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Ghana v. Pearce
Citations: 159 F.3d 1206; 98 Daily Journal DAR 11450; 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8213; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 28102; 1998 WL 768629Docket: No. 97-35588
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; November 4, 1998; Federal Appellate Court
Ghana, a pro se state prisoner, appeals a district court's summary judgment that dismissed his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and the appeal is within the jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Ghana was transferred from New Jersey to Oregon in August 1990 under the Interstate Corrections Compact, which governs interstate prisoner transfers and guarantees certain rights, including humane treatment and the preservation of legal rights from the sending state. During his seven-month stay in Oregon, Ghana faced multiple misconduct hearings based on Oregon's prison rules, which he contests as unlawful because he believes the Compact entitles him to New Jersey's procedural protections. He argues that not applying New Jersey rules constitutes a violation of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court reviews the summary judgment de novo, focusing on whether Ghana's claims can be considered under § 1983. The court faces a novel question regarding whether a violation of the Compact can form the basis for a § 1983 action. To determine this, the court examines if the Compact qualifies as federal law or creates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state compact may become federal law if it meets the Constitution's Compact Clause criteria, receives congressional consent, and involves appropriate subject matter. The Eighth Circuit previously ruled that the Compact does not qualify as federal law in Stewart v. McManus, a decision the current court also supports. Doubts exist regarding the Compact's compliance with the Compact Clause and Congressional approval, but it clearly fails the criteria for federal legislation due to its subject matter. The Supreme Court's decision in Cuyler established that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers was appropriate for federal legislation as it facilitated extradition and addressed a federal concern, specifically crime prevention and law enforcement. Conversely, the Compact, which governs the interstate transfer of state prisoners, does not relate to extradition or enforcement and is thus deemed a local issue without federal interest unless there is a constitutional violation in prisoner treatment. Regarding the creation of a protected liberty interest, the Fourteenth Amendment protects state-created interests in a prison context only when there is significant hardship beyond ordinary prison life. The procedures applied by Oregon did not impose such atypical hardship compared to the standard prison experience, and thus no protected liberty interest arises from the Compact. As the Compact is neither federal law nor a source of constitutional rights, violations of the Compact cannot support a section 1983 claim. The court affirmed the summary judgment, addressing other appeal issues in an unpublished disposition.