Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; May 8, 1998; Federal Appellate Court
Plaintiffs Neil Jean-Baptiste, Gustavo Enrique Cepeda-Torres, and Victor Israel Santana appealed a judgment from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which dismissed their complaint against defendants Janet Reno and the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). All plaintiffs, permanent U.S. residents, faced deportation due to criminal convictions for drug offenses. They filed suit challenging the deportation procedures as violations of their Fifth Amendment due process rights under new immigration laws. The court determined that Congress has stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over such actions, leading to the affirmation of the dismissal.
Jean-Baptiste, originally from Haiti, became a permanent resident in 1972 and was convicted of drug possession in 1989, resulting in a deportation order in 1996. Cepeda-Torres, from Colombia, became a permanent resident in 1982 and was convicted of drug sales in 1995, also facing deportation in 1996. Santana, a Dominican national, entered as a conditional permanent resident in 1989, was convicted of drug sales in 1995, and was deported in 1996 as well. Their appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals were unsuccessful.
The relevant statutory framework includes INA sections 241(a)(2)(B)(i) and 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), which stipulate that any alien convicted of drug offenses or aggravated felonies post-entry is deportable. Notably, the INA does not mandate that permanent residents be notified of the potential loss of residency status resulting from such convictions, which was the circumstance for all plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs initiated a proposed class action in the Eastern District against the INS on August 19, 1996, asserting that lawful permanent residents, convicted of specific crimes post-admission, were denied due process rights under the Fifth Amendment due to a lack of notice regarding the deportation consequences of their actions. They contended that this omission warranted an injunction against the enforcement of their deportation orders. In response, the defendants sought to dismiss the case based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing 8 U.S.C. 1252(g), which bars courts from hearing claims related to the Attorney General's actions regarding deportation. This provision was part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which, along with the earlier Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, significantly limited federal judicial review of deportation orders for aliens with certain criminal convictions. Prior to these acts, the INA allowed for judicial review through habeas corpus proceedings for resident aliens facing deportation, a right that was curtailed with the enactment of these laws, specifically eliminating the ability to contest deportation orders based on specified criminal offenses.
The Immigration Reform Act set an effective date of April 1, 1997, for amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), while also stating that INA 242(g) applies to all exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings regardless of timing. Defendants claimed this provision divested the district court of jurisdiction as of September 30, 1996, the Act's enactment date. However, the district court ruled that 242(g) would not take effect until April 1, 1997, thus retaining its jurisdiction when it made its decision on February 5, 1997. Without the restrictions of 242(g), the court confirmed it had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331.
On the merits, the court found that plaintiffs' challenges to the deportation process for lawful permanent residents lacked a constitutional basis. Although residents were not warned of potential deportation due to specific convictions, the court concluded this did not violate the Constitution or the Administrative Procedure Act, especially since the law clearly indicated deportability for certain crimes. The court determined that the plaintiffs' ignorance of the law could not be used as grounds for contesting the deportation procedures and noted that due process was satisfied as plaintiffs received notice of their deportation. Consequently, the court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which the plaintiffs are appealing. Additionally, the court indicated that the provisions of the Immigration Reform Act are retroactive to cases pending as of the Act's enactment date. The appeal raises the issue of federal court jurisdiction following the effective date of April 1, 1997.
Other federal appeals courts have interpreted the impact of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) on their jurisdiction with differing outcomes based on specific case facts. In *Ramallo v. Reno*, 114 F.3d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the D.C. Circuit considered the case of Marlena Ramallo, who sought to prevent her deportation by enforcing a purported agreement with the government regarding her immigration status. After her district court victory, Congress enacted the Immigration Reform Act, which prompted the D.C. Circuit to determine that the new § 1252(g) stripped the court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as it stemmed from the Attorney General's decision to execute a removal order. The Circuit vacated the district court's ruling and remanded it with instructions to dismiss, asserting that Congress intended to allow residual jurisdiction for such clear-out purposes.
In *Auguste v. Attorney General*, 118 F.3d 723 (11th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh Circuit dealt with a French citizen's challenge to his deportation based on an allegedly unintelligent waiver of his right to a hearing. Despite the district court ruling in Auguste’s favor, the Eleventh Circuit found it lacked jurisdiction under the new § 1252(g) since the Immigration Reform Act had repealed the prior relevant section of the INA. Similar to the D.C. Circuit's approach, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for dismissal, citing the absence of appellate jurisdiction.
In American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno, the Ninth Circuit addressed deportation proceedings against two permanent resident aliens linked to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who claimed selective enforcement of immigration laws in retaliation for First Amendment-protected activities. The district court issued an injunction against the deportation, which the government appealed, arguing that the enactment of 8 U.S.C. § 242(g) retroactively stripped the court of jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit rejected this claim, clarifying that while § 242(g) retroactively applies to cases pending as of April 1, 1997, it does not eliminate jurisdiction over First Amendment claims. The court emphasized that interpreting § 242(g) to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims would raise "serious constitutional questions."
The court examined which provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 were incorporated into § 242(g), particularly § 1252(f), which restricts a court's authority to enjoin certain Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provisions unless concerning an individual alien. The Ninth Circuit concluded that federal jurisdiction was applicable to the aliens' First Amendment claims. In contrast, the D.C. Circuit in Ramallo and the Eleventh Circuit in Auguste had suggested that habeas review could address constitutional issues but did not find it necessary to resolve those questions. The Ninth Circuit, however, found that habeas corpus review would not provide adequate redress for the plaintiffs' constitutional violations, as their First Amendment rights could not be sufficiently vindicated through post-deprivation remedies.
Amended 242(g) divests both the Court and the district court of jurisdiction to adjudicate claims made by or on behalf of aliens related to the Attorney General's actions concerning removal proceedings. This statute reflects Congress's plenary power over immigration, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, which emphasizes that the political branches of government hold comprehensive authority in this area. The Immigration Reform Act was enacted to expedite the removal of excludable and deportable aliens, particularly criminals, and compliance with this mandate is required.
While the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the availability of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241 raises constitutional considerations. Although a statute eliminating judicial review of constitutional challenges could present serious issues, it has been determined that such review has not been entirely abolished due to the continued availability of habeas corpus. The Constitution protects this privilege unless suspended under specific conditions. Additionally, 28 U.S.C. 2241 permits courts to grant habeas corpus for individuals in custody in violation of constitutional provisions. Historical case law supports that habeas corpus remains an avenue for challenging deportation orders, indicating that Congress cannot fully eliminate this review without providing an alternative.
The Antiterrorism Act and the Immigration Reform Act do not explicitly repeal or limit the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which allows district courts to entertain habeas corpus petitions. Consequently, these Acts do not preclude habeas review in deportation cases. The presumption is that Congress did not intend to eliminate federal habeas jurisdiction without clear legislative intent. Judicial review of constitutional challenges by aliens has been recognized, as seen in Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, where it was noted that some judicial relief must remain available. Previous rulings, like Garay v. Slattery, should not be interpreted as barring 2241 habeas relief, as they were based on provisions of the INA that have since been repealed. Permanent residents have constitutional rights and are entitled to fair hearings when facing deportation. If habeas corpus relief under 2241 were unavailable, lawful permanent residents could not address significant constitutional issues. While the Immigration Reform Act aims to redirect jurisdiction to appellate courts, it has effectively removed the ability to challenge deportation orders for certain criminal convictions, as established in Hincapie-Nieto.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), modified by the Immigration Reform Act, allows for judicial review of certain deportation orders, but this right is limited for aliens convicted of specified crimes, as indicated in 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C) and section 309(e)(4)(G) of the Act. This means that individuals with aggravated felony convictions, like the petitioners in this case, are likely barred from appellate review of their deportation orders. Courts have consistently held that both the Antiterrorism Act and the Immigration Reform Act restrict any court’s jurisdiction to review final deportation orders against such aliens.
Despite these limitations, federal district courts retain the authority to consider habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, allowing for the examination of significant constitutional issues. The government has acknowledged this availability for the petitioners to raise substantial constitutional questions. While Congress aimed to expedite the deportation process through the amendments, the independent jurisdiction of federal district courts for habeas petitions remains intact. The ruling clarifies that while 2241 habeas review is permissible, the specific case at hand does not engage the federal jurisdiction under that section since the plaintiffs sought federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331. Therefore, the court affirms the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims, indicating it should be under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) due to lack of jurisdiction, rather than under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
