Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Moreno Valley
Docket: Nos. 95-55529, 95-55531
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; December 19, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
Appellants Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and Outdoor Media Group, Inc. (OMG) are billboard operators contesting the constitutionality of Moreno Valley Ordinance No. 133, which governs structures and signs in the City of Moreno Valley. The district court ruled in favor of the City and its officials, granting summary judgment and denying the appellants' motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and has reversed the lower court's decision.
The ordinance, adopted in June 1987, regulates both off-site and on-site signs. Off-site signs, which can display commercial or noncommercial messages, are restricted to specific zones (medium manufacturing, heavy manufacturing, and service commercial) and require a conditional use permit, ensuring they do not negatively impact public health or community aesthetics. Conversely, on-site signs can only advertise goods or services available on the premises and can be erected in any zone without a permit if they meet certain restrictions.
Additionally, the ordinance exempts four categories of off-site signs from locational restrictions, including official notices, public duty notices, directional or warning signs, and signs near city or county boundaries. Prior to the city's incorporation, Desert had constructed an off-site sign in violation of county zoning laws, and OMG built a sign within the city limits but outside the designated zones, both without the required permits. The City has initiated separate state court actions against both parties to enforce the removal of these signs.
Desert and OMG initiated a legal action against the City in the U.S. District Court, seeking damages, declaratory relief, and an injunction. The district court stayed this case pending the outcome of state court litigation but retained jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims. The state court ruled in favor of the City on state law claims and issued a permanent injunction for Desert and OMG to remove their signs. OMG's appeal of the state court's decision was unsuccessful, while Desert did not appeal. Following the conclusion of the state court proceedings, the City notified the district court, leading to cross-motions for summary judgment on the federal claims from Desert, OMG, and the City. Individual public officials moved for judgment on the pleadings based on qualified immunity, with the district court ultimately ruling in favor of the City and the officials, prompting an appeal from Desert and OMG.
In assessing standing, the City argued that Desert and OMG lacked the right to challenge the sign ordinance and permit process. The court reviewed standing de novo, requiring three elements: 1) injury in fact, 2) traceability of the injury to the City's conduct, and 3) likelihood of redress from a favorable outcome. Desert and OMG demonstrated all three: they faced enforcement actions from the City, their injuries were linked to the City's ordinance, and a declaration of unconstitutionality would allow them to keep their signs. They also had standing to contest the permit requirement despite not applying, as doing so would be futile due to ongoing enforcement actions and the ordinance's restrictions on off-site signs.
Desert and OMG argued that the permit requirement violated the First Amendment by granting City officials "unbridled discretion." The court reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo, noting that while permits are subject to objective criteria, City officials retain discretion to deny permits based on ambiguous reasons.
The Moreno Valley Ordinance No. 138 requires a permit for structures or signs, contingent upon findings that they will not harm public health, welfare, or the community's aesthetic quality. However, this ordinance has been deemed unconstitutional, as it grants city officials unrestrained discretion in permit approvals without clear, objective standards, which violates First Amendment rights, as established in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham and further supported by Gaudiya Vaishnava Society v. City and County of San Francisco. Additionally, the ordinance lacks evidence requirements for denying permits, reinforcing its unconstitutionality.
Regarding commercial speech, any ordinance that restricts such speech must meet three criteria: it should implement a substantial governmental interest, directly advance that interest, and not exceed what is necessary to achieve its goal, per the Central Hudson test. The City, as the regulating party, bears the burden of proof to demonstrate compliance with these criteria. The appellants argue that the City has not adequately established a substantial governmental interest to justify the ordinance, which does not explicitly address aesthetics or safety as purposes. The lack of a purpose statement in the ordinance parallels findings in National Advertising Co. v. Town of Babylon, which invalidated an ordinance for similar reasons.
The City failed to provide evidence supporting the ordinance's promotion of safety and aesthetics, leading to an erroneous summary judgment favoring the City. The ordinance is deemed invalid under the Supreme Court’s Metromedia precedent, which prohibits imposing greater restrictions on noncommercial speech compared to commercial speech or regulating based on content. Specifically, Moreno Valley Ordinance No. 133 imposes stricter limitations on noncommercial structures and signs, allowing on-site commercial signs without a permit across any zone, while off-site noncommercial messages are confined to three specific zones and require permits. For instance, a business owner outside these zones can display a commercial sign but cannot post a noncommercial political message. This disparity violates constitutional protections for noncommercial speech. Additionally, the ordinance regulates noncommercial speech based on content, as it creates exemptions for certain types of noncommercial signs, which necessitates content examination, similar to the invalidated ordinance in National Advertising. Thus, the ordinance's restrictions on noncommercial speech are unconstitutional on both counts of greater restrictions and content-based regulation.
The City’s regulation of noncommercial speech is deemed content-based due to the requirement for officials to assess the content of noncommercial signs to determine exemption applicability. This approach is unconstitutional as it limits public discourse subject selection, following precedents set in National Advertising Co. v. Town of Babylon. The City’s ordinance must serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to be constitutional, which it failed to establish. Consequently, it imposes unconstitutional content-based restrictions on noncommercial speech.
Additionally, the ordinance's severability clause intends for each provision to be enforceable independently. However, the invalidation of key provisions—such as a standardless permit requirement, lack of substantial governmental interest in regulating commercial speech, and greater restrictions on noncommercial speech—renders the entire ordinance invalid, as the remaining sections cannot function independently.
Lastly, the document addresses qualified immunity for government officials, stating that they are protected from civil liability unless their actions violate clearly established rights that a reasonable person would recognize. The standard for granting judgment on the pleadings requires that all allegations be accepted as true, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, it is granted.
City officials are not entitled to qualified immunity due to their violation of established constitutional rights regarding speech regulation. For over fifty years, it has been clear that licensing schemes allowing unfettered discretion for prior restraints on speech are impermissible, as highlighted by *Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham*. Additionally, Supreme Court rulings in *Metromedia* and prior decisions indicate that a City cannot impose stricter regulations on commercial speech than on noncommercial speech or regulate noncommercial speech based on content. The attempt to enforce the ordinance constituted a violation of rights a reasonable person would recognize, leading to the reversal of the district court’s judgment on the pleadings.
The ordinance contains a typographical error regarding section references, which will be corrected in future discussions. Regarding billboards, the City could have more easily met the first prong of the Central Hudson test had it articulated a clear purpose for the ordinance aimed at addressing safety hazards and aesthetic concerns. The court acknowledges billboards as significant hazards to traffic safety and as potential aesthetic detriments. As the ordinance is deemed unconstitutional under the First Amendment, there is no need to consider the Equal Protection or takings claims raised by the appellants.
