Franklin v. Terr

Citations: 201 F.3d 1098; 2000 Daily Journal DAR 1293; 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 868; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1280; 2000 WL 121819Docket: No. 98-16843

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; February 1, 2000; Federal Appellate Court

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A witness enjoys absolute immunity from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for providing perjured testimony at trial, as established in Briscoe v. LaHue. This case examines whether such immunity extends to a witness accused of conspiring to present perjured testimony. The district court ruled that this immunity applies, specifically affirming its decision regarding Kirk Barrett, a therapist, and Lenore Terr, a psychiatrist, who were alleged to have conspired to provide false testimony during George Franklin's murder trial. 

Franklin was convicted based on accusations from his daughter, Eileen Franklin-Lipsker, who claimed to have recovered repressed memories of the crime. Following the federal court's habeas corpus grant due to constitutional errors, the charges against Franklin were dismissed due to insufficient evidence, prompting him to file a § 1983 lawsuit. 

Barrett and Terr sought dismissal, claiming absolute immunity for their roles during the trial, which the district court granted, referencing rulings from several circuit courts that a conspiracy allegation does not negate a witness's immunity for perjured testimony. The court did not assess the sufficiency of the claims against Barrett, as the dismissal was based solely on immunity. Franklin has appealed this decision.

Franklin's application for an interlocutory appeal was granted under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). The review of a dismissal without leave to amend occurs de novo, as established in San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles. The district court's dismissal of the 1983 claim against Barrett was affirmed, but on different grounds, with the court concluding that Franklin did not sufficiently state a claim against Barrett. To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a plaintiff must assert deprivation of a constitutional right and that the defendant acted under color of state authority. Allegations suggesting a private individual conspired with a state official can meet this requirement. However, Franklin's allegations concerning Barrett's actions did not demonstrate that Barrett acted under color of state authority or conspired with a state official, leading to dismissal of the claims against him.

Regarding Lenore Terr, the court affirmed her immunity from damages liability under 1983 for testimony provided during Franklin's trial, referencing the precedent set in Briscoe. The Briscoe decision addressed whether police officers could be held civilly liable for perjury in criminal trials, concluding that witnesses enjoy absolute immunity for their testimony. Thus, both Barrett and Terr were dismissed from Franklin's claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

The Court affirmed that absolute witness immunity, as established at common law, remains intact under Section 1983, particularly for private witnesses. Franklin's attempt to bypass this immunity by alleging conspiracy involving Terr to present false testimony is rejected, as it would undermine the policy of protecting the judicial process. This immunity ensures that judges, advocates, and witnesses can fulfill their roles without fear of harassment or intimidation. The Court highlighted that concerns about potential damages could deter witnesses from testifying or distort their testimony. Franklin's claims, which assert that Terr coordinated with another witness to enhance her testimony and ensure consistency, are intrinsically linked to Terr's role as a witness, thereby granting her immunity from damages. The Court refrained from addressing whether Section 1983 allows actions against individuals who conspired to present perjured testimony without being witnesses themselves. It aligned with the conclusion reached by six other circuits, maintaining that permitting a claim for subornation of perjury where the testimony is protected by absolute immunity would contravene established legal principles.

Miller (10th Cir.) established that judicial process safeguards from Briscoe, which mitigate the impact of perjured testimony at trial, also extend to attempted conspiracies involving such testimony. Wilkins (7th Cir.) determined that 1983 plaintiffs cannot bypass witnesses' absolute immunity by alleging conspiracy to convict via perjured testimony, as this approach is unworkable. Moses (8th Cir.) ruled that a court-appointed psychiatrist retains absolute immunity, emphasizing that allowing conspiracy claims to undermine this doctrine would create unintended exceptions. Alioto (6th Cir.) reinforced that the witness immunity doctrine from Briscoe protects against liability for claims of conspiracies to provide false testimony in court. Conversely, the Second Circuit, specifically in Dory v. Ryan (1994), declined to extend absolute immunity to conspiracies related to perjured testimony outside judicial proceedings, with San Filippo v. U.S. Trust Co. (1984) highlighting that Briscoe's immunity is limited to testimony given in court. The district court's decision to dismiss Franklin's claims against Terr and Barrett was affirmed, as Franklin failed to establish a claim against Barrett, and Terr was deemed absolutely immune from 1983 liability regarding allegations of conspiracy to present perjured testimony. Additionally, the district court found violations of Franklin's Sixth and Fifth Amendment rights and due process in his trial proceedings. The Court of Appeals can uphold the decision on any supported grounds.