Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; October 4, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
Alcan Aluminum Corporation appeals a jury verdict in favor of Timothy R. Sherbert, who was injured due to a forklift accident at Alcan’s facility. Alcan contests the district court's denial of its posttrial motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, arguing that Sherbert failed to provide expert testimony on the standard of care for forklift operation and that the court improperly refused to instruct the jury on assumption of risk. The incident occurred on December 5, 1988, when Sherbert, a truck driver for Roadrunner Express, requested help from Robert Edwards, an experienced Alcan forklift operator, to reposition pallets of aluminum. While attempting to lift three pallets, the top pallet slipped, injuring Sherbert's leg.
Edwards was operating a forklift capable of lifting 12,000 pounds, while the aluminum stack weighed no more than 6,000 pounds. The pallets were designed with wooden runners for support. Edwards followed standard lifting procedures, but when attempting to balance the load, he asked Sherbert to assist by placing a block under one of the runners. After an unsuccessful attempt, the top pallet fell, causing the injury. Edwards later acknowledged in a post-accident report that his decision to move three pallets at once while Sherbert was in an unsafe position contributed to the accident. The court ultimately affirmed the jury's decision in favor of Sherbert.
Sherbert filed a negligence lawsuit against Alcan, seeking damages for his injuries. The jury awarded Sherbert $45,000, attributing five percent negligence to him and ninety-five percent to Alcan. Alcan's motion for judgment as a matter of law was denied by the district court, which asserted that Sherbert presented enough evidence for a jury to consider the standard of care issue. Alcan contended that Sherbert did not provide expert testimony to demonstrate that Edwards, the forklift operator, breached the standard of care, arguing that this evidence was crucial due to the technical nature of forklift operation.
Under Missouri law, the court establishes the standard of care, while the jury assesses whether the defendant's actions fell short of this standard. Expert testimony is necessary only if the subject matter exceeds the knowledge of lay jurors. The court found that the operation of a forklift involves principles of balance that lay jurors can understand. The jury had sufficient evidence to support two theories of negligence: first, that Edwards was negligent for attempting to lift multiple pallets at once; second, that he was negligent for tilting a heavy, slick load while Sherbert stood in front of it. Both theories were based on the common knowledge of jurors, negating the need for expert testimony.
Alcan argued that expert input was needed to explain complex factors like incline and friction; however, the court reasoned that such calculations are not necessary for a typical forklift operator's judgment. The jury, informed by Sherbert and Edwards' testimonies, was capable of determining whether Edwards acted negligently based on the circumstances described.
Edwards, with eleven years of forklift experience, provided detailed testimony regarding an accident where he, while assisting truck driver Sherbert, inadvertently caused a top pallet to slip, resulting in Sherbert's leg injury. The district court ruled that expert testimony was unnecessary for the jury to assess negligence, thereby denying Alcan's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Alcan argued for a new trial, claiming the court wrongfully omitted jury instructions on assumption of risk. However, under Missouri law, the viability of assumption of risk as a defense in general negligence cases has been undermined since the adoption of the Uniform Comparative Act in 1983. Relevant cases suggest that this defense is restricted primarily to contexts involving athletic competitions or reckless conduct. To justify an assumption of risk instruction, evidence must demonstrate that the plaintiff knowingly accepted the risk; Sherbert's testimony indicated he had no prior knowledge of the pallets slipping. Thus, the district court's refusal to give such an instruction was deemed appropriate. Ultimately, the court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that expert testimony was not requisite for establishing negligence and that the assumption of risk instruction was not warranted.
The aluminum stack in question weighed no more than 6,000 pounds and was delivered on pallets featuring wooden runners for support. The lifting procedure involved the forklift operator deciding how many pallets to lift, initially placing a block under the first runner, and then maneuvering the forklift to position the forks under the second runner. During an attempt to lift three pallets, the operator, Edwards, faced balance issues that resulted in a top pallet slipping and injuring Sherbert, who was positioned unsafely. Following the incident, Edwards filed a post-accident report attributing fault to himself for moving multiple pallets while Sherbert was in a dangerous location. Sherbert subsequently sued Alcan for negligence, and the jury awarded him $45,000, finding Sherbert five percent negligent and Alcan ninety-five percent negligent. Alcan's motion for judgment as a matter of law was denied, with the company arguing Sherbert did not present expert testimony to demonstrate that Edwards breached the standard of care for forklift operation. The court emphasized that the standard of care under Missouri law requires the jury to determine if a defendant's conduct meets the established standard, which was central to the case's outcome.
Expert testimony is only necessary for jury determinations if the subject matter exceeds lay knowledge. In the case of Jake C. Byers, Inc. v. J.B.C. Investments, the operation of a forklift is deemed to involve basic principles of balance that jurors can understand. The jury could establish liability based on two negligence theories: (1) Edwards' negligence in lifting three aluminum pallets simultaneously, supported by Sherbert's testimony about Edwards' prior practices, and (2) Edwards' negligence in tilting a stacked load of slick aluminum while Sherbert was in front of it. Both theories do not require expert testimony, as jurors can reasonably infer that tilting a heavy, unstable load poses a risk.
Alcan's argument for requiring expert testimony on complex factors like incline and friction is rejected, as average forklift operators do not rely on such technical details to assess negligence. Edwards, with eleven years of forklift experience, provided sufficient testimony and visuals for the jury to evaluate his conduct. Consequently, the district court correctly denied Alcan's motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Regarding the assumption of risk, Alcan sought a new trial due to the district court's refusal to instruct the jury on this defense. The review of jury instructions is based on whether they adequately presented the case issues. Since Missouri adopted the Uniform Comparative Act in 1983, the viability of assumption of risk as a defense in general negligence cases has been questioned, with applicable cases mostly limited to athletic competitions or reckless conduct.
Assumption of risk serves as a defense against reckless conduct charges, as established in Ross v. Clouser. However, this defense is applied narrowly and is mainly recognized in cases involving athletic competition. Courts require evidence that a plaintiff knowingly consented to assume risks and understood the potential dangers before allowing an assumption of risk instruction. In this instance, Sherbert’s testimony indicated a lack of awareness regarding the risk of pallets slipping, leading the district court to appropriately decline an assumption of risk instruction. Consequently, the court affirmed its decision, stating that expert testimony was unnecessary to determine a breach of the standard of care in forklift operation.
