Mamer v. Morrison

Citations: 35 Ill. 2d 133; 1966 Ill. LEXIS 278; 219 N.E.2d 524Docket: No. 39695

Court: Illinois Supreme Court; May 23, 1966; Illinois; State Supreme Court

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A petition was granted for an appeal concerning a Fourth District Appellate Court ruling that upheld a permanent injunction against the collection of drainage district annual maintenance assessments. The Nutwood Drainage and Levee District was established in 1906, with maintenance assessment amounts set in 1907 by a jury verdict. Plaintiffs, landowners within the district, were assessed $347.59 annually, a sum they agreed to pay. The process for determining these assessments involved county court proceedings led by district commissioners, with the amounts being the maximum collectible unless modified by court action. 

Starting before 1946, the district's commissioners attempted to collect amounts significantly exceeding those set in 1907 without further jury approval. Plaintiffs paid these increased assessments until 1950 but refused to continue beyond the agreed amount. In 1953, the commissioners initiated receivership proceedings against the plaintiffs' lands to collect the assessments. Concurrently, they sought to raise the assessed amounts in county court, leading to a judgment in 1955 that was appealed by the plaintiffs. The court subsequently ruled that no valid assessments existed for 1950-1955 beyond the 1907 amounts. 

In 1958, the commissioners filed a petition to retroactively levy assessments totaling approximately $20,000 for the years 1950 to 1955, which was confirmed in December 1961, prompting an appeal by the plaintiffs.

The appeal was dismissed due to the plaintiffs' failure to file a timely record, and a request for leave to appeal within one year was denied. Subsequently, the plaintiffs initiated injunction proceedings to halt the collection of annual maintenance assessments exceeding $347.59 from 1950-1955, as authorized in prior 1907 proceedings. The trial court deemed a 1961 county court order void and prohibited the collection of the increased assessments, a decision that was affirmed by the appellate court.

The plaintiffs argue that county courts have limited jurisdiction in drainage matters, restricted to the authority granted by statute, and contend that there is no statutory basis for retroactive increases in assessments, rendering the 1961 judgment void and susceptible to collateral attack. They assert that section 5.22 of the Illinois Drainage Code was intended only to correct technical errors, not to authorize retroactive increases in existing assessments.

Conversely, the commissioners maintain that section 5.22 permits new assessments if an earlier assessment is deemed invalid for reasons unrelated to its merits. They assert that since the increase in assessments was invalidated in a previous case (Mamer), they were justified in reassessing for the 1950-1955 period under section 5.22. The commissioners argue that the county court's order fell within the scope of this section and is therefore immune from collateral attack.

The jurisdiction of county courts in drainage matters is strictly derived from the Illinois Drainage Code, and the court's exercise of this power can be re-examined to assess whether it exceeded its conferred authority. The determination hinges on whether the statute granted the county court the power to issue its December 28, 1961, order, and whether the prerequisites for such power were present in this instance. Section 5.22 allows the commissioners to petition the court to rectify defects in assessments due to omissions or mistakes, thereby potentially reinstating assessments against the lands in question. This section codifies earlier provisions from the former drainage law.

The provision in question is corrective and remedial, designed to allow drainage commissioners to recover construction, repair, or maintenance costs from benefitted lands when initial assessments were ineffective for reasons unrelated to the merits of the assessment. It grants authority for reassessing invalid prior assessments and making new assessments for the same years. The validity of the merits is supported by prior judicial outcomes confirming new assessments. Interpreting the provision as only prospective disregards its intended retroactive applicability, which is essential for the provision to serve a practical purpose. The provision is similar to reassessment methods found in the Municipal Code, allowing recovery when prior assessments are deemed invalid. Concerns raised by plaintiffs regarding potential burdens on farm owners are mitigated by the statute's constraints, which only permit reassessment when prior assessments for the same years are invalidated. The legislative intent was to ensure drainage districts can recover funds despite prior improper assessments, addressing financial issues arising from lost income due to invalidated assessments. The court's previous decision established that the 1907 assessment roll remained valid, but this does not conflict with the current interpretation of the provision, which can be applied regardless of the existence of prior assessments. A key unresolved issue is whether the original attempts to increase assessments during 1950-1955 qualify as an 'assessment' under the provision, as this determination affects the applicability of section 5.22.

The special affirmative defense presented by the commissioners in response to the injunction complaint asserts that from 1950 to 1955, they filed annual reports and maintenance tax levies, which were approved by the Jersey County court each year. They provided timely notice of these filings, with no objections raised by the plaintiffs or other landowners, and all landowners except the plaintiffs paid the maintenance assessments. The plaintiffs contest the materiality of these claims but argue that an assessment cannot be valid without a new assessment roll filed according to statutory requirements, which they assert did not occur in the disputed years. 

While acknowledging a significant statutory violation regarding the assessment roll and jury determination, the document emphasizes that the purpose of statute 5.22 is to provide relief when new or increased assessments fail due to noncompliance with statutory requirements. The severity of the violation is deemed irrelevant to the statute's broad remedial intent. The commissioners' actions are classified as abortive assessments, rendered invalid in the prior Mamer decision due to the absence of jury-determined benefit amounts. 

The legislature's intent behind 5.22 is interpreted as allowing county courts to confirm retroactive assessments for years where original assessments were invalidated. Consequently, the Jersey County court was authorized to issue the order dated December 28, 1961. The motion to dismiss the injunction complaint should have been granted, leading to a reversal of the Appellate Court's decision and a remand to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the complaint.