Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois Commerce Commission

Citations: 411 Ill. 526; 104 N.E.2d 796; 1952 Ill. LEXIS 270Docket: No. 32090

Court: Illinois Supreme Court; March 20, 1952; Illinois; State Supreme Court

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On June 19, 1947, six railway employee brotherhoods petitioned the Illinois Commerce Commission, seeking an order for the Illinois Central Railroad Company to provide daily transportation for employees between its crew-board office in Champaign and outlying terminal facilities. Following hearings, on February 28, 1950, the Commission ordered the railroad to implement a 24-hour motor coach service on a 30-minute round-trip schedule, charging twenty cents per passenger. The railroad company appealed this order, and the Champaign County circuit court reversed it. The Commerce Commission subsequently appealed to this court under section 69 of the Public Utilities Act. The Act mandates that findings of fact by the Commission be specific enough for judicial review, ensuring decisions are based on a fair and reasonable foundation.

Previous case law established that courts may review Commission orders to ensure they stay within legal jurisdiction and protect constitutional rights. The Commission's order was based on a 1945 amendment to the Public Utilities Act, which allows it to require necessary employee transportation when deemed essential. The findings indicated that the Illinois Central Railroad operates a line through Champaign, with terminal facilities located two to three miles northeast of the crew-board office, serving about 275 crew members daily. Public transportation options are scarce, with only a few taxicabs available, sometimes reducing to none.

Public transportation for railroad employees is deemed inadequate, negatively impacting their safety, health, comfort, and convenience when reporting for duties at the yard office and roundhouse. These facilities are considered part of an outlying terminal, requiring the railroad company to provide transportation for employees to maintain operations in the public interest. The Commerce Commission ordered a 24-hour motor coach service on a 30-minute schedule at a fare of twenty cents. However, the circuit court reversed this order, citing three main reasons: the findings lacked substantial evidence and were arbitrary; the 1945 amendment to the Public Utilities Act was unconstitutional, violating equal protection and due process; and the order was void for being inconsistent with due process rights. The Commerce Commission contended that the court failed to properly weigh its findings and improperly substituted its judgment. The court referenced a precedent that necessitates the establishment of an outlying terminal and substantial evidence of necessity for transportation as required under the amendment. The Commission asserted that its findings regarding the roundhouse, yard office, and crew-board office as part of an outlying terminal were supported by evidence of operations, while key facilities for passenger services and crew dispatching are located in downtown Champaign, indicating a more complex definition of the terminal.

In Wabash Railway Co. v. Order of Railway Conductors, the court interpreted the relevant statute to stipulate that a railroad is only obligated to provide transportation to an outlying terminal, which must be entirely located outside the city limits. The evidence presented did not sufficiently demonstrate the existence of such an outlying terminal. The court found that the claim of a necessity for the railroad to transport all operating employees from the downtown area to outlying terminals lacked substantial evidentiary support. 

Out of approximately 328 employees, most resided in Champaign or nearby Urbana, with their residences scattered throughout the city. The existing public bus service ceases at midnight, coinciding with the railroad's irregular train schedules. The proposed bus service from the crew-board office was deemed inconvenient for many employees, as a significant number live several miles away. While some employees used private taxi services for transportation, the evidence indicated that not all employees found the crew-board office a suitable starting point for their commute. 

Additionally, it was emphasized that the act's intention was to establish a general necessity for transportation across all operating employees, not merely to accommodate the convenience of a subset of them. Consequently, the commission's findings regarding the necessity for general transportation were ruled unsupported by substantial evidence.

A number of employees reported that transportation to the north yards and roundhouse was inadequate, yet they consistently managed to report for duty. Delays in train movements due to crew tardiness accounted for only 0.5% of total trains dispatched, which is deemed insufficient to warrant additional transportation facilities based on public inconvenience. The evidence presented did not support the existence of an outlying terminal as defined by section 32 of the Public Utilities Act, as amended in 1945. Consequently, the commission's finding that the railroad company must provide transportation for all operating employees lacked substantial evidence. Thus, the commission's order was deemed unlawful, unreasonable, and was properly vacated by the circuit court. Since the case can be resolved without addressing constitutional issues, those matters were not considered. The judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County is affirmed.