Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon; September 28, 2005; Oregon; State Appellate Court
Plaintiff sustained injuries after slipping on ice in the Klamath County Jail parking lot, claiming the county was negligent for not removing snow and ice, failing to use traction materials, and not warning about the icy conditions. During the trial, the court granted the county's motion for a directed verdict based on discretionary immunity, resulting in a judgment for the county. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case, considering the facts favorably for the plaintiff. On the day of the incident in 1998, plaintiff fell while walking to the jail after parking. A sergeant, Gary Shepherd, had applied an ice-melting agent in specific areas but did not cover the entire parking lot due to a lack of policy or explicit direction on where to spread it. Shepherd indicated it was a judgment call and that he had observed a general practice of applying ice melt primarily to entrance and sidewalk areas, rather than broader parking spaces. Maintenance Supervisor Tom Banks confirmed there were no rules against applying ice melt where people walked, indicating discretion was left to deputies.
The excerpt addresses the policy and practices regarding the application of ice melt in a county facility. Banks indicated a general practice of not treating entire parking lots with ice melt, focusing instead on areas where pedestrians walk, such as sidewalks and pathways leading to the building. The county has a formal policy against applying ice melt to parking lots, primarily for budgetary reasons, impacting maintenance personnel rather than deputy sheriffs. During cross-examination, Banks clarified that he did not direct the deputies on ice melt application. The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the county, citing discretionary immunity for the actions of its employees. The court noted that while ice melt was applied in specific areas, there was no policy covering widespread application across the parking lot itself. The court's ruling relied on the principle that discretionary immunity applies to governmental decisions made based on competing policy considerations, as defined by ORS 30.265(3)(c). The burden of proof for claiming this immunity rests with the county, which must demonstrate that the decision not to apply ice melt where the plaintiff slipped constituted a discretionary function.
The county contends it is immune from liability because it had a policy against spreading ice melt in parking lot areas, arguing that this policy absolves them of responsibility for the plaintiff's slip. However, the evidence presented does not conclusively demonstrate that the ice melt application at the county jail adhered to this policy. Witness Shepherd indicated there was no specific guidance on where to apply ice melt, describing his decision as a "judgment call." Additionally, testimony from Banks clarified that the policy did not restrict deputies from applying ice melt in high-traffic areas, and while they generally avoid treating entire parking lots, they do use ice melt on designated walkways. This suggests that decisions regarding ice melt application were more situational rather than strictly policy-driven. Consequently, there is a factual dispute regarding whether the county employees acted under a policy or their discretion, which precludes granting a directed verdict in favor of the county. The courts have established that immunity does not apply when the choice to follow a policy is in question, especially concerning individual safety. The county's reliance on prior cases regarding sidewalk maintenance is unfounded, as those cases involved clear adherence to established maintenance policies, unlike the situation here.
Inspectors would not have discretionary immunity if they were unaware of budgetary decisions impacting their inspections. In this case, evidence suggests that deputies were not aware of or adhering to any policy regarding the application of ice melt. Discretionary immunity protects policy decisions made by government actors and employees executing those policies, not actions taken by chance. The trial court incorrectly granted a directed verdict in favor of the county due to unresolved factual issues about whether the county's ice melt policy influenced employee conduct. Additionally, there were bags of ice melt, unknown to Shepherd, in a maintenance building that were not found until after the plaintiff's fall. The deputies' decisions on ice melt application, despite involving choices, are considered a ministerial function and do not warrant immunity. Routine decisions made by maintenance staff regarding erosion issues similarly do not qualify for discretionary immunity. The ruling has been reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
