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State v. Young
Citations: 183 Or. App. 400; 52 P.3d 1102; 2002 Ore. App. LEXIS 1380Docket: 9803-32414; A111910
Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon; August 28, 2002; Oregon; State Appellate Court
Defendant was convicted of first-degree theft, second-degree burglary, and first-degree criminal mischief. The trial court merged the theft and burglary convictions, sentencing the defendant to 13 months of incarceration for each conviction, to be served consecutively, resulting in a total of 26 months. On appeal, the defendant challenges the legality of the consecutive sentences, arguing they exceed the limits set by sentencing guidelines. Specifically, the defendant claims the consecutive sentences violate the "shift-to-Column-I" provision and the 200-percent limitation outlined in the Oregon Administrative Rules (OAR) 213-012-0020. The court's sentencing authority under ORS 137.717 (1997) mandates a minimum of 13 months for certain property crimes if the defendant has four prior convictions. Although the defendant acknowledges that the imposed 13-month sentences are legally appropriate, he contends that the sentencing guidelines restrict the total incarceration to 24 months due to the 200-percent rule, which limits the presumptive term for a 3-E offender. The trial court's imposition of a 26-month sentence is, therefore, challenged as exceeding these limits. Defendant argues that the presumptive total incarceration term for his convictions should be 14 months under the shift-to-Column-I rule of OAR 213-012-0020(2)(a), which combines the prison term for the primary offense with the maximum jail sentence for the additional offense. Specifically, criminal mischief in the first degree is classified as a level two offense with a maximum 30-day jail sentence in Column I, leading to the conclusion of a 14-month presumptive term. However, the court disagrees with the application of the guideline rules for consecutive sentences, based on the analysis of ORS 137.717. This statute mandates a minimum of 13 months of incarceration for defendants with multiple convictions for designated property crimes, which applies to the defendant in this case. Subsection (3) of ORS 137.717 allows for deviation from this minimum only under specific conditions, none of which are met here. The court references the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Langdon, which held that mandatory minimum sentences from Measure 11 are not subject to the limitations of the sentencing guidelines, indicating a conflict between these legal frameworks. Although the defendant distinguishes his case from Langdon by asserting different rules are at play, the court maintains that the statutory requirements of ORS 137.717 take precedence. The holding in Langdon is relevant to the current case due to the requirements of ORS 137.717 (1997), which mandates that trial courts impose specified minimum sentences. The calculation of the defendant’s sentence using the guideline rules is inconsistent with this statute, as it conflicts with the obligation to impose the minimum term specified. The 200-percent rule and the shift-to-Column-I rule require beginning sentence calculations with the defendant's presumptive sentence under the guidelines, which contradicts ORS 137.717 (1997). In State v. Bagley, it was clarified that ORS 137.717 (1997) does not amend the sentencing guidelines to create new presumptive sentences, and deviations from the minimum sentences are only permissible under specific circumstances outlined in ORS 137.717(3)(b) (1997), which are not present in this case. Moreover, there is nothing in ORS 137.717 (1997) requiring the court to adhere to the limits on consecutive sentences in the guidelines. Any conflict between the guidelines and ORS 137.717 (1997) must resolve in favor of the statute. This is further supported by ORS 137.637, which states that when a determinate sentence is mandated by statute, the longer of the statutory or guideline sentence shall be imposed. Ultimately, the trial court's imposition of consecutive 13-month sentences is upheld, and the applicability of the current version of ORS 137.717 is deemed unnecessary for this case. The relevant rules regarding presumptive sentences and consecutive sentencing are outlined in OAR 213-012-0020(2) and OAR 213-008-0007(3), establishing limits on consecutive sentence terms.