Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; October 22, 1999; Federal Appellate Court
Army Private Donald Saucier, serving as a military police officer, arrested Elliot M. Katz during a public event at the San Francisco Presidio, where Katz was displaying a sign. Katz alleges that Saucier and another officer violently removed the sign, dragged him fifty feet, and forcefully placed him into a van. In response, Katz filed a Bivens action against Saucier and others, claiming violations of his constitutional rights, particularly under the Fourth Amendment for excessive force. Saucier sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the district court denied regarding Katz’s Fourth Amendment claim. Saucier appealed, arguing that the legal standards for assessing excessive force claims and qualified immunity had conflicting interpretations within the circuit, citing a prior en banc decision in Hammer v. Gross. The court affirmed the district court's decision.
The case stems from Katz's arrest during a speech by Vice President Gore aimed at announcing the transition of the Presidio to a national park, a matter of public contention due to concerns over animal experimentation. Katz, an animal rights activist and the president of In Defense of Animals (IDA), attended the event with a sign that read "Please Keep Animal Torture Out of Our National Parks." Despite Saucier's awareness of Katz as a potential protestor and instructions to manage any demonstrations discreetly, Katz attempted to display his banner but was forcibly apprehended by Saucier and another officer before he could do so.
Katz was forcibly taken by military police officers to a van, where he was thrown inside but managed to avoid serious injury through self-protection. He was left alone in the van for approximately twenty minutes before being searched, handcuffed, and transported to a military police station, where he was briefly detained and ultimately released without being informed of any charges. Katz and the IDA subsequently filed a lawsuit against the United States and various military officials, alleging violations of the First and Fourth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Saucier and several military officials regarding the First Amendment claim, citing qualified immunity due to unclear constitutional protections for protestors at the time. However, the court denied Saucier's request for summary judgment on the excessive force claim, identifying factual disputes regarding the level of force used and Katz's actions during arrest. The court ruled that the law on the use of force in arrests was clearly established, leading to a conclusion that a triable issue existed regarding the reasonableness of the force applied by Saucier.
Saucier filed an interlocutory appeal regarding the district court's denial of his qualified immunity claim. The denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity is reviewed de novo. Jurisdiction for this appeal is established under the collateral order doctrine, allowing review of the denial of summary judgment except when the defendant argues that the pretrial evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. In summary judgment cases, the appellate review focuses on whether clearly established law existed at the time of the incident that could have been violated by the defendant's actions.
The court can also assess if there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the officer's conduct met the qualified immunity standard of objective legal reasonableness. Saucier contends that the en banc decision in Hammer conflicts with subsequent cases equating the reasonableness test for qualified immunity with that of an excessive force claim. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability unless their conduct violates clearly established rights. The analysis involves two steps: determining if the law was clearly established and, if so, whether a reasonable official could have believed their conduct was lawful. The reasonableness of an officer's actions is relevant both to the qualified immunity defense and as an element of the plaintiff's excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Graham v. Connor establishes that claims of excessive force by law enforcement during an arrest must be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment's “reasonableness” standard. This assessment is objective, focusing on whether the officer’s actions were “objectively reasonable” given the circumstances. The Graham inquiry balances the force applied against the necessity for that force. Key factors to consider include: 1) the severity of the crime, 2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to officer or public safety, and 3) if the suspect resists arrest or attempts to flee. Both the qualified immunity defense and the merits of excessive force claims assess the objective reasonableness of the officer's conduct. The inquiry for qualified immunity parallels that of the excessive force claim, as courts have consistently held that the evaluation of excessive force and qualified immunity defenses are fundamentally the same. This approach is supported by decisions across various circuit courts, which have similarly adopted the "objectively reasonable" standard in police misconduct cases.
A finding of excessive force does not inherently conflict with a finding of qualified immunity. In cases of excessive force, a material issue of fact regarding whether an officer used excessive force prevents summary judgment on qualified immunity. An officer cannot reasonably believe that the force used was necessary if no reasonable officer could have held that belief, establishing a Fourth Amendment violation. Genuine disputes over the amount of force or justifying circumstances imply that a reasonable officer could not have believed the force was lawful. The court refutes Saucier's claim that previous panel opinions conflict with the en banc ruling in Hammer, where excessive force was used to extract a blood sample post-arrest. In Hammer, the legality of using force was assessed under the "shock the conscience" standard, which the plaintiff conceded was not met. Although the excessive force may not have shocked the conscience, officers could not have anticipated the later Graham ruling establishing a new objective reasonableness test. Thus, qualified immunity was granted as the officers acted within the legal framework at the time. Saucier's assertion that the force used in arresting Katz was minimal and therefore per se reasonable is rejected, as the facts remain disputed.
Katz alleges that Saucier and Parker approached him without warning, seized his banner, dragged him approximately fifty feet, and violently threw him into a van, nearly causing serious injury. Accepting these facts as true for summary judgment, it is concluded that no reasonable officer could believe the force used was necessary. The analysis focuses on three factors: (1) the severity of the alleged crime, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat, and (3) whether the suspect resisted arrest. Unfurling a banner at a public event is not deemed a severe crime, especially given Katz's age (sixty) and the fact that he wore a leg brace and appeared unarmed. Disputes regarding Katz's alleged resistance to arrest do not negate the conclusion that the force used was excessive. The court references prior cases underscoring that excessive force claims hinge on the reasonableness of the officer's actions, affirming that genuine material facts remain regarding Saucier's use of force, thus denying his qualified immunity claim. Although the district court granted summary judgment for defendants General Glynn Mallory, Jr. and Major Corbin Lee due to lack of connection to Saucier's actions, the legal principles regarding qualified immunity and excessive force remain central. The reasonableness of an officer's use of force is typically a factual question for the jury, but courts can determine reasonableness in summary judgment if the evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the force was reasonable.
