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United States v. Barragan-Mendoza

Citations: 174 F.3d 1024; 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2810; 99 Daily Journal DAR 3645; 43 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 639; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7500; 1999 WL 221857Docket: No. 97-30264

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; April 19, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case involves the modification of a criminal sentence initially reduced due to the defendant's diminished mental capacity. The defendant, convicted of cocaine possession and distribution, received a twenty-seven-month sentence, which was later challenged by the government for being below the statutory minimum. The district court, while acknowledging its error, questioned its jurisdiction to amend the sentence beyond the seven-day limit established by Rule 35(c). Despite assurances from both parties and an increased sentence imposed later, the defendant's attorney argued lack of jurisdiction, and the defendant subsequently filed a Rule 35(c) motion. The appellate court reviewed the timeliness of the appeal, determining that the Rule 35(c) motion extended the appeal window, thus making the appeal timely. The court held that Rule 35(c) strictly limits modifications to seven days post-imposition, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence after this period. Consequently, the original sentence of twenty-seven months was reinstated, as the government's failure to appeal the initial sentence precluded any further modifications. The court emphasized that district courts have no inherent authority to alter sentences outside statutory provisions and Supreme Court precedents, underscoring the importance of adhering to procedural timelines in criminal sentencing adjustments.

Legal Issues Addressed

Effect of Government's Failure to Appeal

Application: The government's failure to appeal the original sentence prevents it from being altered, and the May 29, 1997 sentence must stand.

Reasoning: Consequently, the May 29, 1997 sentence must stand due to the government's failure to appeal it.

Inherent Authority of District Courts

Application: District courts do not have inherent authority to modify sentences beyond the constraints of Rule 35(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 3582.

Reasoning: District courts lack inherent authority to revisit sentencing orders and can only resentence under a court of appeals mandate or pursuant to Rule 35.

Jurisdiction to Modify Sentences

Application: The district court lacked jurisdiction to amend Barragan's sentence since it did not act within the seven-day limit set by Rule 35(c).

Reasoning: Since the district court did not act within this timeframe, it lacked jurisdiction to modify Barragan’s sentence.

Modification of Sentences under Rule 35(c)

Application: The district court's authority to modify a sentence is limited to correcting clear errors within seven days of the sentence's imposition.

Reasoning: Rule 35(c) restricts district courts' ability to modify sentences, permitting such changes only in specific circumstances rather than allowing for mere reconsideration of sentencing issues.

Timeliness of Appeal under Rule 4(b)

Application: A Rule 35(c) motion extends the appeal period, making a notice of appeal timely if filed after the resolution of the motion.

Reasoning: Although Rule 4(b) does not list Rule 35(c) motions as delaying the appeal period, Supreme Court precedent indicates that timely motions for rehearing or reconsideration do extend this timeline.