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United States v. Dudley
Citations: 104 F.3d 442; 322 U.S. App. D.C. 399; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 502; 1997 WL 9834Docket: Nos. 95-3134 and 95-3135
Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; January 13, 1997; Federal Appellate Court
Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge, addresses the appeals of Vielka Dudley and Antonio Scott regarding their sentences for their roles in a cocaine distribution conspiracy led by Marcos Anderson. Dudley and her boyfriend, Gabriel Davis, supplied cocaine to Anderson, while Scott, Anderson's son, managed a distribution center in Landover, Maryland. Both appellants contend that the evidence was insufficient and that the district court's factual findings on the amounts of cocaine attributed to them were inadequate. The court disagrees, citing strong evidence supporting their responsibilities for the contested amounts and affirming their sentences. Dudley and Davis operated out of their home in Mitchellville, Maryland, and maintained an apartment in Washington, D.C., where Dudley signed the lease and handled rent payments. Evidence includes Dudley making drug-related calls, possessing personal documents, and being seen in the apartment. A significant incident occurred on November 12, 1988, when Timothy Booze contacted Anderson for cocaine, leading to Dudley being observed at Anderson's headquarters, allegedly carrying cash from a cocaine transaction. The court attributed one kilogram of cocaine from this incident to Dudley, which she disputes. Further transactions on April 18, 27, and 29, 1989, involved Dudley and Davis selling varying amounts of cocaine to Anderson, which Dudley accepts responsibility for, totaling 1.75 kilograms. A search of their properties on May 16, 1989, uncovered 2.4 kilograms of cocaine at the apartment, with the court attributing an additional 3.4 kilograms to Dudley based on an empty wrapper found, which she contests. Dudley was arrested and convicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, specifically five kilograms or more, and for using communications facilities to further this conspiracy. The jury could not reach a verdict on two counts of possession linked to a May 16 search. Initially, Dudley was sentenced to 260 months in prison based on a calculated offense level of 34, holding her accountable for the entire 28.9 kilograms of cocaine involved in the conspiracy. Following an appeal, the court vacated and remanded her sentence for individualized findings regarding drug quantity. Upon resentencing on July 24, 1995, the district court determined Dudley was responsible for at least 6.15 kilograms of cocaine, resulting in a new sentence of 200 months based on a lowered offense level of 32. Scott, Dudley’s co-defendant and Anderson's son, became involved in the cocaine business in 1988 and managed Anderson's distribution center in Maryland. He was also charged with similar offenses and initially sentenced to 240 months based on the same total drug quantity. However, upon remand, he was resentenced to reflect his responsibility for at least 11.25 kilograms, which included amounts from a robbery plot and direct purchases. Dudley argued that there was insufficient evidence regarding her responsibility for a specific one-kilogram transaction on November 12, 1988, and for 3.4 kilograms linked to an apartment. The court reviewed this claim for clear error, finding sufficient evidence, including phone calls and her prior involvement in cocaine sales, to support her engagement in the November 12 transaction. Dudley signed the lease for the apartment, paid rent, made calls related to drug deals, kept bills there, purchased an entertainment system, and was seen at the location, indicating her control over the apartment was comparable to Davis’s. Her involvement in three cocaine sales with Davis shows she was actively participating in the drug conspiracy operating from the apartment. Dudley's argument, comparing her case to others where defendants had greater control over drugs, fails as she must demonstrate that other defendants were not held responsible under similar circumstances. In contrast, evidence suggests Dudley and Davis operated a joint drug distribution business from the apartment, with the 6.15 kilograms of cocaine being part of her conspiratorial agreement. Dudley also contends that the district court did not adequately assess the November 12 transaction and her involvement with the apartment. The court must make individualized findings regarding the drug quantity foreseeable to each conspirator. Previous remanding required the court to provide specific findings for each defendant’s participation. During resentencing, the court acknowledged Dudley and Davis’s collaboration and her direct involvement in drug sales, which supported the court’s decision to hold Dudley accountable for the drugs associated with the apartment. The findings, while not exhaustive, sufficiently justified the ruling against Dudley. The district court is required to provide detailed factual findings regarding the evidentiary links between Dudley and her co-defendants and the amounts of drugs for which they are found responsible. Simply stating a conclusion of responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt is insufficient; the court must clearly articulate the factual basis for its sentencing decisions to facilitate appellate review. The government is encouraged to propose findings that support the sentence, with notice to the defendant, who may also submit proposals. It is the court's duty to ensure that its findings are clear and thorough, potentially in a sentencing memorandum, as recommended by the Seventh Circuit, to prevent misinterpretation during appeals. In the case of B. Scott, evidence indicates that he was aware of and participated in the California robbery plan and was involved in Anderson’s cocaine purchases. Although some evidence links him only to the Landover distribution center, additional evidence suggests his role as Anderson's lieutenant in the conspiracy, supporting the attribution of responsibility for the cocaine connected to both the robbery and the broader conspiracy activities. Scott contends that the district court failed to provide specific findings on the scope of his conspiratorial agreement and his ability to foresee the drug quantities involved. The court determined that Scott was aware of preparations for a robbery in California, including the movement of people and weapons. It was noted that Scott was actively involved in cocaine sales in Washington, had visited the central location of the conspiracy, and had comprehensive knowledge of the conspiracy's operations, arguably more than other members. The court's factual findings are deemed sufficient, with emphasis on the need for thoroughness in drug distribution conspiracies. The sentences for co-defendants Vielka Dudley and Antonio Scott were affirmed, with their appeals consolidated despite being briefed and argued separately. Dudley argues against her responsibility for a specific quantity of cocaine but only challenges the amount, not her involvement. A significant finding was that 40 grams of cocaine base and 2.4 grams from two locations were not included in Dudley’s offense level. At oral argument, Dudley’s counsel raised a new issue regarding an empty wrapper, which was not considered due to its late introduction. The court referenced similar case precedents demonstrating Dudley’s substantial control over the apartment where drugs were found, which suffices to attribute the drugs to her. Additionally, the district court noted that Scott could potentially be held accountable for all drugs purchased by Anderson, given that drugs sold through Scott's operation likely originated from Anderson. However, without evidence establishing that Scott's conspiratorial agreement included all of Anderson’s purchases, attributing the entire quantity to Scott would not be justified.