Court: Illinois Supreme Court; January 24, 1952; Illinois; State Supreme Court
A writ of error was issued to review the superior court of Cook County's decision to set aside an award from the Industrial Commission favoring Milow Priest for the loss of his right eye, which he claimed was due to an accidental injury at work for Electro-Motive Division, General Motors Corporation. The primary issue was whether the superior court erred in its factual determination regarding the cause of the eye loss, specifically whether it resulted from an accidental injury during employment or from a pre-existing pathological condition.
On September 9, 1949, while working, Priest's eye was struck by flying steel particles. Initially, he experienced irritation but continued working until quitting time. Upon returning to work, he sought treatment from a nurse, who diagnosed a sty and provided drops. As pain escalated, he returned to the nurse, who denied treating him a second time and claimed the left eye was affected, contrary to testimonies from co-workers who noted a bandaged right eye. A local doctor later treated him for eye pain and suggested seeing a specialist.
Evidence from the Evangelical hospital, where Priest was treated later, indicated a hypopyon ulcer in the right eye, leading to its removal, without any mention of issues with the left eye. Expert testimonies conflicted on whether the infection was caused by latent syphilis or by the alleged work-related injury. The defendant presented records from Priest's pre-employment physical indicating possible past syphilis but no current eye issues. After a lengthy hearing, the Industrial Commission awarded Priest compensation for total eye loss, but the superior court subsequently set aside this award following a writ of certiorari from the defendant.
The Industrial Commission is authorized to draw reasonable inferences from evidence, having the advantage of observing witnesses and assessing their credibility (de Carrion v. Industrial Com., 370 Ill. 474). Courts should not weigh evidence or replace the Commission’s judgment (Allen Son. Co. v. Industrial Com., 349 Ill. 71, 78). The Commission's finding that the plaintiff injured his right eye should only be overturned if manifestly against the weight of the evidence (Wilhelm v. Industrial Com., 399 Ill. 80, 90). The evidence presented, despite inconsistencies, supports the Commission's conclusion, bolstered by corroborating testimonies from the plaintiff's coworkers and others present after the incident.
Regarding conflicting medical opinions about the injury's consequences, courts will not adjudicate the credibility of competing expert testimonies; this is within the Commission's expertise (Chicago, Wilmington, Franklin Coal Co. v. Industrial Com., 400 Ill. 60, 66). The court emphasizes that determining the preponderance of evidence in such cases is beyond its purview unless the Commission's conclusions are clearly erroneous. Both conflicting medical theories presented were equally credible, and the Commission determined the plaintiff's injuries were compensable. The superior court incorrectly dismissed this finding and substituted its own judgment. Therefore, the prior award for the petitioner is reinstated, and the judgment against it is reversed.
