Court: Illinois Supreme Court; March 23, 1962; Illinois; State Supreme Court
The court addressed whether the Appellate Court correctly removed the remanding portion of its order that reversed a trial court's judgment favoring the plaintiff, despite the defendant admitting liability. Clara Brant, as administratrix of George Brant's estate, initiated a Federal Employers’ Liability Act case against Wabash Railroad Company, resulting in a jury awarding $88,500 to the plaintiff. The Appellate Court later reversed this judgment, citing prejudicial statements by the plaintiff's counsel, and ordered a new trial. The plaintiff then invoked section 75(2.c) of the Civil Practice Act to strike the remand order, which the Appellate Court granted. The defendant subsequently sought a mandamus to expunge this order. Section 75(2.c) allows a party to waive the right to a new trial and request the removal of a remand order if they can affirm they will not present new evidence. The court noted that in a referenced case, Lees v. Chicago and North Western Railway Co., a remand was deemed improper because the grounds for recovery were unclear, suggesting that the Appellate Court could not issue a final judgment favoring the defendant. In contrast, the intervenor cited Bowman v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., where the court indicated that the striking of a remand order is mandatory if the required affidavit is filed.
In the Bowman case, the Appellate Court's decision to reverse was based on a defense that entirely barred the plaintiff’s claim. Consequently, a final order could be issued for the defendant. However, this did not eliminate the requirement from the Lees case that the Appellate Court must be able to issue a final judgment for the defendant. In the current case, the Appellate Court could not do so because the defendant admitted liability, necessitating further proceedings to determine damages. Allowing a defendant who admits liability to escape responsibility due to trial errors would lead to an absurd outcome, contradicting the principle against such interpretations of statutes. The intervener acknowledged that remanding for a new trial could result in injustice and hardship, which the legislature recognized by allowing discretionary review of new trial orders under section 77 of the Civil Practice Act. The same policy considerations apply to Appellate Court orders for new trials, suggesting that future legislative action may address discretionary reviews in this context. Ultimately, the writ of mandamus is granted.
