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Cellular Telecommunications Industry Ass'n v. Federal Communications Commission

Citations: 168 F.3d 1332; 335 U.S. App. D.C. 32; 15 Communications Reg. (P&F) 358; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4163Docket: Nos. 97-1690, 97-1703 and 97-1705

Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; March 15, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

The case revolves around a dispute over whether federal law preempts Texas's requirement for telecommunications providers to contribute to state-administered universal service programs. Federal law, specifically 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(3)(A) of the Communications Act, restricts states from regulating the entry and rates of mobile telecommunications services. However, it allows states to impose requirements necessary for ensuring universal service. Pittencrieff Communications sought an FCC ruling claiming Texas's contribution requirements were preempted by federal law. The FCC denied the petition, affirming that these requirements did not constitute rate or entry regulation, which is preempted by 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(3)(A), and are consistent with section 254(f) of the Telecommunications Act that allows state contributions for universal service. Cellular entities sought judicial review, arguing that Texas's law was preempted because it raised wireless service costs, but the FCC maintained that these contributions fell under permissible regulatory 'other terms and conditions.' The court upheld the FCC's interpretation, concluding that the statutory provisions harmonize and do not preempt state universal service laws. The petitions for review were denied, affirming the FCC's authority and interpretation.

Legal Issues Addressed

Federal Preemption under Communications Act

Application: The FCC concluded that federal law does not preempt Texas's requirements for telecommunications providers to contribute to state universal service programs.

Reasoning: The case at hand involves petitions for judicial review regarding whether the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) correctly concluded that federal law does not preempt Texas's requirements.

Interpretation of 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(3)(A)

Application: The statute's first sentence prohibits state regulation of entry and rates, while the second sentence allows states to promote universal service without preemption.

Reasoning: The Commission concluded that the second sentence provides an exception, enabling states to promote universal service if the condition about wireless services being a substitute is satisfied.

Judicial Review and Harmonization of Statutes

Application: The Commission's interpretation, supported by circuit court rulings, effectively harmonizes with related statutes, rejecting Cellular's claims of redundancy.

Reasoning: This interpretation is supported by various circuit court rulings, indicating that it effectively harmonizes with related statutes.

State Regulation of Telecommunications

Application: Texas law requiring telecommunications providers to contribute to universal service programs does not equate to rate or entry regulation preempted by federal law.

Reasoning: The Commission denied a petition from Pittencrieff Communications, concluding that the state’s contribution requirements do not equate to rate or entry regulation, which is preempted under 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(3)(A).

State Universal Service Contributions

Application: States may require contributions to universal service from telecommunications carriers under federal law, aligning with section 254(f) of the Telecommunications Act.

Reasoning: The Commission supports its position with section 254(f) of the Telecommunications Act, which allows states to impose contributions to universal service in accordance with federal rules.