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People v. Duda

Citations: 84 Ill. 2d 406; 419 N.E.2d 909; 50 Ill. Dec. 641; 1981 Ill. LEXIS 263Docket: No. 53403

Court: Illinois Supreme Court; March 31, 1981; Illinois; State Supreme Court

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Defendants Donald W. Duda, Daniel James Norris, Timothy Kiser, Paul Evan Haynes, and Peter K. Callahan were convicted of criminal trespass to State-supported land in a bench trial in Sangamon County, Illinois, and sentenced to two days in jail. Their conviction was reversed by the appellate court, prompting the People to appeal. The charges stemmed from a demonstration on September 3, 1978, at the Capitol grounds where Duda had sought but was denied permission to advocate for the repeal of marijuana laws. A crowd of 250 to 300 gathered, and while the demonstration was initially orderly, it later became chaotic with incidents of vandalism, littering, and drunkenness.

At 2 p.m., officials decided to end the demonstration by 3 p.m. and warned demonstrators that failure to leave could lead to arrest. After the crowd refused to disperse, a crowd-control team was deployed, leading to the arrests of Duda, Norris, Callahan, and Kiser around 3:30 p.m. Haynes was arrested later as demonstrators returned after being given multiple warnings to leave. Testimony indicated Duda communicated the order to disperse to the crowd, which responded by chanting, and that Norris and Callahan linked arms with other demonstrators just before their arrest.

Defendant Norris was observed by Lieutenant Charlson encouraging others to hold onto him and sit on the ground, while defendant Callahan urged participants to hinder police efforts to remove Norris from the crowd. Under Section 21.5 of the Criminal Code of 1961, individuals who enter or remain on state-supported land after receiving notice to depart, thereby interfering with another's lawful use of that land, commit a Class A misdemeanor. The defendants acknowledged that they received proper notice to leave and remained thereafter. The central issue is whether the prosecution proved that their actions interfered with lawful use of the land. The prosecution argued that the defendants' refusal to leave caused temporary damage to the grounds and interfered with the Secretary of State's duty to preserve the area. The appellate court rejected this argument, stating that the term "lawful use or enjoyment" does not include the duty to maintain the property. It concluded that even if the prosecution's interpretation of the statute were correct, the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. The prosecution cited Washington Mobilization Committee v. Cullinane to argue that refusal to comply with police orders is sufficient for convictions under Section 21.5, even without prior disorderly conduct. They contended that requiring police to only remove those directly causing disturbances would undermine the statute's purpose, creating an impractical burden on law enforcement.

The case distinguishes itself from Cullinane due to significant differences in the statutes involved. A conviction under section 21.5 necessitates establishing three elements: 1) notice to leave, 2) remaining post-notice, and 3) interference with another's lawful use or enjoyment of land. The court rejects the argument that merely refusing to leave suffices for conviction, as this would effectively eliminate the requirement of proving interference, which contradicts the statute's intent. The court emphasizes that each statutory provision must retain meaning and not be rendered superfluous. The evidence did not demonstrate any interference with official activities or public access, as the demonstration occurred on a closed holiday weekend without hindering groundskeepers or personnel. The court finds the cited case, People v. Barnett, factually different because it involved indoor obstruction and did not address section 21.5's elements directly. The assertion that defendant Duda’s encouragement of the crowd constituted interference was also dismissed, as refusal to leave alone does not meet the interference criteria. Consequently, the court affirms the appellate court's judgment, determining that the prosecution failed to prove a violation of section 21.5, making it unnecessary to evaluate the statute's constitutionality.