Narrative Opinion Summary
The case involves an appeal by a Taiwanese citizen against the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision which upheld the denial of her suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The appellant, who gained permanent residency through marriage, faced deportation proceedings initiated by the INS in 1990 due to alleged visa fraud and unauthorized work. Her application for suspension was denied by the Immigration Judge based on lack of continuous physical presence, questionable moral character due to a welfare fraud conviction, and failure to prove extreme hardship. On appeal, while the BIA acknowledged her physical presence from 1987 to 1994, it evaluated her moral character from 1984 to 1991 and found her ineligible due to her conviction. The BIA's reliance on the incorrect seven-year period for continuous presence was challenged, yet the conviction barred her from demonstrating the requisite good moral character. Consequently, the BIA's affirmation of the deportation denial was upheld, with costs awarded to the INS. The decision underscores the statutory prerequisites of continuous presence and moral character for suspension eligibility, as clarified by case law references such as Sida v. INS and Miller v. INS.
Legal Issues Addressed
Calculation of the Seven-Year Period for Continuous Presencesubscribe to see similar legal issues
Application: The statute mandates that the seven-year period used to assess an individual's continuous physical presence should be calculated up to the date of the application for suspension.
Reasoning: The statute mandates that the seven-year period used to assess an individual's continuous physical presence in the United States also applies to establishing good moral character under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1254(a)(1).
Continuous Physical Presence Requirement under INA Section 244(a)(1)subscribe to see similar legal issues
Application: The BIA incorrectly calculated the seven-year continuous physical presence by including time during non-frivolous appeal, which should only apply if the petitioner has not yet filed for suspension.
Reasoning: The BIA incorrectly included time accrued during Flores's appeal in this calculation.
Good Moral Character Requirement under INA Section 244(a)(1)subscribe to see similar legal issues
Application: Flores's 1987 conviction for welfare fraud, classified as a crime of moral turpitude, precluded her from establishing good moral character during the relevant period for suspension of deportation.
Reasoning: Flores’s 1987 conviction for welfare fraud, classified as a crime of moral turpitude, rendered her ineligible to demonstrate good moral character during the relevant period for suspension of deportation.
Statutory Eligibility for Suspension of Deportationsubscribe to see similar legal issues
Application: The statutory eligibility requirements must be satisfied before discretionary relief can be considered, and Flores failed to meet these requirements due to her conviction.
Reasoning: Consequently, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) did not need to assess whether it abused its discretion in denying her application, as statutory eligibility is a prerequisite for discretionary relief.