Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon; November 23, 2010; Oregon; State Appellate Court
Appellant seeks to overturn a judgment that committed her to the custody of the Mental Health Division, citing a finding that she posed a danger to herself due to a mental disorder. She argues that the state failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of this danger. The court conducted a de novo review of the facts, noting appellant's history of psychosis and paranoia, which included three psychiatric hospitalizations and four emergency room visits in the two months prior to the commitment hearing. The court found her 'dangerous to self' but expressed concerns about her ability to care for herself rather than an intention to harm. The court determined that although she was not dangerous to others, the legal standard required evidence of imminent physical harm.
On appeal, appellant contends that the state's evidence regarding her risk of harm was speculative, particularly regarding her ability to find shelter in freezing conditions. The state countered that appellant's mental disorder rendered her unable to seek necessary help, thus posing a risk of hypothermia. The appellate court emphasized that the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that appellant is at risk of suffering physical harm due to her mental condition. It reiterated that speculative assertions cannot justify commitment. The testimony from the state's sole witness, a psychiatrist, indicated that appellant could not procure safe housing, but the court found this insufficient as it lacked factual support necessary for commitment. Consequently, the appellate court agreed with appellant and reversed the commitment order.
Sanchez's testimony indicated that the appellant's refusal to stay at a crisis management center demonstrated an inability to make appropriate housing decisions and that he believed she could not afford housing, although he lacked evidence to support this claim. However, the record contradicts Sanchez's assessment, showing that the appellant had been residing in a hotel prior to hospitalization for about a month, did not want to stay at the crisis center believing it to be a homeless shelter, and was receiving financial support from government programs. There was insufficient evidence to conclude that she could not obtain housing if released, particularly as there was no indication she had recently lived on the street. Thus, Sanchez's speculative conclusion about the appellant's inability to secure shelter did not meet the state's clear and convincing evidence burden, undermining the argument concerning her risk of hypothermia. Furthermore, the court's speculation that the appellant would not seek treatment for hypothermia due to her mental disorder was also unfounded; she had sought help after being exposed to freezing temperatures and recognized the need for treatment despite her condition. The record did not substantiate the court's conjecture about her ability to care for herself in cold weather. The court rejected the state's argument for affirming the judgment based on the appellant's alleged inability to meet her basic needs. The decision was reversed, and although certain statutes were amended in 2009, the analysis remained unaffected. The appeal was reviewed de novo under the 2007 version of ORS 19.415, as the notice of appeal was filed before the amendments took effect. The record does not detail the severity of the hypothermia for which the appellant was treated.
