Coger v. Board of Regents of Tennessee

Citations: 154 F.3d 296; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 19857; 73 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 45,447; 77 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 818Docket: No. 97-5134

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; August 17, 1998; Federal Appellate Court

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The appeal centers on whether states possess immunity from lawsuits under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court must assess two primary questions: (1) Did Congress intend to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in ADEA cases? and (2) Did Congress act within its enforcement rights under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment? The district court ruled that the ADEA does not abrogate this immunity, leading to the dismissal of the suit. However, the appellate court disagrees, determining that Congress did indeed express intent to abrogate such immunity and acted under valid constitutional authority to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Consequently, the appellate court reverses the district court's dismissal and remands the case for further proceedings.

The underlying case involved seventeen senior faculty members from Memphis State University, who claimed age discrimination related to salary increases and evaluation processes. After extensive trial proceedings, the University sought dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The district court ultimately dismissed the case, leading to the Faculty Members' appeal.

A district court's dismissal of a suit for failure to state a claim can be reviewed de novo under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), requiring that the complaint be construed favorably toward the plaintiff, with factual allegations accepted as true to assess if the plaintiff can prove any set of facts supporting their claims. Similarly, a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is also reviewed de novo. 

The Eleventh Amendment establishes sovereign immunity, preventing federal courts from hearing cases against states by individuals, unless exceptions apply. Congress can abrogate this immunity through Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which includes the Equal Protection Clause. In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court laid out a two-part test to determine if Congress effectively abrogated state immunity: (1) Congress must clearly express its intent to do so, and (2) Congress must act under a constitutional provision that grants it this power. The only recognized basis for such authority is Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is crucial for assessing whether Congress had the authority to abrogate states' immunity in Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) cases.

Congress's intent to abrogate states’ immunity under the ADEA was evaluated based on the clarity required by the Supreme Court. The University contends that the ADEA's language does not clearly express this intent, arguing that merely including states in the definition of "employer" does not suffice to demonstrate unmistakable intent for abrogation. The University references prior Supreme Court cases, noting that a clear statement is necessary for such abrogation. Conversely, the Faculty Members assert that the explicit inclusion of states in the ADEA's definition of "employer" indicates Congress's intent to hold states liable under the Act. The conclusion reached supports the Faculty Members' view, asserting that Congress's amendment in 1974, which expanded the definition of "employer" to include states, clearly signifies that states are not immune from ADEA lawsuits. This amendment enabled legal and equitable relief for violations, thus affirming the abrogation of state immunity. The analysis draws parallels to the Supreme Court's interpretation in other contexts, suggesting that Congress's intent to abrogate is unmistakable due to the specific references to states in the statute.

In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., the Supreme Court determined that Congress explicitly waived states’ immunity under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), indicating that states are considered "persons" liable for hazardous waste costs. This ruling was later overruled on different grounds in Seminole Tribe. The text argues that Congress’s intent to abrogate states' immunity in age discrimination cases under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) is clear, citing Davidson v. Board of Governors and Hurd v. Pittsburg State Univ. as supporting cases. The ADEA permits lawsuits against state employers, showcasing Congress’s intention to override Eleventh Amendment immunity. Various appellate courts have similarly concluded that the ADEA's provisions reflect Congress’s intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. However, a dissenting view in Kimel v. State of Florida Bd. of Regents argued that the ADEA does not unequivocally express this intent, focusing solely on the statute's language. 

The document also addresses whether Congress enacted the ADEA amendments under a valid exercise of its enforcement authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The University contends that the Seminole Tribe decision shifted the analysis to whether the statute was enacted under Section 5 rather than whether it could have been. The University argues that the 1974 ADEA amendments were enacted under the Commerce Clause, as indicated in the legislative history.

Disagreement exists regarding the University’s interpretation that the Seminole Tribe decision altered the method of assessing Congress's constitutional authority for legislation. The central issue remains whether Congress had the authority to enact the legislation, irrespective of whether it correctly identified the source of that authority. Previous rulings indicate that Congress’s legislative power is valid even if it does not expressly invoke a specific constitutional provision. The excerpt references various cases affirming that the determination of Congress's authority should not hinge on its articulation of that authority. Consensus among multiple circuits confirms that Seminole Tribe did not change the evaluative standard for identifying whether legislation falls under Congress's Section 5 power. 

The discussion then shifts to whether Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to enact the 1974 amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal protection under the law, while Section 5 provides Congress with the power to enforce this guarantee. Legislation is deemed appropriate under Section 5 if it is clearly designed to enforce the Equal Protection Clause and aligns with constitutional principles. Notably, Congress did not explicitly cite Section 5 when enacting the 1974 amendments to the ADEA.

Congress, in enacting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), identified several key issues regarding older workers: they face significant challenges in retaining and regaining employment despite increased productivity; arbitrary age limits hinder their job performance potential; unemployment rates among older workers are notably high, leading to skill and morale deterioration; and age discrimination in commerce burdens economic activity. Following extensive investigations into age discrimination, Congress concluded that older workers were often denied employment based on harmful stereotypes. 

The 1974 amendments to the ADEA were primarily focused on addressing age discrimination rather than its effects on commerce, suggesting a remedial nature of the legislation enacted under Congress’s Section 5 enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court affirmed that the lack of explicit invocation of Section 5 by Congress does not invalidate the amendments, as constitutional authority does not depend on explicit references to specific powers. Thus, the arguments against Congress's authority to enact these amendments under its Section 5 power were rejected, emphasizing that the intent and findings of Congress were sufficient to support the legislation’s constitutionality.

Congress's 1974 extension of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to states aimed to prevent arbitrary age discrimination in employment, supported by the Fourteenth Amendment. The intent was to align with the guarantee of "equal protection of the laws." The University argues that the ADEA exceeds Congress’s enforcement authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment since age is not a suspect class and should only undergo rational review. However, it is countered that the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence extends beyond suspect classifications. Landmark cases affirm that age discrimination falls under the Equal Protection Clause, which aims to protect individuals from intentional and arbitrary discrimination. Therefore, the absence of age as a suspect classification does not preclude Congress from addressing age-based discrimination under its Section 5 authority, confirming that Congress acted within its powers when enacting the 1974 amendments to the ADEA.

The University references the Supreme Court's decision in *City of Boerne* to assert that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) is overly expansive, arguing it constitutes a substantive law rather than a remedial one, and therefore exceeds Congress's enforcement power under Section 5. In *City of Boerne*, the Court deemed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) unconstitutional, identifying it as disproportionate to the issues it aimed to address, as there was no pattern of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause. The Court found that RFRA's stringent standards risked invalidating numerous state laws and compromised the separation of powers and federal balance by attempting to redefine the substantive meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment instead of acting remedially. 

The Court's analysis suggests that legislation must deter or remedy constitutional violations to fall under Congress's enforcement power, but Congress cannot redefine constitutional rights. For a statute to be considered remedial, there must be congruence and proportionality between the identified injury and the legislative response. The *City of Boerne* ruling emphasizes that remedial measures should be assessed based on the severity of the constitutional violations they address. The Fifth Circuit has articulated a two-part proportionality inquiry focusing on the extent of the constitutional threats and the legislative remedies provided. Congress's findings when enacting the ADEA highlighted the discrimination against older workers based on harmful stereotypes, documenting evidence of employment discrimination due to age. Amendments to the ADEA aimed to extend the same protections against age discrimination to government employees as those available to private sector employees.

President Nixon's 1972 remarks were referenced by both the House and Senate to illustrate the intent behind the 1974 amendment to address age discrimination, equating its societal harm to discrimination based on race or religion. Discrimination against older individuals, particularly in employment, is seen as detrimental, undermining their spirit and denying valuable contributions to society. Congress deemed age classifications in employment to be arbitrary and discriminatory, violating the Constitution. 

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) aims to prohibit such arbitrary age discrimination, mandating that employment decisions be based on merit rather than age. Employers are required to evaluate employees on relevant characteristics without using age as a substitute for productivity or other attributes. While the ADEA may address some behaviors not explicitly unconstitutional, it operates within Congress's enforcement powers to remedy constitutional violations, as established in City of Boerne. 

The court concluded that ADEA amendments are remedial rather than creating substantive rights, aligning with the intended protection against arbitrary actions affecting older citizens. It was determined that Congress intended to remove states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity through the 1974 amendments and had the authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was reversed and remanded for further district court proceedings. Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c) outlines that a court may enter judgment against a party if the evidence does not support their claim after a full hearing on the issue.

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority to enforce its provisions through appropriate legislation. Section 1 establishes the Equal Protection Clause, affirming that all individuals born or naturalized in the U.S. are citizens and prohibits states from enacting laws that abridge citizens' privileges, or from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process, or denying equal protection under the law. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), is referenced as part of this legal framework. The Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne evaluated the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which Congress enacted in response to the Court's ruling in Employment Division v. Smith. In Smith, the Court determined that the Free Exercise Clause does not necessitate exemptions from neutral laws that significantly burden religious practices. RFRA was intended to counter this decision by requiring that any law imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise must be justified by a compelling state interest and must be the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.