State ex rel. Juvenile Department v. D. J.

Citations: 215 Or. App. 146; 168 P.3d 798; 2007 Ore. App. LEXIS 1333Docket: 2004812661, 2004812662, 2004812663; 102485M; A134837

Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon; September 26, 2007; Oregon; State Appellate Court

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In a case regarding the termination of parental rights, the father failed to respond to a petition and did not appear at the hearing, leading the trial court to enter a default judgment that terminated his rights. After nearly a year, the father sought to set aside the judgment, but the trial court denied his motion, citing the lack of a reasonable time frame for filing. The father appealed, arguing the delay was justifiable. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision. 

The relevant background includes dependency proceedings initiated by the state in August 2004 concerning the father's three children, who were aged seven, five, and three at the time. The father was incarcerated for sexually abusing one of the children and was represented by counsel in those proceedings. In October 2005, a petition to terminate parental rights was filed, served to the father in prison, and accompanied by a summons directing him to appear at a January 2006 hearing. The summons warned that failure to appear could result in termination of rights without further notice. The father did not contact the juvenile court or attend the hearing, resulting in the court allowing the state to present its case and subsequently terminating his parental rights.

Following this ruling, the father obtained legal counsel but chose to appeal the default judgment rather than seek to have it set aside. His appeal was dismissed in December 2006 as he had not appeared at the hearing, which barred him from contesting the judgment under ORS 19.245(2). The court indicated that the father's absence effectively amounted to consent to the petition's outcome, leaving no issues for adjudication. In a footnote, the court suggested that the appropriate remedy would have been a motion to set aside the default judgment per ORS 419B.923. 

Almost a year after the judgment, the father moved to set it aside, claiming his absence was due to excusable neglect and attributing the delay in filing the motion to a strategic decision made by his counsel. During the hearing on this motion, the court questioned the counsel about this claim, who maintained that the delay was a tactical choice to appeal rather than to seek to set aside the judgment.

Father argued that his decision regarding the appeal of a default termination was reasonable, particularly due to a recent Court of Appeals ruling that changed the legal landscape. He claimed that the only option now available is to file a motion to set aside the termination, which he believed was not the case before the Jenkins decision. The court sided with the state, determining that father’s motion was filed beyond the time frame deemed "reasonable" under ORS 419B.923(3). The court emphasized the importance of timely case resolution, referencing the Adoption and Safe Families Act, which prioritizes children’s permanency and mandates that cases should not extend excessively beyond a year. Given that this case had been ongoing since 2004 and the appeal was significantly delayed, the court found the motion untimely.

On appeal, father challenged the trial court's conclusion regarding the timeliness of his motion, acknowledging the court's valid concern for the children's need for a swift resolution while arguing that this need must be balanced with his circumstances, including his absence at the termination hearing and reliance on court-appointed counsel. The state countered by noting that much of father’s supporting evidence was not admitted in the juvenile court and moved to strike this material, which was granted. The state further contended that the trial court's decision was discretionary and should only be overturned for abuse of discretion, asserting that the child's emotional and developmental needs are central to determining a reasonable timeframe. The state argued that the nearly year-long delay in filing the motion justified the trial court's conclusion and that father's claims regarding his lawyer's inadequacy were inconsistent with his earlier position that the attorney's actions were reasonable. ORS 419B.923 outlines the procedures and standards for motions to set aside parental rights termination judgments.

The court has the authority to modify or set aside any order or judgment it issues, based on reasons including excusable neglect, provided that such a motion is made within a reasonable timeframe. However, no order or judgment under ORS 419B.527 can be modified during an adoption proceeding or after an adoption petition is granted. A motion to modify may still be filed while an appeal is pending. The section does not restrict the court's inherent power to modify orders or judgments for fraud or within a reasonable time. 

In the case at hand, the key issue is whether the father's motion to set aside a judgment terminating parental rights was filed within a reasonable time. This requires analysis of three subsidiary questions: the definition of 'reasonable time,' the applicable standard of review, and whether the trial court erred in its conclusion regarding the timeliness of the father's motion. 

While ORS 419B.923 does not define 'reasonable time,' the Juvenile Code provides that it generally refers to a timeframe that considers a child’s emotional and developmental needs. However, the father argues that this definition is less relevant to the timing of motion filings and that the circumstances surrounding his delay should be considered instead. The context of other references in the Juvenile Code suggests that the focus on 'reasonable time' in this case may extend beyond just the child’s needs, indicating a broader interpretation of timeliness in the filing of motions.

The legislature's use of similar language in various statutes indicates an intention to encompass a wide array of factors influencing the reasonableness of filing delays, including specific reasons for such delays. Under ORCP 71, a party may file a motion to set aside a civil judgment if done "within a reasonable time," with the determination of reasonableness hinging on the specific facts and circumstances of each case, as established in case law. This principle applies similarly to motions under ORS 419B.923, particularly in juvenile cases where children's interests are paramount.

In evaluating whether a motion was filed within a reasonable time, factors such as the length of delay and reasons given for it are crucial. The standard of review for a trial court's determination regarding reasonable time is based on whether there was an abuse of discretion. A trial court's decision stands if it falls within a range of legally correct options and produces a permissible outcome.

In this case, the trial court found that the father did not file his motion within a reasonable time, emphasizing that the delay was nearly one year post-judgment and the case was over two years old. The court highlighted the children’s need for stability and questioned the father's justification for the delay, particularly noting his choice to appeal rather than move to set aside the judgment. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that the reasons provided for the delay were insufficient.

The trial court's decision regarding the delay in proceedings related to the children's adoption is upheld, as the court deemed it justified given the significant interest in achieving permanency for the children. The father contends that his reliance on his lawyer excuses the delay; however, he presents conflicting arguments—claiming both that his lawyer's ineptitude caused the delay and that any delay was due to reasonable tactical choices made by his lawyer. The court finds no legal support for the father's assertion that reliance on his lawyer automatically negates other factors in assessing the reasonableness of the delay. While his reliance is a relevant consideration, the extent of the delay and its potential impact on the children are also critical factors. Additionally, the father's claim of excusable neglect for not attending the January 2006 termination hearing pertains to the merits of his case rather than the timeliness of his motion to set aside. Consequently, the trial court's evaluation and discretion in this matter are affirmed, and the motion to strike portions of the record is granted.