Robert A. Cornell, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Charles Woods Harold Kropp Charles Harper Ronald Welder John Henry John Emmett Larry Moline and Paul Hedgepeth, Appellants/cross-Appellees
Docket: 94-3548
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; November 7, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
Appellants, referred to as "prison officials," appeal a district court ruling that found them liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, awarding inmate Robert A. Cornell $2,163.67 in actual damages and $29,039.00 in attorney's fees. Cornell cross-appeals certain aspects of the decision. The court affirms the district court's ruling without error.
In 1977, Cornell was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. After residing in the Iowa State Penitentiary (ISP) for over a decade, he earned the title of "honor lifer" and was transferred in 1987 to the adjacent John Bennett Correctional Center (JBCC) due to his exemplary behavior.
On September 18, 1987, Cornell was interviewed by internal affairs regarding a suspected violation of rules by Correctional Officer Harold Kropp. Major Harry A. Grabowski, who led the investigation, allegedly promised Cornell immunity from discipline in exchange for his cooperation. Although Grabowski lacked the authority to grant such immunity, he claimed Deputy Warden John Henry had permitted it. During the investigation, Cornell admitted to contracting Kropp for construction work on a property owned by his wife.
Following this, Kropp was questioned, and a month later, he resigned. Officer Charles Wood, Kropp's union steward, attempted to help Kropp regain his position through grievance procedures but was unsuccessful. Subsequently, on October 26, 1987, Wood filed a disciplinary report against Cornell for violating the prohibition on contracts between inmates and staff. Despite the alleged immunity, Deputy Warden Henry ordered Cornell's transfer back to ISP, denying he had authorized the immunity and refusing to dismiss the charges against Cornell.
Cornell initiated an administrative appeal to contest a disciplinary report resulting from Officer Wood's allegations. A committee chaired by Charles Harper held a hearing where Cornell asserted he had been promised immunity, supported by a statement from Major Grabowski confirming this exemption. Despite this, the committee found Cornell guilty of violating institutional rules, imposing ten days of disciplinary detention, sixty days of administrative segregation, and forfeiture of sixteen days of good time. Cornell continued to appeal to various officials, ultimately reaching Paul Grossheim, who dismissed the disciplinary report on December 30, 1987, and ordered the expungement of Cornell's record. He returned to JBCC on January 22, 1988, after spending 89 days in maximum security without the imposed sanctions being enacted.
Subsequently, Cornell filed a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 lawsuit against several prison officials, claiming retaliatory transfer, retaliatory discipline, and due process violations. After a two-day bench trial, the district judge denied the officials qualified immunity, finding that Cornell's return to maximum security was motivated by unconstitutional retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. The court ruled in favor of Cornell on the retaliatory transfer claim but determined that the sanctions from the disciplinary committee did not constitute viable retaliatory discipline since they were never implemented. The court also sided with Cornell on his due process claim.
The district judge ordered the prison officials to pay Cornell $2,163.67 in actual damages and requested his attorney to apply for fees, ultimately awarding $29,039.00 after reducing the initial request. The prison officials appealed, challenging the denial of qualified immunity, the findings of retaliatory actions, the due process ruling, and the amount of attorney's fees awarded. Cornell cross-appealed, arguing that the court incorrectly categorized the disciplinary committee's sanctions and failed to impose punitive damages against the officials.
Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to remain in a specific institution, as established in Goff v. Burton and supported by Olim v. Wakinekona. However, a transfer motivated by retaliation for exercising constitutional rights is prohibited. In this case, it must be determined whether Cornell’s participation in a prison investigation constituted an exercise of a constitutional right. While incarcerated individuals face limitations on their rights, they retain First Amendment rights consistent with their status. The right to participate in governmental investigations is recognized, and public employees are protected from retaliation for such participation.
The court concludes that a prisoner's cooperation with an investigator is compatible with legitimate penological goals and supports the assertion that Cornell's actions were protected by the First Amendment. The district court determined that Cornell's truthful responses to an investigation regarding a correctional officer's misconduct aligned with legitimate prison objectives.
The prison officials contest the finding that retaliation was the actual motivating factor for Cornell's transfer, which is a factual issue reviewed for clear error. The district court applied the appropriate standard and found that the transfer would not have occurred but for the unconstitutional retaliatory motive.
Officer Wood, who reported the incident involving Cornell, lacked first-hand knowledge of the agreement between Cornell and Officer Kropp and only learned of it through his role as Kropp's union steward. Despite being informed of Cornell's immunity, Wood delayed filing the report by over thirty days, which violated prison policy. Following the report, Cornell was transferred to a maximum security facility, contrary to guidelines that typically require an inmate to remain in their current housing until a disciplinary report is resolved. The district court found that this transfer was motivated by an unconstitutional retaliatory intent against Cornell for exercising a constitutional right, leading to his successful claim for retaliatory transfer.
Additionally, the district court ruled in Cornell's favor regarding retaliatory discipline, affirming that prison officials cannot impose disciplinary actions based solely on retaliatory motives. The court determined that Cornell's transfer constituted a form of discipline, a point not disputed by the prison officials. A key distinction in claims of retaliatory discipline is that if the disciplinary action stemmed from an actual violation of prison rules, the claim for retaliation would fail. Claims based on false allegations are permissible, but if the prisoner was disciplined for actions they were not entitled to perform, the retaliation claim cannot succeed. Ultimately, the inquiry focuses on whether there is evidence supporting the disciplinary committee's finding of a rule violation by the prisoner.
Cornell was found to have violated a prison rule, leading prison officials to argue against his success on a retaliatory discipline claim. However, a high-ranking prison official had previously assured Cornell of immunity for that violation, indicating that he was engaging in permissible activity at the time. If the prison disregards this immunity and punishes Cornell as retaliation for exercising a constitutional right, it faces a retaliatory discipline claim. The district court correctly ruled that Cornell's transfer was retaliatory punishment for his constitutionally protected actions, although it found that additional penalties imposed by the committee did not constitute retaliation since they were held in abeyance pending administrative appeals and were ultimately expunged from his record.
Regarding due process, prison officials contended that the district court erred in finding that their failure to adhere to certain regulations violated Cornell's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the incomplete record made it impossible to ascertain if the procedures established a protectable liberty interest. Despite this, the court noted that the procedures seemed unlikely to infringe on due process rights, as they did not protect against significant hardships compared to ordinary prison life.
Prison officials argue that the district court erred by denying them qualified immunity, a defense that protects officials from liability unless their actions violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights known to a reasonable person. For a right to be considered clearly established, its contours must be clear enough for a reasonable official to recognize a violation. The analysis focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of the officials’ actions. The court reaffirmed that prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for exercising their constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights, such as responding to investigator inquiries. Given the legal context at the time of the officials' actions, the court found that it should have been apparent that their behavior was unlawful, thus supporting the district court's refusal to grant qualified immunity.
Additionally, the prison officials contested the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to Cornell, arguing it was excessive. The appellate court reviews such awards for abuse of discretion. The district court had reviewed the attorney's fee application and reduced the initial request, ultimately awarding $29,039 after a nearly 25% reduction. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting the fee amount.
Cornell argued that the district court erred by not imposing punitive damages against prison officials, asserting that such damages are warranted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when conduct is driven by malice or involves reckless indifference to others' federally protected rights. The court, referencing case law, determined that while the officials' actions were not commendable, they did not meet the threshold of egregiousness required for punitive damages. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision not to impose these damages. The district court's ruling that found the prison officials liable under § 1983 was upheld, awarding inmate Robert A. Cornell $2,163.67 in actual damages and $29,039.00 in attorney's fees. The opinion also touches on the conditions for inmate transfer to a less secure facility and reiterates the legal standards regarding retaliatory actions and the rights of individuals when approached by government investigators. The conclusion emphasizes that the due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were acknowledged but not violated in this case.
