birthday party during which Schaffer facilitated arrangements for Espy’s attendance at both the party and an Arkansas Poultry Federation event. Evidence suggested Schaffer attempted to conceal the nature of the events from Espy’s office. Espy attended the Tyson birthday party and was later indicted along with Schaffer for related offenses.
In June 1998, Schaffer was found guilty of violating the Meat Inspection Act and providing unlawful gratuities. Following his conviction, he moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court initially granted. However, the independent counsel’s appeal resulted in the reinstatement of the jury’s verdict on the Meat Inspection Act count, as the appellate court determined that sufficient evidence existed for a reasonable juror to find Schaffer had sought to influence Espy regarding Tyson Foods’ policies.
Schaffer filed a motion for a new trial under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure after Espy was acquitted of all charges, arguing that Espy’s post-trial testimony was "newly discovered" evidence. This testimony became available after the expiration of Espy’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination following his trial. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, where Espy stated he considered his appearance at an event a legitimate reason for his trip to Arkansas, attended a birthday party for Don Tyson out of courtesy, and had no knowledge of Schaffer or any discussions relating to USDA policies during his visit. Schaffer’s counsel revealed that prior to Schaffer’s trial, Espy’s counsel indicated Espy would not testify, leading Schaffer’s counsel to refrain from attempting to subpoena him, believing Espy would invoke the Fifth Amendment. The district court determined Schaffer met the requirements of Rule 33 and granted the new trial motion. The independent counsel subsequently filed an appeal. Rule 33 allows a new trial if justice requires it and permits motions based on newly discovered evidence within three years of the conviction. Schaffer’s motion was timely only if Espy’s testimony qualified as newly discovered evidence, with the court applying standards from the case of Thompson v. United States.
A court may grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence if five conditions are met: 1) the evidence was discovered after the trial; 2) the party seeking the new trial exercised diligence in obtaining the evidence; 3) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; 4) it is material to the issues at hand; and 5) it is likely to result in an acquittal in a new trial. A district court's decision to grant a new trial can only be reversed if there was an abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law.
In the case at hand, the district court abused its discretion because Schaffer did not meet the second and fifth requirements. Specifically, Schaffer did not demonstrate diligence in procuring testimony from a witness and failed to show that the witness's testimony would likely lead to an acquittal. Diligence is case-specific; a defendant believing a witness's testimony is vital must either seek a trial continuance or explain the inability to produce the witness to the court. A lack of communication with the court regarding the pursuit of witnesses indicates insufficient diligence. Schaffer claimed it would have been futile to subpoena the witness or seek a continuance, but this belief does not fulfill the diligence requirement.
Additionally, Schaffer could not prove that the witness's testimony would likely result in an acquittal since it was not relevant to the offense charged. Schaffer was convicted under the MIA for offering something of value to a U.S. officer, and the proposed testimony did not pertain to the elements of this crime.
The prior appeal regarding Schaffer’s MIA conviction focused on whether sufficient evidence was presented for a jury to determine that Schaffer had the intent to influence the Secretary’s duties under the Meat Inspection Act. The prosecution clarified that the case was about Schaffer's intent, not whether Secretary Espy was corrupt. Espy’s testimony during the evidentiary hearing indicated he viewed the APF function as legitimate and was unaware of any attempts to influence his official duties during the relevant weekend. This testimony does not impact Schaffer’s intent in facilitating Espy's attendance at these events, as the jury could still infer that the meeting, while legitimate, was arranged to provide Espy with official cover. The court found that the district court erred in determining that Schaffer met certain legal requirements and thus did not address whether Espy’s testimony constituted "newly discovered" evidence under Rule 33. The court noted a precedent suggesting that testimony from a non-party witness post-trial would not qualify as newly discovered if its substance was known to the defendant at trial. Ultimately, the court concluded that Espy’s new testimony alone did not warrant a new trial for Schaffer, reversed the order for a new trial, reinstated the jury’s verdict on the Meat Inspection Act count, and remanded the case for sentencing.
