United States v. Alfonso Garcia, Also Known as Jose L. Garcia, Also Known as Quata
Docket: 94-3781
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; November 3, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
Alfonso Garcia, also known as Jose L. Garcia, pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of cocaine base, violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and subsequently appealed two aspects of his sentencing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and referred a disciplinary issue concerning Garcia's trial defense counsel for further investigation.
The case background reveals that on August 31, 1993, Garcia supplied two kilograms of cocaine base to Luis Orozco in Chicago, with the understanding that payment would occur after Orozco sold the drugs. Orozco was arrested during a delivery to a cooperating individual, leading him to contact Garcia for additional cocaine. Following a series of taped conversations, Garcia agreed to meet Orozco to finalize payment and deliver more cocaine.
On September 1, 1993, at a restaurant meeting, Garcia misled Orozco about the availability of the cocaine, insisting on payment for the initial two kilograms before completing the transaction. Undercover officer Juan DeLeon, posing as Orozco's buyer, facilitated the exchange, handing Garcia $45,000 for the initial drugs, after which Garcia was arrested. During the arrest, police searched Garcia's car, finding $2,500 in a hidden compartment, capable of holding up to twenty kilograms of cocaine, though no additional drugs were discovered at that time.
After his arrest, Garcia misidentified himself to authorities using his brother's information, which led to confusion in court proceedings where his attorney introduced the case under the false name.
On September 7, 1993, a magistrate judge held a preliminary examination and detention hearing for 'Jose' Garcia, where the pretrial services officer recommended releasing him on bond due to his clean record. Garcia's attorney argued there was no risk of flight or danger to the community, noting it was his first arrest. Despite these arguments, the magistrate judged that there was a risk of flight and potential danger, leading to Garcia's detention. His true identity was discovered a week later.
On September 30, 1993, a grand jury indicted Garcia on two counts: distributing two kilograms of cocaine and possessing four kilograms with intent to distribute, violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On May 27, 1994, he pleaded guilty to the distribution count, admitting to distributing two kilograms of cocaine on August 31, 1993, and supplying an additional kilogram to Orozco earlier. Disputes arose regarding his accountability for the four kilograms he claimed he could deliver and four more he allegedly sold to Orozco over 18 months. The government sought a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for providing false identification, as he had prior felony convictions and outstanding warrants under his real name. Both parties reserved the right to argue at sentencing regarding the obstruction enhancement and whether additional kilograms should count as relevant conduct.
During the sentencing hearing, the district court listened to testimonies, reviewed evidence, and assessed relevant conduct for sentencing. It determined that transactions with Orozco prior to August 31 did not qualify as relevant conduct but found that Garcia intended to supply the four kilograms negotiated with Orozco and undercover officer DeLeon. The court deemed Orozco's testimony credible and supported by evidence, concluding that Garcia was responsible for a total of seven kilograms of cocaine.
The court found that Mr. Garcia's use of a false name and date of birth constituted materially false information, warranting a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1, despite the lack of significant hindrance to the investigation. The court also granted a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in an adjusted offense level of 31, criminal history category III, and a guideline range of 135 to 168 months. Ultimately, Mr. Garcia was sentenced to the minimum of 135 months.
On appeal, the primary issue is whether Mr. Garcia's misrepresentation of his identity justifies the two-point enhancement. The appellate review is based on a clearly erroneous standard for factual findings and de novo for the interpretation of guidelines. Under Sec. 3C1.1, a two-level increase applies if a defendant willfully obstructs or impedes justice. Notable examples include providing materially false information to a judge or law enforcement. Mr. Garcia acknowledges providing false identification but argues that he did not commit perjury since he made no affirmative misrepresentations before the magistrate. In contrast, the government contends that his actions were intended to mislead the court regarding his criminal history, which would have affected the magistrate's decision on bond.
The government advocates for the affirmation of the sentencing court's conclusion that Mr. Garcia's use of false identifying information constituted a material misrepresentation, supporting a finding of obstruction of justice. Mr. Garcia argues that his case differs from prior cases, citing his silence rather than active misrepresentation. However, his use of the false identity 'Jose Garcia' is deemed an affirmative misrepresentation, and his failure to correct this falsehood constitutes material nondisclosure. The court rejects Mr. Garcia’s attempt to differentiate between misrepresentation and nondisclosure, asserting that both misled the magistrate judge and obstructed judicial proceedings.
Mr. Garcia contends that he should not face a sentencing enhancement for providing false information to a pretrial services officer instead of a probation officer. The court clarifies that the relevant application note permits enhancements for materially false information provided in relation to any court investigation, including pretrial services reports. The court emphasizes that the information is intended for judicial use in pretrial decisions, asserting that false identification is a material fact. Therefore, the court concludes that the provision of false information during any pretrial investigation justifies the enhancement under Sec. 3C1.1.
Additionally, the court notes the concerning conduct of Mr. Garcia's attorney, who appeared to misrepresent Mr. Garcia's identity and criminal history to the magistrate judge, despite prior knowledge of his false identity and record. This raises potential disciplinary issues, which the court refers to the district court for further investigation, as no action has yet been taken on this matter.
The district court has primary oversight of a defendant's conduct due to its inherent authority. Under U.S.S.G. Secs. 1B1.3 and 2D1.1, when determining a defendant's base offense level, the court considers drug types and quantities beyond the charges of conviction. Specifically, Sec. 1B1.3(a)(2) allows for the inclusion of all actions part of the same course of conduct as the offense, while application note 12 of Sec. 2D1.1 mandates that the weight of drugs under negotiation in uncompleted distributions is factored into the calculation if the defendant intended to produce and could reasonably produce that amount. If the court finds the defendant lacked intent or capability for the negotiated amount, that quantity is excluded from the guidelines calculation.
In Mr. Garcia's case, the sentencing court included four kilograms of cocaine that he negotiated to sell. Garcia argues that the court failed to make specific findings regarding the negotiated cocaine quantity as required by application note 12. Sentencing determinations are reviewed with deference, upheld if the guidelines were correctly applied to non-erroneous factual findings. The court's conclusion that the four kilograms constituted relevant conduct is a factual finding that stands unless clearly erroneous. Mr. Garcia did not dispute that the negotiated transaction was part of the same course of conduct as the conviction; his only objections relate to application note 12. He contends that the district court must make specific findings on his intent and capability to produce the undelivered cocaine. The burden of proof lies with the government to demonstrate the drug quantity and the defendant's intent and capability. However, the court only needs to establish that the defendant was reasonably capable of producing the negotiated amount.
The district court's determination regarding Mr. Garcia's relevant conduct was upheld, as it did not err in its factual findings based on the evidence provided by the government. The court established that Mr. Garcia intended and was capable of delivering four additional kilograms of cocaine, supported by transcripts of his conversations with Orozco and DeLeon. It emphasized Mr. Garcia's commitment to the transaction, noting he had previously delivered two kilograms and had a relationship of trust with Orozco, which involved detailed planning for the delivery of the additional cocaine.
Mr. Garcia's argument that his statements were mere bravado rather than sincere negotiations was rejected. The court found that the evidence indicated genuine intent rather than idle talk, as Mr. Garcia's prior actions and ongoing negotiations demonstrated his capability to fulfill the delivery. The court concluded that the government met its burden of proof, establishing Mr. Garcia's intent and ability to deliver the four kilograms. Additionally, the court did not find merit in Mr. Garcia's claim that it failed to assess whether he took a "substantial step" toward the attempted delivery, affirming accountability for the promised quantity.
Mr. Garcia contends that before his arrest, there was no clear evidence of his intent or ability to deliver additional cocaine, asserting that he only sought payment for the cocaine already delivered and did not possess more. This argument is dismissed as meritless for two reasons: it was not presented in the district court and is thus waived on appeal, and the 'substantial step' criterion is not applicable. The court determines that a defendant's intent and ability to produce the drug quantity, rather than a 'substantial step,' are what hold him responsible for any undelivered amounts. Mr. Garcia fails to provide sufficient grounds to challenge the sentencing court's findings, which were not clearly erroneous. The sentence aligns correctly with the applicable sentencing guidelines and is affirmed. Additionally, Mr. Garcia has a prior federal conviction for smuggling illegal aliens, and issues arose during pretrial services regarding his identity, which he chose not to clarify to avoid possible obstruction charges. The district court concluded that Mr. Garcia's provision of false information did not significantly obstruct the investigation, and his claim that the false identity did not result in his release does not negate the potential for an enhancement under the guidelines.
Enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Section 3C1.1 applies to defendants who both obstructed justice and those who attempted to obstruct it, as established in United States v. Cotts. Courts have upheld enhancements based on attempted obstruction without the need for lengthy obstruction, as demonstrated in multiple cases. The government contended that Mr. Garcia waived his argument regarding the applicability of Section 3C1.1, but it was determined he raised the issue sufficiently to avoid waiver. Several precedents illustrate that false identification and misleading information to pretrial services can justify the enhancement. For instance, in United States v. Mafanya and United States v. Gardiner, false statements were deemed sufficient for such enhancements. The failure to provide truthful identity information has also been ruled as obstructive conduct, as seen in cases like United States v. Pereira-Munoz and United States v. Benitez. Conversely, in United States v. Johns, the court held that a defendant's denial of guilt does not constitute obstruction under Section 3C1.1, although false statements about material facts can lead to enhancement. Mr. Garcia acknowledged the materiality of his false identity, aligning with established case law that confirms the significance of identity in obstruction cases.
